European Action Plan for the Prevention of Runway Incursions

EUROCONTROL

EAPPRI V3.0 – Released Issue

European Action Plan for the

Prevention of Runway Incursions

EUROCONTROL

Edition Number: 1.0

Edition Validity Date: 20/11/2017

Statement of commitment .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 04

Introduction and background

......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 07

What's changed

Important and urgent action

European Action Plan for the Prevention of Runway Incursions

Recommendations ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 13

1.1 General principles

1.2 Aerodrome operator issues

1.3 Communications

1.4 Aircraft operator issues

1.5 Air navigation service provider issues

1.6 Data collection and lesson sharing

1.7 Regulatory issues

1.8 Aeronautical information management

1.9 Technology

1.10 Civil military

2.0 Future work

Appendices

A Communications guidance

B Guidelines for aerodrome local runway safety teams

............................................................................................................................................................................................ 48

C Airside vehicle driver training

D Aircraft operator / Flight crew best practices

E Air navigation service providers / Air traffic controller best practices

............................................................................................................................................. 80

F Oversight activities for regulators

G Safety management systems

H Aeronautical information management guidance

.................................................................................................................................................................................................100

I Guidance for joint use aerodromes  Civil-Military

.................................................................................................................................................................................................108

J Use of aeronautical ground lighting that protects the runway

.............................................................................................................................................................114

K Aerodromes design guidance for the prevention of runway incursion

......................................................................................................................................120

L Maintenance, inspections, works in progress/temporary modifications of the aerodrome

..........................................................................126

M Technology

N Interpreting events – Runway incursion?

O Bibliography

CONTENTS

The rate and numbers of runway incursion reports remain steady.

From the reports and data that are received, it is shown that

there continue to be a minimum of two runway incursions every

day in the European region. Accidents continue to take place

on runways. Findings from those incident and accident reports

have been used to determine the new recommendations and

associated guidance materials contained in this update to the

European Action Plan for the Prevention of Runway Incursions

(EAPPRI).

The increasing availability of runway incursion incident reports

is a positive indication of the commitment of organisations

and operational staff to prevent runway incursions and runway

accidents by learning from the past accidents and incidents and

sharing this information across Europe.

The establishment of aerodrome local Runway Safety Teams

(RST), which should comprise, as a minimum, representatives

from Aircraft Operators, Air Navigation Service Providers and

the Aerodrome Operator, is helping to facilitate effective local

implementation of the recommendations. At the same time,

aerodrome local Runway Safety Teams address runway safety

specific issues relating to their own aerodrome.

Core to the new (and existing) recommendations contained

in this document is the uniform and consistent application of

ICAO and, increasingly, EU provisions. It is for the Regulator/

National Aviation Authority to decide upon the strategy for

implementation at applicable aerodromes within its own State.

The recommendations are mainly generic and it will be for the

responsible organisations to decide specific details, after taking

local conditions into account e.g. aerodromes where joint civilian

and military operations take place.

The new recommendations are the result of the combined

and sustained efforts of organisations representing all areas of

aerodrome operations. The organisations that contributed to

this action plan are totally committed to enhancing the safety

of runway operations by advocating the implementation of the

recommendations that it contains. These organisations include,

but are not limited to, Aerodrome Operators, Air Navigation

Service Providers, Aircraft Operators, and Regulators/National

Aviation Authorities.

STATEMENT OF COMMITMENT

The following organisations and persons have actively contributed to the review of EAPPRI Edition 2.0 and the production

of this EAPPRI Version 3.0.

ORGANISATIONS AND LIST OF ACTIVE

PARTICIPANTS INVOLVED IN THE PRODUCTION

OF EAPPRI VERSION 3.0

ORGANISATION CONTRIBUTOR

EUROCONTROL  NETWORK MANAGER • Richard “Sid” Lawrence: EAPPRI v3.0 Development Lead

• Tzvetomir Blajev

• Asa Standar

• Goran Redzepovic

• Francisco Hoyas

AIRPORTS COUNCIL INTERNATIONAL ACI EUROPE • Ian Witter (London Heathrow Airport)

• Dirk Geukens (Brussels Airport)

EUROPEAN COCKPIT ASSOCIATION ECA • Loic Michel

• Captain Johan Glantz

• Captain Peter Drichel (Vereinigung Cockpit (VC))

• Captain Peter Rix (Vereinigung Cockpit (VC))

• Captain Moritz Burger (Vereinigung Cockpit (VC))

EUROPEAN REGIONAL AIRLINES ASSOCIATION ERAA • Captain Pascal Kremer (Luxair)

INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANISATION ICAO • Brian de Couto

INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION IATA • Anthony van der Veldt

• Stefano Prola

RYANAIR • Captain Andrew Elbert

• Captain Juan de la Roca

EASYJET • Captain Peter Malady

BELGOCONTROL • Xavier Belles

• Marc Evens

• Luigi Locoge

• Patrick Persoons

ENAIRe • Alfonso Barba

• Alberto Rodriguez de la Flor

ENAV S.P.A. • Maria Grazia Bechere

• Felice De Lucia

• Stefano Romano

DEUTSCHE FLUGSICHERUNG DFS • Martin Peters

• Martin Rulﬀs

DIRECTION DES SERVICES DE LA NAVIGATION AÉRIENNE

DSNA

• Pierre-Francois Dinelli

• Sebastien Raphoz

• Yan Le Fablec

FerroNATS • Raquel Martinez Arnaiz

FINAVIA • Paavo Puranen

KONTROLA ZRANCNEGA PROMETA SLOVENIJE

SLOVENIA CONTROL

• Robert Segula

LFV AIR NAVIGATION SERVICES OF SWEDEN • Erik Wildenstam

• Maria Lundahl

It is further acknowledged that the following organisations were involved in the production of EAPPRI Edition 2.0 which

forms the basis for this EAPPRIv3.0. .

NATIONAL AIR TRAFFIC SERVICES NATS UK • Karen Bolton

• Matt Ross

STOBART ATC SOUTHEND AIRPORT • Damon Knight (previously NATS)

GATWICK ATC AIR NAVIGATION SOLUTIONS • Graham Wadeson

ANA AEROPORTOS DE PORTUGAL • Pedro Reis

AVINOR AERODROMES • Mette Krokstrand

BRUSSELS AIRPORT COMPANY • Dirk Geukens

• Davy van Hyfte

COPENHAGEN AIRPORT • Robert Strauss

GENEVA AIRPORT • Patricia Fellay

GROUPE ADP CDG • Noemie Vellou

• Arnaud Guihard

• Jeremy Baton

AGENCIA ESTATAL DE SEGURIDAD AÉREA AESA • Jorge Reyes Fiz

UK CAA • Andrew Badham

DIRECTION DE LA SÉCURITÉ DE L'AVIATION CIVILE DSAC • Geoﬀroy Chevalier

• Fabrice Alger

UK FLIGHT SAFETY COMMITTEE • Dai Whittingham (Chairperson)

WSP USA • Gael Le Bris (formerly Groupe APD)

INDEPENDENT • Mike Edwards (Homeﬁeld ATM Safety contracted

to EUROCONTROL)

ORGANISATION

EUROPEAN AVIATION SAFETY AGENCY EASA

BRITISH AIRPORTS AUTHORITY NOW HEATHROW AIRPORT HOLDINGS LIMITED BAA

EUROPEAN COMMERCIAL AVIATION SAFETY TEAM NOW SUSPENDED ECAST

INSPECTIE VERKEER EN WATERSTAAT, MINISTERIE VANINFRASTRUCTURE EN MILIEU THE NETHER

LANDS

INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL ASSOCIATIONS IFATCA

INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF AIRCRAFT OWNERS AND PILOT ASSOCIATIONS IAOPA

INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF AIRLINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION IFALPA

This version of European Action Plan for the Prevention of

Runway Incursions (EAPPRI) recognises the emergence of

EU provisions intended to improve runway safety in Europe.

However, like its predecessors, this third version of EAPPRI

continues to recognise the International Civil Aviation

Organisation (ICAO) Standards and Recommended

Practices (SARPS); it is therefore suitable for universal

application. The ICAO runway incursion definition (also

adopted by the EU) is “any occurrence at an aerodrome

involving the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle or

person on the protected area of a surface designated for

the landing and take-off of aircraft.”

Since the first release of the EAPPRI, aerodrome local

Runway Safety Teams have been established at hundreds

of airports across Europe. The implementation of the

recommendations contained in the first and second

versions of the Action Plan has been extensive, thanks

to these teams and the organisations that support them.

In 2008, the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)

embedded this concept as an essential requirement

to the European Union “EASA Basic Regulation”, a

key element in helping to raise the safety of runway

operations at European airports. More recently, the

Commission Regulation No 139/2014 (or “Aerodrome

Regulation” as it is sometimes known), and its associated

Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) and Guidance

Material (GM), further elaborate the importance of these

runway safety arrangements. Other EU legal instruments

covering standardised European rules of the air (SERA);

air operations; the reporting, analysis and follow-up of

occurrences in civil aviation; common requirements for

the provision of air navigation services; and technical

requirements and administrative procedures relating to

air traffic controllers' licences and certificates also impact

runway safety to one degree or another.

Many operational staff have experienced a runway

incursion and have contributed to the future prevention

of runway incursions through incident reports. These

reports have taught us that the majority of contributory

and causal factors are concerned with communication

breakdown, ground navigation errors and inadequate

information in the cockpit.

The runway incursion problem remains a significant safety

issue. One of the important challenges is that pilots and

drivers on a runway without a valid ATC clearance believe

they have permission to be there

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

The aspiration to present aerodrome NOTAM information

in a digitised, interoperable exchange format (i.e. graphical

display) should be continued.

Emerging technologies such as those associated with

Remote Tower Operations (RTO) present opportunities

and threats as far as maintaining the safety on and

around runways is concerned. Similarly, authorised

remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAS) or ‘drones’ need

to be accommodated on and around aerodromes whilst

ensuring the continuation of safe operations.

Other technologies on the ground (in ATC and/or on

the aerodrome) as well as those on board aircraft are

becoming increasingly available. Given that EAPPRI’s

status is wholly advisory, it is not appropriate to make

direct recommendations to implement these various

technologies. However it is right to acknowledge their

presence and provide brief information and guidance so

that operational practitioners can make further enquiries

to decide for themselves the merits, or otherwise, of

certain technological advances as applicable in their local

operation.

Examples of aerodrome local Runway Safety Team

achievements are contained in the guidance materials

shown in the appendices to this document and some are

also highlighted below.

ICAO

ICAO has introduced Annex 19, Safety Management

to bolster the industry wide implementation of Safety

Management Systems (SMS). In addition, it has published

Doc. 9981, PANS Aerodromes (PANS ADR) to provide more

information about aerodrome operations including the

prevention of runway incursions; a new edition is planned

to be published in 2019 and to become applicable in

2020. The ICAO Aerodrome Design and Operations Panel

also continues to develop SARPs for runway safety in

Annex 14 – Aerodromes, Volume 1 - Aerodrome Design

and Operations, as well as PANS Aerodromes. ICAO is

also developing a new high-level runway safety strategy

document to support the future ICAO Global Aviation

Safety Plan (GASP).

At a more grassroots level, ICAO published the second

edition of the Runway Safety Team (RST) Handbook

in 2015; this document provides practical guidance

about how to set up and manage aerodrome local

RSTs. ICAO also established the concept of RST

Go-Teams to assist States and airports in establishing RSTs.

The implementation of Safety Management Systems

(SMS) and the establishment of aerodrome local Runway

Safety Teams (RST) have undoubtedly enabled aircraft

operators, air navigation service providers and aerodrome

operators to improve operational runway safety. In

the spirit of continuous improvement, however, new

recommendations in this document challenge industry

partners and regulators to re-assess the effectiveness

of these working arrangements and practices to ensure

that they continue to be optimised to deliver safe runway

operations, including the prevention of runway incursions.

Practical use of the ICAO runway incursion definition is

intended to allow runway incursion data to be compared,

common causes and contributory factors to be identified

and lessons to be shared. However, experience has shown

that these ideals are threatened because the interpretation

of the definition still varies across the industry. Further

work may be necessary, but as an intermediate step a

new appendix provides additional guidance aimed at

improving the overall consistency of runway incursion

data and a better understanding of runway collision risk.

Aerodrome vehicle driving operations are an ongoing

hazard for safe runway operations. A number of new

recommendations and associated guidance would

further strengthen the existing comprehensive barriers, if

implemented. The use of synthetic trainers (simulators) to

train airside drivers is bringing economic and operational

benefits to some airports. Control and management of

aerodrome works in progress/contractors are given more

prominence in this document; additional aerodrome

design considerations are also promoted.

Operational safety studies continue to show that the

H24 use of stop bars can be a powerful runway incursion

prevention barrier. Previous editions of EAPPRI included

H24 stop bar use in Guidance Material but in this version

the practice is elevated to Recommendation status for

aerodrome operators and air navigation service providers

to consider.

Regulators and national aviation authorities have an

important role to play in setting the national tone as far as

runway safety and runway safety promotion is concerned.

New Recommendations ask national authorities to

strengthen this activity and their oversight of operators’

SMS.

This document recognises the proliferation of aeronautical

information (e.g. NOTAMs) that pilots, in particular, are

expected to assimilate. New Recommendations call for

improvements of Aeronautical Information Management

(AIM) and the simplification of the way it is presented.

WHAT’S CHANGED

EU and EASA

New EU Regulations have been introduced in recent

years. These regulations, covering aerodrome operations,

occurrence reporting and design, are aimed at establishing

safe operations of aerodromes and ensuring that every

effort is made to reduce the number of accidents and

incidents (including those affecting runway operations).

Moreover, EASA is placing more focus on Safety Promotion

activities and incorporates runway safety actions in the

European Plan for Aviation Safety (EPAS).

SESAR

The Single European Sky ATM Research (SESAR) project has

developed, and is developing, a number of technological

solutions to improve airport operations; many of these

have direct or indirect safety benefits. A SESAR deployment

plan is in place to manage the implementation of these

new and emerging technologies; some of those that can

potentially help prevent runway incursions are described,

in brief, in Appendix M.

EUROCONTROL – Network Manager

Since 2011, the EUROCONTROL Network Manager has

introduced the concept of ‘Top 5’ Safety priorities. Some of

these priorities are related to runway incursion prevention.

Associated ‘Top 5’ Operational Safety Studies covering

‘landing without ATC clearance’, ‘detection of occupied

runway’ and ‘sudden high energy runway conflicts’ have

been commissioned. The resulting reports serve as a cross

domain reference and source of information and advice

in case stakeholders undertake operational safety and

improvement to address each priority area.

Airport Council International (ACI)

ACI has introduced its Airport Excellence (APEX) in Safety

Programme which is designed to help airports identify

and mitigate aviation safety vulnerabilities through peer

review missions, education, mentoring and best practice

guidance. This activity is complementary to the ICAO RST

Go-Teams concept/model (and vice versa).

IFALPA/ECA/ACI

IFALPA, in conjunction with ACI, is developing a method

for naming taxiways, runways and their intersections and

holding positions, to remove ambiguity. This method is

being considered by ICAO and new guidance to industry

is expected to be published in the future.

Civil Air Navigation Services Organisation (CANSO)

To support the management of runway safety risk, CANSO

has introduced a Runway Safety Maturity Checklist which

is designed to help organisations identify and prioritise

areas for runway safety improvement from different

perspectives.

• Implement the change.

• Monitor the effectiveness of the change.

Changes to aerodrome operations may involve the

introduction of new aerodrome infrastructure including

visual aids, additional technologies or new ways to use the

existing platform. Prior to making local changes that differ

from EU/ICAO provisions, consideration should be given

to the potential global effect on air traffic management. A

considered approach to local change would be to create

an operational evaluation period prior to permanent

introduction of the desired operation. If you are satisfied

with the outcome of the operational evaluation, consult

your regulator to determine the overall effect on the

air traffic management system prior to permanent

introduction to operations.

For further information on the content of

this Action Plan, please contact:

Runway Safety Office, Safety Unit,

Network Management,

EUROCONTROL, Rue de la fusée 96,

B-1130 Brussels, Belgium

Phone: + 32 (0)2 729 3965

runway.safety@eurocontrol.int

http://www.eurocontrol.int/articles/runway-safety

Runway incursions are still considered one of the most

serious safety threats amongst operational personnel.

The publication of this 3

edition of the European Action

Plan for the Prevention of Runway Incursions (EAPPRI)

provides an opportunity for aviation industry stakeholders

and organisations to re-focus and re-energise their runway

incursion prevention activities.

As a starting point, it is suggested that organisations

review and re-assess their implementation of the

recommendations from the previous version before

embarking on the implementation of the new

recommendations in this document. Special attention

should be given to ensuring that SMSs provide the

necessary support (processes, procedures, practices) to

facilitate effective runway incursion prevention activities.

In addition, aerodrome local Runway Safety Teams should

re-assess all aspects of their work to ensure that they are

delivering effective runway safety outcomes.

Aerodromes which have not yet established a local Runway

Safety Team are encouraged to do so - proportionate to

their size and complexity - as soon as possible.

As in the previous edition, this version of EAPPRI

continues to emphasise the need for a mutual exchange

of information and data between organisations in order to

facilitate lesson learning and assisting in the enhancement

of runway safety.

To assist your organisation to plan this activity, the

following generic approach is suggested:

• Confirm your organisation’s usage of the relevant

EU regulations and ICAO provisions - note any

discrepancies.

• Identify any changes required in your operations.

• Identify any changes required from your operating

partners.

• Document the change requirements.

• Invite your internal and where appropriate external

partners to a joint meeting, using the aerodrome

local Runway Safety Team to discuss the change

requirement and possibly identify solutions.

• Conduct an appropriate safety assessment of the

proposed change.

IMPORTANT AND URGENT ACTIONS

“Shall”

is used in this document to signify that, while a

recommendation does not have the force of a mandatory

provision, its content has to be appropriately transposed

at local level to ensure its application. (This is the case

of an ANSP transposing into its Operations Manual the

content of applicable recommendations in order to have

controllers complying with them.)

“Should”

is used in this document to signify that the application of

the recommendations would be beneficial to safety either

as a ‘best practice’ or as a potential mandatory provision,

after a local assessment.

“Assess”

is used in this document to indicate that you assess the

current position/situation and decide if and how changes

should be made to increase their effectiveness.

“Do Not”

as used in some Recommendations this document, is an

imperative statement to signify that any recommendation

and associated action must not be contradicted unless a

local feasibility/safety assessment has been undertaken.

“Regulator”

is used in this document to refer not only to the

organisation responsible for designing and making

the regulatory framework progress, but also to the

organisation that ensures that this regulatory framework

is applied among the aviation undertakings it oversees.

In some recommendations of this document, the term

“regulator” refers also to the entity in charge of promoting

safety among the aviation undertakings under its

responsibility.

Aerodrome Flight Information Service

Officers (AFISOs)

The Recommendations and Guidance Materials in this

document that are applicable to air navigation service

providers/air traffic controllers may also be relevant to

AFISOs according to the local aerodrome context and

the rules, regulations and practices and procedures that

govern the provision of AFIS.

“H24”

means either full H24 operations (where aerodromes

are open all day/night, or during published aerodrome

operating hours when ATC is being provided (and not just

in reduced visibility conditions and/or at night).

‘Active’ Runway

EASA GM1 ADR – DSN.M.745 states that “Active runway is

to consider any runway or runways currently being used

for take-off or landing. When multiple runways are used,

they are all considered active runways.”

Note:

Many of the EU Regulations listed in this document

are supported by, and as necessary, should be read in

conjunction with, EASA Certification Specifications (CS),

Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) and Guidance

Material (GM) which are intended to assist in the

implementation of the relevant EU regulation.

These so-called “soft laws” can be accessed via:

https://www.easa.europa.eu/document-library/agency-

rules-overview.

MEANING OF TERMS AND ACTION VERBS IN

RECOMMENDATIONS AND GUIDANCE MATERIALS

RECOMMENDATIONS

1.1 General principles

1.2 Aerodrome operator issues

1.3 Communications

1.4 Aircraft operator issues

1.5 Air navigation service provider issues

1.6 Data collection and lesson sharing

1.7 Regulators issues

1.8 Aeronautical information management

1.9 Technology

1.10 Civil military

2.0 Future work

EUROPEAN ACTION PLAN FOR THE PREVENTION

OF RUNWAY INCURSIONS

1.1 GENERAL PRINCIPLES

# Recommendation Action Guidance

1.1.1 Assess the implementation and operation of aerodrome local

Runway Safety Teams (RST) and consider if and how changes

could be made to increase their eﬀectiveness in developing

runway safety actions.

Aerodrome Operators,

Air Navigation Service Provider,

Aircraft Operators, Regulator.

Appendix B

1.1.2 Implement local runway safety awareness campaign plans

and assess their eﬀectiveness at each aerodrome for Air Traf-

ﬁc Controllers, Pilots and Vehicle Drivers and other personnel

who operate on or near the runway. Consider format, method

of delivery, frequency and feedback.

Aerodrome local Runway

Safety Team.

Appendix B

1.1.3 Ensure that all infrastructure, practices and procedures relat-

ing to runway operations are in compliance with ICAO and,

where applicable, EU provisions.

Aerodrome Operator (lead),

Air Navigation Service Provider.

Appendix J

Appendix K

Appendix L

1.1.4 Promote and make available speciﬁc joint training and famil-

iarisation in the prevention of runway incursions to Pilots, Air

Traﬃc Controllers and Manoeuvring Area Vehicle Drivers.

Aerodrome local Runway Safety

Team,

Air Navigation Service Provider,

Aircraft Operator,

Regulator,

Aerodrome Operator.

Appendix B

1.1.5 a.

Assess how the subject of Runway Safety is included within

initial and refresher/recurrent training for operational staﬀ:

Aircraft Operator,

Air Navigation Service Provider,

Aerodrome Operator,

Regulator,

Training establishments.

Consider what more can be done to include the viewpoint

and procedures of other stakeholders operating on the

aerodrome.

1.1.6 a.

Ensure that adequate information is collected on all runway

incursion incidents so that causal and contributory factors

can be identiﬁed, lessons can be learned and actions taken.

Aircraft Operator,

Air Navigation Service Provider,

Aerodrome Operator,

Aerodrome local Runway Safety

Team,

EUROCONTROL.

In addition, the salient points from investigation reports

should be disseminated for Units, Organisations, and Na-

tional and European stakeholders as information that may

inﬂuence future safety improvement actions.

1.1.7 Assess the arrangements currently in place that coordinate

changes to manoeuvring area procedures, including works

in progress.

Guidance Note:

This assessment should include the role of the aerodrome

local Runway Safety Team in change management.

Air Navigation Service Provider,

Aerodrome Operator,

Regulator.

Appendix F

Appendix L

# Recommendation Action Guidance

1.1.8 a.

Assess the implementation and eﬀectiveness of Safety

Management Systems related to runway safety activities.

Air Navigation Service Provider,

Aerodrome Operator,

Aircraft Operator,

Regulator.

Appendix G

Ensure a continued focus on runway safety in internal audit

activities.

1.1.9 Continue to develop components of SMS as detailed by

ICAO, EU or EUROCONTROL (ESARR3) provisions that move

towards a data driven, performance-based safety system

approach with an emphasis on safety assurance and

identifying and sharing best practice and signs of excellence.

Air Navigation Service Provider,

Aerodrome Operator,

Aircraft Operator,

Regulator.

Appendix G

1.1.10 European stakeholders should work together to study the

interpretation of the ICAO runway incursion deﬁnition with

the aim of improving the consistency and credibility of

runway incursion reporting via appropriate regulatory

channels.

EUROCONTROL. Appendix N

1.2 AERODROME OPERATOR

# Recommendation Action Guidance

1.2.1 Assess the implementation of maintenance programmes

relating to runway operations e.g. markings, lighting, signage

in accordance with Commission Regulation (EU) No 139/2014

and ICAO Annex 14, Aerodromes, Volume 1 - Aerodrome

Design and Operations when applicable.

Ensure that signs, markings and lights are clearly visible,

adequate and unambiguous in all appropriate conditions.

Aerodrome Operator.

Appendix B

Appendix J

1.2.2 Assess all arrangements associated with aerodrome construc-

tion works/works in progress (WiP):

Ensure that up to date information about temporary work

areas and consequential operational impact is adequately

presented and disseminated.

Aerodrome Operator,

Air Navigation Service Provider,

AIM Provider,

Aircraft Operators.

Appendix H

Appendix L

Ensure that suﬃcient coordination between ANSPs and

Aerodrome Operator is in place prior to notiﬁcation to the

Regulator.

Appendix H

Appendix L

Ensure that existing signs are covered and markings are

removed when appropriate.

Appendix L

Ensure that temporary signs and markings are clearly visible,

adequate and unambiguous in all appropriate conditions.

Appendix L

Aerodrome construction contractors and other person-

nel working airside should be appropriately briefed (about

runway safety/runway incursion prevention) prior to starting

work and be properly supervised whilst they are on the

aerodrome.

1.2.3 a.

Assess formal Driver training and refresher programmes

(including practical training and proﬁciency checks) against

driver training guidelines e.g. the training programme frame-

work at Appendix C.

Aerodrome Operator (lead),

Air Navigation Service Provider

(support).

Appendix C

Carry out regular audits of airside driving permits (e.g. check

‘recency’ of use) in particular those allowing access to the

runways, which should be as few as possible.

Appendix C

# Recommendation Action Guidance

1.2.4 Assess formal RTF communications training and assessment

for drivers and other personnel who operate on or near the

runway.

Aerodrome Operator (lead),

Air Navigation Service Provider

(support).

Appendix C

Appendix L

1.2.5 Assess the procedure for those occasions where manoeu-

vring area drivers become uncertain of their position on the

manoeuvring area.

Aerodrome Operator(lead),

Air Navigation Service Provider

(support).

Appendix C

1.2.6 Promote the adoption of ‘sterile cab’ procedures to improve

communications when on the manoeuvring area.

Aerodrome Operator(lead),

Air Navigation Service Provider

(support).

Appendix C

1.2.7 Assess the implementation of the ICAO standard naming

convention for the manoeuvring area to eliminate ground

navigation error and communication confusion.

Aerodrome Operator (lead),

Air Navigation Service Provider

(support).

Appendix K

1.2.8 a.

Ensure all vehicles on the manoeuvring area are in radio

contact with the appropriate Air Traﬃc Control service, i.e.

ground and/or the tower either directly or through an escort

Regulator,

Aerodrome Operator (lead),

Air Navigation Service Provider

(support).

Appendix A

Appendix C

Assess the numbering policy for aerodrome vehicles and

consider assignment of unique numbers or airside identiﬁca-

tion call signs for each airside vehicle (to reduce the risk of

vehicle related call sign confusion).

Appendix A

Appendix C

1.2.9 Ensure all manoeuvring area vehicle drivers are briefed at the

start of a shift.

Aerodrome Operator. Appendix C

Appendix L

1.2.10 Enable the tracking of vehicle movements on the manoeu-

vring area when possible.

Aerodrome Operator,

Air Navigation Service Provider.

Appendix M

1.2.11 Aerodrome Operators, in conjunction with ANSPs, should

review procedures for runway inspections.

This should include:

Carrying out runway inspections in the opposite direction to

runway movements.

Aerodrome Operator,

Air Navigation Service Provider,

Regulator.

Appendix L

Measures to ensure that uni-directional lighting is inspected

eﬀectively.

Appendix C

Introducing procedures to increase situational awareness (of

ATC and drivers) when vehicles occupy a runway (e.g. Vehicle

‘Operations Normal’ calls to ATC).

Appendix E

Temporarily suspending operations to allow a full runway

inspection to be carried out without interruption.

Appendix L

# Recommendation Action Guidance

1.2.12 New aerodrome infrastructure and changes to existing infra-

structure should be designed to reduce the likelihood

of runway incursions.

Aerodrome Operator. Appendix C

Appendix E

Appendix L

1.2.13 Working with ANSPs, avoid infringing lines of sight from the

air traﬃc control tower:

Assess visibility restrictions from the tower, which have a

potential impact on the ability to see the manoeuvring area

especially critical areas such as runway entry points.

Aerodrome Operator,

Air Navigation Service Provider

Appendix E

Appendix H

Consider short term safety actions such as dissemination of

this information as appropriate.

Identify longer term improvement where possible and

develop appropriate mitigation, procedures, technology or

re-positioning of the facility to ensure the best solution pos-

sible within the limitations of the airport layout.

1.2.14 Regularly assess the operational use of aerodrome ground

lighting e.g. stop bars, to ensure a robust policy to protect

the runway from the incorrect presence of traﬃc:

Safety studies have demonstrated that the use of H24 stop

bars can be an eﬀective RI prevention barrier.

Therefore, Aerodrome Operator should, with ANSPs, consider

the implementation of H24 stop bars at all runway holding

points or other lighting systems providing an equivalent

level of safety (e.g. Autonomous Runway Incursion Warning

Systems (ARIWS)) at all runway holding positions.

Aerodrome Operator,

Air Navigation Service Provider,

Regulator.

Appendix E

Appendix J

Assess the need for elevated stop bars to improve stop bar

conspicuity

Appendix E

Consider use of LED technology to improve stop bar clarity.

1.2.15 Aerodrome Operators, in cooperation with ANSPs, should

implement procedures in line with Standardised European

Rules of the Air (SERA) in case of stop bar unserviceability.

Aerodrome Operator,

Air Navigation Service Provider.

Appendix E

Appendix J

# Recommendation Action Guidance

1.2.16 a.

The design of closely spaced multiple parallel runway hold-

ing positons on the same taxiway should be avoided.

Aerodrome Operator

Appendix K

Where a. above cannot be followed, the holding positions

should be clearly segregated.

1.2.17 a.

Aerodrome Operators, in cooperation with ANSPs, should

identify the Protected Area for each runway and produce an

Aerodrome Protected Area chart/map.

Aerodrome Operator,

Air Navigation Service Provider,

Regulator.

Appendix C

Appendix M

Ensure that the Protected Area map is used in manoeuvring

area driver training and is present in all vehicles that are driv-

ing on the manoeuvring area.

Appendix C

Appendix L

Appendix M

1.3 COMMUNICATIONS

# Recommendation Action Guidance

1.3.1 a.

To avoid the possibility of call sign confusion, implement the

use of full aircraft or vehicle call signs for all communications

concerning runway operations

Air Navigation Service Provider

(lead),

Aircraft Operator (lead),

Aerodrome Operator (lead).

Appendix A

Appendix E

To avoid call sign confusion at aerodromes, implement the

introduction of discrete RTF call signs to manoeuvring area

vehicles.

Aerodrome Operator (lead),

Air Navigation Service Provider

(support).

Appendix E

1.3.2 Implement, monitor and ensure the use of standard phrase-

ologies as applicable:

EU: SERA Part C AMC

ICAO: Doc. 4444, PANS-ATM

Air Navigation Service Provider

(lead),

Aircraft Operator (lead),

Aerodrome Operator (lead).

Appendix A

Appendix B

Appendix E

Appendix L

1.3.3 Implement, monitor and ensure the use of the readback

procedure (also applicable to manoeuvring area drivers and

other personnel who operate on the manoeuvring area).

Air Navigation Service Provider

(lead),

Aircraft Operator (lead),

Aerodrome Operator (lead).

Appendix A

Appendix C

Appendix D

Appendix E

1.3.4 Where practicable, improve situational awareness by con-

ducting all communications associated with runway opera-

tions using aviation English.

Air Navigation Service Provider

(lead),

Aircraft Operator (lead),

Aerodrome Operator (lead).

Appendix A

Appendix C

Appendix D

Appendix E

1.3.5 When practicable, improve situational awareness, by imple-

menting procedures whereby all communications associated

with runway operations are on a common or cross-coupled

frequency.

Air Navigation Service Provider

(lead).

Appendix A

Appendix C

Appendix E

1.3.6 Consider regular evaluation of radio telephony practices,

assessing elements such as frequency loading and use of

EU/ICAO compliant phraseology.

Air Navigation Service Provider,

Aircraft Operator,

Aerodrome Operator.

Appendix A

Appendix B

Appendix E

1.3.7 If conditional clearances are used in accordance with ICAO

provisions, ensure a policy and robust procedures are

developed and implemented.

Air Navigation Service Provider. Appendix A

Appendix E

1.3.8 ANSPs and Aerodrome Operators should implement

procedures that ensure signiﬁcant aerodrome information

which may aﬀect operations on or near the runway, in

addition to that found in NOTAMS and on the ATIS, should be

provided to manoeuvring area drivers and pilots ‘real-time’

using radio communication.

Air Navigation Service Provider,

Aircraft Operator,

Aerodrome Operator.

Appendix C

Appendix E

Appendix H

1.4 AIRCRAFT OPERATOR

# Recommendation Action Guidance

1.4.1 Provide training and assessment for pilots regarding

Aerodrome signage, markings and lighting.

Aircraft Operator (lead). Appendix D

1.4.2 Pilots shall not cross illuminated red stop bars when lining-up

or crossing a runway (or on a taxiway where placed), unless

contingency procedures are in force, e.g. to cover cases

where the stop bars or controls are unserviceable.

Aircraft Operator. Appendix A

Appendix D

Appendix J

1.4.3 Ensure that ﬂight deck procedures contain a requirement for

explicit clearances to cross any runway.

Guidance Note:

Includes non-active runways.

Aircraft Operator. Appendix A

1.4.4 Flight Crew should not enter a runway for departure if not

ready to take-oﬀ. Flight Crew must advise Air Traﬃc Control

on ﬁrst contact with the Tower if additional time on the

runway is required for operational reasons.

Aircraft Operator,

Air Navigation Service Provider.

Appendix D

1.4.5 If received signiﬁcantly early, ﬂight crew should conﬁrm with

ATC the line-up/take-oﬀ or crossing clearance when ap-

proaching the runway holding position.

Aircraft Operator,

Air Navigation Service Provider.

Appendix D

1.4.6 Flight crew should consider conﬁrming landing clearance on

short ﬁnal, if ATC issued it more than 5 nautical miles from

touch down.

Aircraft Operator,

Air Navigation Service Provider

Appendix D

1.4.7 Promote best practices in ﬂight deck procedures while taxi-

ing and during ﬁnal approach - to include the “Sterile ﬂight

deck” concept.

IATA (lead),

ECA/IFALPA (support).

Appendix D

1.4.8 Promote best practices for pilots’ planning of ground

operations.

IATA (lead),

ECA/IFALPA (support).

Appendix D

1.4.9 Ensure a means to indicate receipt of landing / line-up / take

oﬀ / crossing clearances in the cockpit.

Airframe Manufacturer,

Aircraft Operator.

Appendix D

1.4.10 Pilots are advised to switch on forward facing lights when in

receipt of a take-oﬀ clearance and show forward facing lights

on the approach.

Guidance Note:

Global IFALPA policy

Aircraft Operator. Appendix D

1.4.11 Pilots must be made aware of current safety signiﬁcant

airport information.

Aircraft Operator. Appendix H

1.4.12 During taxi for departure or during approach, pilots should

not accept a runway change proposal if time to

re-programme the FMS / re-brief is not suﬃcient.

This includes a change of departure intersection.

Aircraft Operator,

Air Navigation Service Provider.

Appendix D

# Recommendation Action Guidance

1.4.13 If Pilots have any doubt as to their exact position on the

surface of an aerodrome, they should contact Air Traﬃc

Control and follow the associated ICAO procedure (ICAO Doc.

4444, PANS-ATM).

Aircraft Operator. Appendix D

1.4.14 A pilot should avoid being “head-down” to ensure a

continuous external watch is maintained whilst taxiing.

Aircraft Operator. Appendix D

1.4.15 If there is any doubt when receiving a clearance or

instruction, clariﬁcation should be requested immediately

from Air Traﬃc Control.

Aircraft Operator. Appendix A

Appendix D

1.4.16 Aerodrome charts or an equivalent electronic device should

be displayed on the ﬂight deck during taxi. This includes

when operating at the home aerodrome.

Aircraft Operator. Appendix D

1.4.17 Avoid accepting rapid exit taxiways or angled taxiways for

line-up that limits the ability of the Flight crew to see the

runway threshold or the ﬁnal approach area.

Aircraft Operator. Appendix D

1.4.18 Ensure that crews are aware of the signiﬁcance of red lights

(e.g. stop bars and other red lights) used in line with alerting

systems to prevent incorrect entry onto a runway and to

enhance situational awareness.

Aircraft Operator. Appendix J

1.4.19 A pilot shall only apply Engine-Out–Taxi (EOT) procedure

after careful consideration of local and operational

circumstances so as to avoid a conﬂict with sterile cockpit

procedures.

Aircraft Operator. Appendix D

1.5 AIR NAVIGATION SERVICE PROVIDER

# Recommendation Action Guidance

1.5.1 ANSPs shall ensure that runway safety issues are included

in initial and refresher training and brieﬁngs for Air Traﬃc

Control staﬀ.

Air Navigation Service Provider. Appendix E

1.5.2 ANSPs shall implement, update or highlight existing pro-

cedures that assist air traﬃc controllers, pilots and vehicle

drivers to maintain good situational awareness. Procedures

should also support pilots to maintain a sterile cockpit envi-

ronment and maintain situational awareness whilst taxying

or during critical stages of operation.`

Actions include:

Ensuring that Air Traﬃc Control communication messages

are not overly long or complex.

Air Navigation Service Provider. Appendix E

Indicating the ultimate clearance limit (e.g. the runway

holding position or intermediate holding position) and, in

case of complex /overlong taxi route, use progressive taxi

instructions to reduce pilot/vehicle driver workload and the

potential for confusion.

Air Navigation Service Provider. Appendix E

It is strongly advised to develop and utilize standard taxi

routes and clear standard route designators to minimise the

potential for confusion, on or near the runway.

Air Navigation Service Provider. Appendix E

Whenever possible, pass en-route clearances prior to taxi

and, in order to avoid distractions during taxi, consider the

passing of revisions to en-route clearances whilst an aircraft

is stopped.

Air Navigation Service Provider. Appendix E

When an aircraft is at a holding position or on the runway,

ATC should always use the phrase: “HOLD POSITION” before

passing a revised clearance.

Air Navigation Service Provider. Appendix E

Record and track vehicles entering the manoeuvring area

through the use of vehicle progress strips.

Air Navigation Service Provider. Appendix E

When planning a runway change for departing or arriving

traﬃc, consider the time a pilot will require to prepare/re-

brief.

Air Navigation Service Provider. Appendix E

Issue line-up and/or take-oﬀ or crossing clearance only when

the aircraft is at or approaching the runway holding position.

Air Navigation Service Provider. Appendix E

Do not issue a line-up clearance if the pilot has reported the

aircraft is not ready to depart.

Air Navigation Service Provider. Appendix E

# Recommendation Action Guidance

Do not issue a line-up clearance if the aircraft is expected to

wait on the runway for more than 90 seconds before being

able to issue the take-oﬀ clearance.

Air Navigation Service Provider. Appendix E

Do not use angled taxiways for entering the runway that limit

the ability of the ﬂight crew to see the runway threshold or

the ﬁnal approach area.

Guidance Note:

Consider to mandate the application in case of multiple or

intersection departures.

Air Navigation Service Provider. Appendix E

Avoid issuing premature landing clearance.

Air Navigation Service Provider. Appendix E

1.5.3 ANSPs should assess the current procedures regarding

runway occupancy status and support the implementation of

memory aids considering also the availability of new/emerg-

ing technologies.

Air Navigation Service Provider. Appendix E

1.5.4 ANSPs should consider the implementation of emerging

technology that can improve situational awareness and im-

prove safety nets. This could include the implementation of

enhanced A-SMGCS functionalities or alternative surveillance

technologies.

Air Navigation Service Provider. Appendix E

Appendix N

1.5.5 ANSPs, in conjunction with the Aerodrome Operator, shall

implement procedures for when an aircraft or vehicle be-

comes lost or uncertain of its position on the manoeuvring

area. It is recommended that these procedures are reviewed

and tested on a regular basis.

Air Navigation Service Provider. Appendix C

Appendix E

Appendix L

1.5.6 ANSPs, in conjunction with the Aerodrome Operator, should

regularly review procedures for runway inspections. This

should include the evaluation of:

Carrying out routine runway inspections in the opposite

direction to runway movements.

Air Navigation Service Provider. Appendix C

Appendix E

Appendix L

Implementing procedures to increase overall situational

awareness when vehicles occupy a runway (e.g. ‘Vehicle

Operation Normal’ calls.

Air Navigation Service Provider. Appendix C

Appendix E

Appendix L

# Recommendation Action Guidance

1.5.7 Safety studies have demonstrated that the misapplication

and misinterpretation of conditional clearances can be a

contributing factor in runway incursions.

Therefore ANSPs should:

Assess conditional clearance operational procedures

and practices.

Air Navigation Service Provider. Appendix A

Appendix E

Consider if the operational use of conditional clearances can

be reduced or removed at a speciﬁc aerodrome.

Air Navigation Service Provider. Appendix A

Appendix E

Raise awareness to ATC staﬀ about the correct use of condi-

tional clearances and potential risks.

Air Navigation Service Provider. Appendix E

1.5.8 ATC procedures shall contain a requirement to issue an

explicit clearance, including the runway designator, when

authorizing a runway entry, runway crossing or hold short of

any runway.

Guidance Note:

Includes non-active runways.

Air Navigation Service Provider. Appendix E

Appendix N

1.5.9 ANSPs should review, on a regular basis, runway capacity

enhancing procedures when used either individually or in

combination (intersection departures, multiple line-up, con-

ditional clearances etc.) to identify any potential hazards and,

if necessary, develop appropriate mitigation strategies.

Air Navigation Service Provider. Appendix B

Appendix E

1.5.10 ANSPs should regularly assess the operational use of aero-

drome ground lighting (e.g. stop bars, runway guard lights)

in line with the applicable EU/ICAO provisions, to ensure a

robust runway protection policy, and:

Stop Bars at runway holding position must always be con-

trolled by the controller in charge of the runway operations

on that runway (Aerodrome controller).

Air Navigation Service Provider. Appendix E

Appendix J

Safety studies have demonstrated that the use of H24 stop

bars may be an eﬀective RI prevention barrier. Therefore,

considering local constraints and speciﬁcities, Aerodrome

Operators should, with ANSPs, consider the implementation

of H24 stop bars or other lighting systems providing an

equivalent level of safety (e.g. ARIWS) at all runway holding

positions.

Air Navigation Service Provider. Appendix E

Appendix J

# Recommendation Action Guidance

ANSPs, in cooperation with Aerodrome Operators, should

implement procedures, in line with the applicable EU

Regulations and associated AMC and GM in case of stop bar

unserviceability.

Air Navigation Service Provider. Appendix E

Appendix J

Aircraft or vehicles shall not be instructed to cross illuminat-

ed red stop bars unless contingency procedures are in force.

Air Navigation Service Provider. Appendix E

Appendix J

1.5.11 ANSPs should assess the sight lines from the Tower Visual

Control Room (VCR) and existing visibility restrictions which

have a potential impact on the ability to see the runway.

Disseminate information as appropriate (e.g. include on ap-

propriate AIP- A/D chart).

Air Navigation Service Provider. Appendix E

1.5.12 In case of infringement of the Tower VCR sight lines, ANSPs

should develop and implement short-term appropriate miti-

gations and identify longer term improvement, whenever

possible.

Air Navigation Service Provider,

Aerodrome Operator.

Appendix E

Appendix K

1.5.13 a.

ANSPs should regularly review Human Machine Interface

(HMI) eﬀectiveness. Controller Working Position (CWP)

ergonomics and procedures shall promote and improve the

controller ‘visual scan’ of the manoeuvring area in all weather

conditions.

Air Navigation Service Provider,

Aerodrome Operator.

Appendix E

Air traﬃc controllers shall perform a visual scan of the

entire runway and approach area in both directions before

issuing a clearance to enter the runway or landing. This

should primarily be by direct visual means, backed up by

surveillance equipment in poor visibility situations.

Air Navigation Service Provider. Appendix E

ANSP shall develop procedures to ensure that, as far as

practicable, controllers are “heads-up” for a continuous watch

of aerodrome operations.

Air Navigation Service Provider. Appendix E

Air traﬃc controllers should pay attention to aircraft ‘vacating’

runways in particular where the exit taxiway may lead

directly to another runway (crossing).

Air Navigation Service Provider. Appendix E

1.5.14 ANSPs should apply and actively encourage Team Resource

Management (TRM) principles in operations.

Air Navigation Service Provider. Appendix E

1.6 DATA COLLECTION AND LESSON SHARING

# Recommendation Action Guidance

1.6.1 Review and promote the implementation of occurrence

reporting regimes and ensure their compatibility with ICAO,

EU and national provisions.

Regulator,

Air Navigation Service Provider,

Aircraft Operators,

Aerodrome Operators.

Appendix B

1.6.2 Disseminate de-identiﬁed information on actual runway

incursions locally to increase understanding of causal and

contributory factors to enhance lesson learning.

Regulator,

Aerodrome Operator,

Air Navigation Service Provider,

Aircraft Operator.

Appendix B

Note:

See also General Principle Recommendations 1.1.6a, 1.1.6b and 1.1.9.

1.7 REGULATORS

# Recommendation Action Guidance

1.7.1 Conﬁrm that all infrastructure, practices and procedures

relating to runway operations are in compliance with EU

Regulations and, as applicable, any ICAO and/or national

provisions.

Regulator. Appendix J

Appendix K

Appendix L

1.7.2 Ensure the implementation of safety management systems

is in accordance with EU Regulations and, as applicable, any

ICAO and/or national standards.

Regulator. Appendix G

1.7.3 Ensure that safety assurance documentation for operational

systems (new and modiﬁed) demonstrates compliance with

regulatory and safety management system requirements. .

Regulator. Appendix G

1.7.4 Regulators should focus on runway safety in their oversight

activities e.g. preventing runway incursion risks.

Regulator. Appendix F

1.7.5 Ensure that Aerodrome Operators and Air Navigation Service

Providers regularly review the operational use of aeronautical

ground lighting e.g. stop bars, to ensure a robust policy to

protect the runway from the incorrect presence of traﬃc.

Guidance Note:

Aircraft operators should also be invited to review to provide

a wider perspective.

Air Navigation Service Provider,

Aerodrome Operator,

Aircraft Operator,

Regulator.

Appendix E

Appendix J

1.7.6 Ensure that the content of training materials for Pilots, Air

Traﬃc Controllers and Drivers working on the manoeuvring

area includes runway incursion prevention measures and

awareness.

Regulator. Appendix F

1.7.7 Ensure that environmental procedures e.g. noise mitigation

rules take due account of runway safety.

Guidance Note:

Those noise mitigation elements that could potentially

aﬀect runway incursion/excursion risk include (but are not

limited to): Airﬁeld design and alignment based on noise

consideration, noise preferred runway or runway operational

mode, time-based runway selection to share noise load,

runway speciﬁc curfews, arrival/departure curfews etc. which

may (for example) require additional backtrack, runway

crossings or other similar and otherwise avoidable risk.

Regulator.

Appendix B

# Recommendation Action Guidance

1.7.8 Assess the performance of the change management process

for procedural and/or infrastructural changes on the ma-

noeuvring area.

Regulator. Appendix G

1.7.9 National agencies charged with the oversight of aviation

safety should consider how they discharge their

responsibilities for runway safety which may include:

The establishment and coordination of a national/state

runway safety group that, inter alia, will address the

prevention of runway incursions and runway collision risk.

Regulator.

Appendix B

Appendix F

Ensuring the prevention of runway incursions in national

runway safety plans/State Safety Plans.

Supporting the state-wide promotion and coordinated

implementation of EAPPRI v3.0.

Participating in aerodrome local Runway Safety Teams.

1.8 AERONAUTICAL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AIM

# Recommendation Action Guidance

1.8.1 Ensure that the content of aeronautical information provided

is in accordance with the ICAO standards and recommended

practices and is up to date and relevant to the pilot.

Information on aerodrome conditions should be simple to

understand and focused on what is operationally necessary

for the safety of ﬂight, expressed in a standardised manner

on format and content. Content should be minimized in

volume as far as it does not compromise its eﬃciency and

comprehensiveness.

Air Navigation Service Provider,

Aeronautical Information Service

Provider,

Aerodrome operator, Regulator.

Appendix H

Information on temporary changes to operating conditions

at the aerodrome should be optimized to increase the

situational awareness of the most critical changes. When

needed, an AIP Supplement with graphics and charts should

be published.

Appendix H

For planned temporary changes, issuance of NOTAM with

short notice ahead of the eﬀective date or non-AIRAC

publications should be avoided.

Appendix H

Appendix L

1.8.2 Data (DAT) providers of aeronautical data, ﬂight manuals

and charts should establish a process with the Aeronautical

Information Service Provider, with the objective of ensuring

the accuracy, timeliness and integrity of the data.

Aeronautical Information

Service Provider,

Industry.

Appendix H

1.8.3 Ensure that the means and procedures are established at

aerodromes for the collection of post-ﬂight information and

to allow users to provide feedback on the availability and

quality of aeronautical information, in accordance with ICAO

Annex 15 Aeronautical Information Services.

Aeronautical Information Service

Provider,

Aerodrome Operator,

Aircraft Operator,

EUROCONTROL.

Appendix H

1.8.4 The ergonomics of aeronautical maps and charts and

relevant documentation should be improved to enhance

their readability and usability, and be in accordance with

relevant standards for aeronautical charts.

Air Navigation Service Provider,

Aeronautical Information Service

Provider,

Aerodrome Operator,

Aircraft Operator.

Appendix H

1.8.5 Move towards digital aeronautical information

management to provide and use high quality aeronautical

and aerodrome data in an interoperable exchange format.

Aerodrome Operator,

Air Navigation Service Provider,

Aeronautical Information Service

Provider,

Regulator,

EUROCONTROL.

Appendix H

1.8.6 Aerodrome Operators and Aeronautical Information Service

Providers should establish formal arrangements and assign

responsibilities for maintaining direct and continuous liaison.

Air Navigation Service Provider,

Aeronautical Information Service

Provider,

Aerodrome Operator, Regulator.

Appendix H

1.9 TECHNOLOGY

# Recommendation Action Guidance

1.9.1 Improve situational awareness by adopting the use of tech-

nologies that enable operational staﬀ on the manoeuvring

area to conﬁrm their location in relation to the runway e.g.

via GPS with transponder or airport moving maps, visual aids,

signs etc.

Aerodrome Operator,

Air Navigation Service Provider,

Aircraft Operator.

Appendix M

1.9.2 Promote the integration of safety nets to provide immedi-

ate and simultaneous runway and traﬃc proximity alerts for

pilots, air traﬃc controllers and manoeuvring area vehicle

drivers.

EUROCONTROL,

SESAR.

Appendix M

1.10 CIVIL MILITARY

# Recommendation Action Guidance

1.10.1 Where more than one aerodrome operator exists at a joint-

use aerodrome, a leading aerodrome operator should be

identiﬁed to secure a harmonised, consistent and coordinat-

ed application of the recommendations for the prevention of

runway incursions.

Military Aviation

Authority,Regulator.

Appendix I

1.10.2 New investment or reconstruction work on the manoeuvring

area should be planned, coordinated and safety assessed

between civil and military entities, in consultation with the

aerodrome local Runway Safety Team.

Military Aviation Authority,

Regulator, Aerodrome Owner/

Operator,

Air Navigation Service Provider,

aAerodrome local Runway Safety

Team.

Appendix B

Appendix I

1.10.3 Diﬀerences in application of Civil and Military traﬃc proce-

dures that can aﬀect operational safety should be published

in accordance with ICAO Annex 15, Aeronautical Information

Services.

Aerodrome Operator,

Air Navigation Service Provider,

Aeronautical Information Service

Provider,

Military Aviation Authority,

Regulator.

Appendix I

1.10.4 Coordinate civil and military inspection/audit activities and

subsequent safety recommendations with civil and military

authorities.

Regulator,

Military Aviation Authority.

Appendix F

Appendix I

1.10.5 Timely planning and coordination of aerodrome operations

between civil and military aerodrome entities should be

established as appropriate.

Aerodrome Operator. Appendix I

1.10.6 Standard ICAO phraseology should be in use during civil

operations at joint use aerodromes.

Air Navigation Service Provider,

Aircraft Operator.

Appendix A

Appendix E

Appendix I

1.10.7 When practicable, procedures to use VHF frequency for

communications or cross coupled UHF/VHF associated

with runway operations should be developed for civil and

military traﬃc operating simultaneously. The objective is to

maintain the required level of situational awareness with civil

and military pilots, manoeuvring area vehicle drivers and air

traﬃc controllers.

Air Navigation Service Provider,

Aerodrome Operator.

Appendix A

Appendix D

Appendix E

Appendix I

1.10.8 On the manoeuvring area, a formation of military aircraft

should be treated as one entity and never split.

Air Navigation Service Provider,

Aircraft Operator.

Appendix I

1.10.9 Conditional clearances should not be used for civilian traﬃc

during military formation ﬂight operations.

Air Navigation Service Provider. Appendix A

Appendix I

1.10.10

Standard ICAO Annex 14 –Aerodromes, Volume 1 - Aero-

drome Design and Operations aerodrome signs, lights and

markings should be used where civil and military share a

manoeuvring area.

Aerodrome Operator. Appendix A

Appendix I

# Recommendation Action Guidance

1.10.11

Wherever practicable, military aircraft should use on-board

lights in accordance with ICAO Annex 2, Rules of the Air.

If required, additional procedures should be applied to main-

tain the required level of situational awareness at joint-use

aerodromes.

Aerodrome Operator. Appendix A

Appendix D

Appendix I

1.10.12

Ensure that military pilots and manoeuvring area vehicle

drivers who are temporarily deployed at civil aerodromes are

competent to operate within the remit of ICAO provisions

and local procedures.

Military Aviation Authority,

Regulator,

Aerodrome Operator,

Aircraft Operator.

Appendix A

Appendix C

Appendix F

Appendix I

1.10.13

EAPPRI recommendations on infrastructure should be

implemented at civil/military joint-use aerodrome at least

where civil aircraft operations are permitted.

Military Aviation Authority,

Regulator,

Aerodrome Operator,

Aircraft Operator.

Appendix J

Appendix K

2 FUTURE WORK

# Recommendation Action Guidance

2.1.1 Information about the development of new technologies

that can be applied to runway safety shall be disseminated as

part of the general runway safety awareness campaign.

European regulatory bodies in

coordination with Industry.

Appendix C

2.1.2 Identify any ICAO guidance material that should be upgraded

to ICAO standards and recommended practices and review

other relevant materials.

EUROCONTROL Safety

Improvement Sub Group

(Runway Safety

2.1.3 Monitor and evaluate emerging technologies that may

aﬀect future aerodrome operations. Consider potential

implications concerning runway safety and provide

appropriate guidance:

Remote Tower technologies.

EUROCONTROL Safety

Improvement Sub Group

(Runway Safety).

Appendix M

Authorised Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS)/’drone’

and autonomous vehicle operations on and around the

aerodrome.

2.1.4 Coordinate with other national and regional runway incur-

sion prevention activities.

EUROCONTROL Safety

Improvement Sub Group

(Runway Safety).

Appendix M

Introduction

Factors affecting communication breakdown

Loss of communication and runway incursions

Aviation language for international services

Runway Frequency

Aerodrome Control Phraseologies

Aerodrome Control Phraseology – READBACK

Avoiding Call Sign Confusion

Communication techniques - general

What to do if uncertain of your position on the manoeuvring area

Conditional Clearance

Improving communications for little or no cost

APPENDIX A

COMMUNICATIONS GUIDANCE

APPENDIX A COMMUNICATIONS GUIDANCE

INTRODUCTION

The demanding environment associated with aerodrome

operations on a runway requires that all participants

accurately receive, understand, and correctly read back all

air traffic control clearances and instructions. All access

to a runway (even if non-active) should take place only

after a positive ATC clearance has been given / received

and a correct readback has been provided / accepted, and

after the stop bar (where provided) has been switched

off; providing a clearance in a timely manner, as the

aircraft is approaching the relevant runway, will help to

prevent runway incursions. This appendix offers guidance

materials built upon Best Practices from European

aerodromes that may help to protect the integrity of voice

communications for operational staff working on the

manoeuvring area.

FACTORS AFFECTING COMMUNICATION

BREAKDOWN

From studies of investigation reports, and from reports/

surveys regarding runway safety occurrences, it is

apparent that communications issues are frequently a

causal or contributory factor.

Examples of factors leading to communication breakdown

on the manoeuvring area include, but are not limited to:

 Complex instructions to different aircraft.

 Controller/pilot/driver high speech rate.

 Two different languages being used.

 Frequency congestion / blocked frequency.

 Use of non-standard EU/ICAO phraseology.

 Call sign confusion.

 Absent, poor or incomplete readback.

 Incomplete or ambiguous clearances.

 Inadequate aviation English.

 Heavily accented English.

 Different frequencies associated with runway operations.

 Inadequate driver communication training.

LOSS OF COMMUNICATION AND RUNWAY

INCURSIONS

Entering a runway (to line up or cross) or landing without

a valid ATC clearance will lead to the incorrect presence

of traffic on a runway and require a runway incursion to

be reported. Pilots should squawk 7600 in VMC or IMC to

advise loss of communication on the manoeuvring area.

Be aware that when communication is lost on the

approach most pilots will land without a clearance. Pilots

should squawk 7600 in VMC or IMC to advise loss of

communication.

ICAO Doc. 4444 PANS-ATM AIR-GROUND

COMMUNICATIONS FAILURE

Note 2. "An aircraft equipped with an SSR transponder is

expected to operate the transponder on Mode A Code 7600

to indicate that it has experienced air-ground communica-

tion failure. An aircraft equipped with other surveillance

system transmitters, including ADS-B and ADS-C, might

indicate the loss of air-ground communication by all of the

available means."

AVIATION LANGUAGE FOR

INTERNATIONAL SERVICES

Use of Aviation English is proven to be a significant factor

in the establishment and maintenance of situational

awareness for all participants associated with runway

operations.

ICAO Annex 1

"As of 5 March 2008, aeroplane, airship, helicopter and

powered-lift pilots, air traffic controllers and aeronautical

station operators shall demonstrate the ability to speak

and understand the language used for radiotelephony

communications to the level specified in the language

proficiency requirements in Appendix 1."

APPENDIX 1

REQUIREMENTS FOR PROFICIENCY IN LANGUAGES USED

FOR RADIOTELEPHONY COMMUNICATIONS.

1. General

Note - The ICAO language proficiency requirements include

the holistic descriptors at Section 2 and the ICAO Operational

Level (Level 4) of the ICAO Language Proficiency Rating Scale

in Attachment A. The language proficiency requirements

are applicable to the use of both phraseologies and plain

language.

2. Holistic descriptors

Proficient speakers shall:

a) communicate effectively in voice-only (telephone

radiotelephone) and in face-to-face situations;

b) communicate on common, concrete and work-related

topics with accuracy and clarity;

c) use appropriate communicative strategies to

exchange messages and to recognise and resolve

misunderstandings (e.g. to check, confirm, or clarify

information) in a general or work-related context;

d) handle successfully and with relative ease the linguistic

challenges presented by a complication or unexpected

turn of events that occurs within the context of a routine

work situation or communicative task with which they

are otherwise familiar; and

e) use a dialect or accent which is intelligible to the

aeronautical community."

ICAO Annex 10, Aeronautical Communications,

Language to be used

"The air-ground radiotelephony communications shall be

conducted in the language normally used by the station

on the ground or in the English language. ICAO Doc. 9432

Manual Radio Telephony."

Note - Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No

2016/1185 also says that “air-ground radio telephony

communications shall be conducted in English or in

the language normally used by the ground station”. In

exceptional cases, however, it also provides EASA Member

States with a potential opt out from this requirement subject

to a safety assessment and notification to the Commission.

Notwithstanding this, see SERA AMC/GM 14015, EAPPRI

Recommendation 1.3.4 and below provide further

information regarding the frequencies and language to be

used for runway operations

RUNWAY FREQUENCY

It is recommended that communications for all operations

on a runway (landing, departing, crossing aircraft, vehicles

crossing and runway inspections etc.) take place on

the VHF frequency assigned for that runway; this will

help to maintain high levels of situational awareness.

To accommodate vehicles that are equipped with UHF

radios only, frequency 'coupling' should be employed

to ensure that all UHF communications associated with

runway operations are simultaneously transmitted on the

appropriate VHF frequency (and vice versa). When using

RTF frequency coupling, Controllers (and drivers) need to

be mindful of ‘clipped’ transmissions, where the beginning

or end of the transmission is not broadcast/received.

Concerns about runway frequency congestion due to

drivers using VHF can be alleviated by treating every use

of the runway as a planned traffic movement, and keeping

detailed discussions e.g. FOD descriptions, for another

frequency.

Some aerodromes (e.g. Brussels Airport) have taken the

principles described above further and have introduced

the concept known as “Triple One”: One Runway, One

Frequency, One Language (English) as a means to further

improve communications/situational awareness for all

operations on a runway.

Note: Aerodromes with multiple runways may use a different

frequency for each runway.

AERODROME CONTROL PHRASEOLOGIES

Use of established standard EU and ICAO phraseologies

for radio telephony communication between aircraft and

ground stations is essential to avoid misunderstanding,

and to reduce the time required for communication. EU/

ICAO phraseology shall be used in all situations for which it

has been specified. When standardised phraseology for a

particular situation has not been specified, plain language

shall be used. EU SERA (AMC of SERA 14001) and ICAO

Annex 10 Volume II, Aeronautical Telecommunications

both state this requirement is as follows:

“standardized phraseology shall be used in all situations

for which it has been specified. Only when standardized

phraseology cannot serve an intended transmission, plain

language shall be used.”

All personnel involved in operations associated with

runways must use clear, concise and unambiguous

phraseologies. Such usage will ensure that safety levels

are maintained or improved upon.

ICAO Doc. 9432 Manual of Radiotelephony says:

“In the Doc. 4444 PANS-ATM, it is further emphasized that

the phraseologies contained therein are not intended to

be exhaustive, and when circumstances differ, pilots, ATS

personnel and other ground personnel will be expected

to use appropriate subsidiary phraseologies which

should be as clear and concise as possible and designed

to avoid possible confusion by those persons using a

language other than one of their national languages.

“Appropriate subsidiary phraseologies” can either refer

to the use of plain language, or the use of regionally

or locally adopted phraseologies. Either should be

used in the same manner in which phraseologies are

used: clearly, concisely, and unambiguously. Additionally,

such appropriate subsidiary phraseologies should

not be used instead of ICAO phraseologies, but in

addition to ICAO phraseologies when required, and

users should keep in mind that many speakers/listeners

will be using English as a second or foreign language."

All personnel involved in operations associated with

runways must use clear, concise and unambiguous

phraseologies. Such usage will ensure that safety levels

are maintained or improved upon.

Example Phraseologies

Listed below are some of the relevant key ICAO

phraseologies contained within those documents,

applicable for operations on runways. More examples of

the application of phraseologies may be found in ICAO

Doc. 9432, Manual of Radiotelephony and Doc. 4444, PANS

-ATM. It should be noted that these phraseologies are for

use by air traffic controllers, pilots, and when applicable,

vehicle drivers.

Special note for vehicle drivers

ICAO Doc. 4444, PANS-ATM phraseologies for the

movement of vehicles, other than tow-tractors, on the

manoeuvring area shall be the same as those used for

the movement of aircraft, with the exception of taxi

instructions, in which case the word “PROCEED” shall be

substituted for the word “TAXI” when communicating

with vehicles.

The procedure contained in ICAO Doc. 4444, PANS-ATM

12.2.7 makes no provision for vehicles to be included in

the process of receiving a conditional clearance; they

may only be the subject of a conditional clearance.

Note 1: Words in parentheses ( ) indicate that specific

information, such as a level, a place or a time, etc., must

be inserted to complete the phrase, or alternatively that

optional phrases may be used. Words in square parentheses [

] indicate optional additional words or information that may

be necessary in specific instances.

Note 2: The detailed phrases listed below do not form the

complete phrases to be used, nor do they represent the

total number listed in ICAO Doc. 4444, PANS-ATM where

a complete listing is available in Chapter 12. They refer to

those elements considered crucial to runway safety aspects.

A. TAXI PROCEDURES

For departure

ATC (call sign) TAXI TO HOLDING POINT [number]

RUNWAY (number)

Or where detailed taxi instructions are required

ATC (call sign) TAXI TO HOLDING POINT [number]

RUNWAY (number) HOLD SHORT OF RUNWAY

(number) [contact TWR]

ATC (or CROSS RUNWAY (number)) TIME (time);

It should be noted that the words "position … and /

or hold" may be misunderstood by some pilots due to

the use of non ICAO phraseology within North America,

where "taxi into position and hold…" is used by ATC

when issuing a line up clearance. There have been a

number of runway safety occurrences with the key

words ‘position’ and ‘hold’ misapplied, therefore read-

backs should be very carefully monitored when using

these words. See also, Holding instructions from ATC

below.

ATC (call sign) TAXI VIA RUNWAY (number);

PILOT (call sign) REQUEST BACKTRACK

ATC (call sign) BACKTRACK APPROVED

ATC (call sign) BACKTRACK RUNWAY (number);

Other general instructions

Caution should be exercised when using the phrase

‘follow’, at or near runway holding points as pilots and

drivers have been known to interpret this as clearance

to continue following traffic as it enters or lines-up on

a runway.

ATC (call sign) VACATE RUNWAY

PILOT/DRIVER (call sign) RUNWAY VACATED

The Pilot or Driver may not always be sure if they are

clear of the ILS sensitive area. Don’t assume runway

vacated means no runway re-entry for some aerodrome

layouts.

ATC (call sign) EXPEDITE TAXI (reason)

PILOT/DRIVER (call sign) EXPEDITING

ATC (call sign) TAXI SLOWER (reason)

PILOT/DRIVER (call sign) SLOWING DOWN

B. HOLDING INSTRUCTIONS FROM ATC

ATC (call sign) HOLD (direction) OF (position,

runway number, etc.);

ATC (call sign) HOLD POSITION;

ATC (call sign) HOLD (distance) FROM (position)

… to hold not closer to a runway than specified in ICAO

Doc. 4444, PANS-ATM ,Chapter 7, 7.6.3.1.3.1

ATC (call sign) HOLD SHORT OF (position);

READBACK FROM PILOTS/DRIVERS

(call sign) HOLDING;

(call sign) HOLDING SHORT.

It should be noted that aircraft should not hold closer

to a runway than specified in ICAO Doc. 4444, Chapter

7, 7.6.3.1.3.1.

The procedure words, ROGER and WILCO, are insufficient

acknowledgement of the instructions HOLD, HOLD

POSITION and HOLD SHORT OF (position). In each case

the acknowledgement shall be by the phraseology

HOLDING or HOLDING SHORT, as appropriate.

C. TO CROSS A RUNWAY

PILOT/DRIVER (call sign) REQUEST CROSS RUNWAY

(number…)

Note - If the control tower is unable to see the crossing

aircraft or vehicle (night, low visibility, etc.), the instruction

should always be accompanied by a request to report

when the aircraft or vehicle has vacated the runway.

ATC (call sign) CROSS RUNWAY (number)

[REPORT VACATED]

D. PREPARATION FOR TAKEOFF CLEARANCE

TO ENTER RUNWAY AND AWAIT TAKEOFF

CLEARANCE.

ATC (call sign) LINE UP [AND WAIT];

ATC (call sign) LINE UP RUNWAY (number);

ATC (call sign) LINE UP. BE READY FOR IMMEDIATE

DEPARTURE;

Good practice read back example

Pilot (call sign) from S3 line up runway 27 and wait

ATC (call sign) TAXI TO HOLDING POINT [number]

[RUNWAY (number)] VIA (specific route to be

followed), [HOLD SHORT OF RUNWAY

(number)] or [CROSS RUNWAY (number)]

Note - The pilot or driver will, when requested, report

“RUNWAY VACATED” when the aircraft or vehicle is clear

of the runway.

Proposing ‘be ready for immediate departure’ or asking

the question ‘are you ready for immediate departure?’

does not imply a take-off clearance has been given.

The phrase ‘Go ahead’ (meaning pass your message)

may be misinterpreted as an instruction to move the

vehicle or aircraft and should therefore NOT be used.

E. MULTIPLE LINEUPS ON THE SAME RUNWAY.

Line-up instructions may be issued to more than one

aircraft at different points on the same runway, using

the ICAO criteria contained in ICAO Doc. 7030. In

addition to the standard phraseology in Chapter 12 of

PANS-ATM the following ATC phraseology shall be used:

ATC (call sign) LINE UP AND WAIT RUNWAY 22,

INTERSECTION ALPHA ONE, NUMBER 2 FOR

DEPARTURE, NUMBER ONE AN AIR FRANCE

B737 DEPARTING FROM INTERSECTION

BRAVO.

PILOT LINING UP AND WAIT RUNWAY 22,

INTERSECTION ALPHA ONE, NUMBER 2,

(call sign)

F. CONDITIONAL CLEARANCES

ICAO Doc. 4444, PANS-ATM 12.2.7 Conditional phrases,

such as “behind landing aircraft” or “after departing

aircraft”, shall not be used for movements affecting the

active runway(s), except when the aircraft or vehicles

concerned are seen by the appropriate controller and

pilot. The aircraft or vehicle causing the condition in

the clearance issued shall be the first aircraft/vehicle to

pass in front of the other aircraft concerned. In all cases

a conditional clearance shall be given in the following

order and consist of:

a) identification;

b) the condition;

c) the clearance; and

d) brief reiteration of the condition,

For example:

ATC “(call sign), BEHIND DC9 ON SHORT FINAL,

LINE UP BEHIND”.

G. TAKEOFF CLEARANCE

ATC (call sign) CLEARED FOR TAKE-OFF

[REPORT AIRBORNE]…. Applicable for Low

Visibility operations;

Best Practice to prevent wrong runway selection, or

when more than one runway in use, always use the

runway designator in the instruction,

ATC (call sign) RUNWAY (number) CLEARED FOR

TAKE-OFF

When take-off clearance has not been complied with,

ATC (call sign) TAKE OFF IMMEDIATELY OR VACATE

RUNWAY [(instructions)];

Note - This makes explicit the need for the aircraft

receiving the conditional clearance to identify the aircraft

or vehicle causing the conditional clearance.

The acknowledgement of a conditional clearance must

contain the condition in the read-back e.g.

PILOT BEHIND LANDING DC9 on SHORT FINAL,

LINING UP BEHIND call sign.

ATC (call sign) [that is] correct

Note: The procedure also makes no provision for vehicles

to be included in the process of receiving a conditional

clearance. They may only be the subject of a conditional

clearance.

ATC (call sign) TAKE OFF IMMEDIATELY OR HOLD

SHORT OF RUNWAY

Or to cancel a take-off clearance

ATC (call sign) HOLD POSITION, CANCEL TAKE-OFF

I SAY AGAIN CANCEL TAKE-OFF (reasons);

PILOT (call sign) HOLDING;

Or to stop a take-off after an aircraft has commenced

take-off roll

ATC (call sign) STOP IMMEDIATELY [(repeat aircraft

call sign) STOP IMMEDIATELY]

PILOT (call sign) STOPPING;

AERODROME CONTROL PHRASEOLOGY 

READBACK

Of equal importance to the usage of correct phraseologies

is the need to obtain the required readback, in the order

required and accurately. Listed below are the provisions

provided in the relevant ICAO documents pertaining to

this safety critical element of runway operations, together

with the paragraph number in the ICAO document.

In ICAO Doc.4444 PANS-ATM the requirements regarding

readbacks are as follows:

“Read-back of clearances and safety-related

information

The flight crew shall read-back to the air traffic controller

safety-related parts of ATC clearances and instructions which

are transmitted by voice. The following items shall always be

read-back:

a) ATC route clearances;

b) clearances and instructions to enter, land on, take

off from, hold short of, cross and backtrack on any

runway; and

c) runway-in-use, altimeter settings, SSR codes, level

instructions, heading and speed instructions and,

whether issued by the controller or contained in ATIS

broadcasts, transition levels.

Other clearances or instructions, including conditional

clearances, shall be readback or acknowledged in a manner

to clearly indicate that they have been understood and will

be complied with.

The controller shall listen to the readback to ascertain that

the clearance or instruction has been correctly acknowledged

by the flight crew and shall take immediate action to correct

any discrepancies revealed by the readback.

Studies of air ground communication practices have shown

that incomplete readbacks may mask a misunderstanding.

Incorrect readbacks show there is a misunderstanding.

Air traffic control must challenge incomplete or incorrect

readbacks.”

AVOIDING CALL SIGN CONFUSION

The use of full call signs of all traffic operating on or in

close proximity to a runway has been identified as a critical

element in enhancing safety for runway operations. Whilst

the ICAO provisions allow for use of abbreviated call signs

in certain circumstances, it is deemed Best Practice not to

apply any shortening of call signs in this situation.

Call sign confusion is not restricted to similar call signs

between aircraft. Confusion may occur between aircraft

and vehicle call signs. Confusion with infrastructure may

also be part of call sign confusion incidents.

Runway Incursion Example:

RJ 85 is on final to land RWY 02. Meanwhile, an aircraft

with the call sign “Delta xxx” has to taxi to a position called

“Delta 2” later split in “Delta 2-2. RWY 02 (RWY 2 for US

pilots) is in use.

ATC to outbound taxiing traffic:

“DELTA XXX CROSS RUNWAY ZERO SEVEN RIGHT AND

CONTINUE STRAIGHT AHEAD TO DELTA TWO

(a taxiway)”

Pilot Delta xxx:

“CROSS RUNWAY SEVEN RIGHT TO RUNWAY TWO”

(unchallenged incorrect readback)

ATC:

“DELTA XXX TAKE POSITION ON DELTA TWO PLEASE”

(non EU/ICAO phraseology)

Pilot Delta xxx

“AFFIRM ON DELTA TWO TWO ”

ATC to landing traffic:

“RJ85 GO AROUND, I SAY AGAIN GO AROUND TRAFFIC

TOO CLOSE TO THE RUNWAY”

Pilot 85

“GOING AROUND RJ85”

Pilot of Delta interpreted these instructions as Delta

to (runway) 02.

ICAO DOC. 4444, PANS-ATM

 TRANSMISSION OF NUMBERS

- RWY = each digit separately

- i.e. RWY02 = RUNWAY ZERO TWO – RUNWAY TWO

 TAXI PROCEDURES

- TAXI TO HOLDING POINT RWY # #

HOLD SHORT OF RWY # #

(was not said by the controller)

 PREPARATION FOR T/O

- CLEARANCE TO ENTER A RWY MUST BE OBTAINED:

- LINE UP (AND WAIT) RWY # #

Other points of confusion include aircraft type

misidentification and aircraft livery confusion where

the livery is not representative of the aircraft call sign.

To mitigate against potential call sign confusion between

vehicles operating on the aerodrome, some airports

have introduced vehicle numbering schemes (e.g. block

numbers or unique/discrete identifying numbers) to help

differentiate call signs for vehicles.

COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUES  GENERAL

Detailed below are the relevant provisions laid down in

Annex 10, Aeronautical Communications with regard to

radio transmission guidelines and techniques.

Speech-transmitting techniques should be such that the

highest possible intelligibility is incorporated in each

transmission. Fulfilment of this aim requires that flight

crew and ground personnel should:

a) Enunciate each word clearly and distinctly;

b) Maintain an even rate of speech. When a message

is transmitted to an aircraft and its contents need to

be recorded the speaking rate should be at a slower

rate to allow for the writing process. A slight pause

preceding and following numerals makes them easier

to understand;

c) Maintain the speaking volume at a constant level;

d) Be familiar with the microphone operating techniques

particularly in relation to the maintenance of a

constant distance from the microphone if a modulator

with a constant level is not used;

e) Suspend speech temporarily if it becomes necessary

to turn the head away from the microphone.

WHAT TO DO IF UNCERTAIN OF YOUR POSITION ON

THE MANOEUVRING AREA

Pilots and airside manoeuvring area drivers do not

knowingly enter a runway without a valid ATC clearance.

When this happens, it is most likely because the pilot

or driver is uncertain of their position and situational

awareness has been lost. ICAO has developed a procedure

about what to do if you are a pilot, driver or air traffic

controller with a team member who does not know that

they are on a runway or taxiway.

ICAO Doc. 4444 PANS-ATM -

“UNCERTAINTY OF POSITION ON THE

MANOEUVRING AREA

Except when a pilot is in doubt as to the position of the

aircraft with respect to the manoeuvring area shall

immediately:

a) stop the aircraft; and

b) simultaneously notify the appropriate ATS unit of the

circumstances (including the last known position).

In those situations where a pilot is in doubt as to the position

of the aircraft with respect to the manoeuvring area, but

recognizes that the aircraft is on a runway, the pilot shall

immediately:

a) notify the appropriate ATS unit of the circumstances

(including the last known position);

b) if able to locate a nearby suitable taxiway, vacate the

runway as expeditiously as possible, unless otherwise

instructed by the ATS unit; and then,

c) stop the aircraft.

A vehicle driver in doubt as to the position of the vehicle with

respect to the manoeuvring area shall immediately:

a) notify the appropriate ATS unit of the circumstances

(including the last known position);

b) simultaneously, unless otherwise instructed by the ATS

unit, vacate the landing area, taxiway, or other part of the

manoeuvring area, to a safe distance as expeditiously as

possible; and then,

c) stop the vehicle.

7.4.1.5.4 In the event the aerodrome controller becomes

aware of an aircraft or vehicle that is lost or uncertain of its

position on the manoeuvring area, appropriate action shall

be taken immediately to safeguard operations and assist the

aircraft or vehicle concerned to determine its position.”

CONDITIONAL CLEARANCES

Safety studies have demonstrated that the misapplication

and misinterpretation of conditional clearances can be a

contributing factor in runway incursions.

As per Recommendation 1.3.7, if conditional clearances are

used, in accordance with ICAO provisions, ANSPs should

ensure a policy and robust procedures are developed and

implemented. Moreover, ANSPs should:

 Assess conditional clearance operational procedures

and practices. There should be a clear operational

justification for the use of conditional clearances, i.e.

to help improve the flow and throughput of traffic.

Conditional clearances should not be used for the

convenience of the controller and/or pilot when there

is no operational requirement. Strict observations

of conditional clearance conditions by controllers

should be monitored as part of routine operational

supervision and ongoing competency assessments.

 Consider if the operational use of conditional

clearances can be removed or reduced at specific

aerodromes where their use cannot be justified for

capacity enhancement or traffic throughput purposes.

Note: To raise awareness of the importance of the correct

application of conditional clearances a SKYbrary SKYclip has

been produced which can be viewed at

http://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/Conditional_

Clearance_(SKYclip)

IMPROVING COMMUNICATIONS FOR LITTLE

OR NO COST

 Introduce a method for self-checking if EU/ICAO

compliant phraseology is used for air traffic controllers

e.g. by taking the opportunity to listen to short

samples of own R/T and comparing what was said

with EU/ICAO phrases on a regular basis.

Note: An example 'best practice' form can be seen

on SKYbrary at https://skybrary.aero/bookshelf/

books/4081.pdf

 Ensure a cockpit friendly method to record line-up /

crossing clearances is available.

 Implement a method for manoeuvring area drivers to

record when a clearance to enter or cross a runway is

received.

 ATC clearances must be issued early enough to ensure

that they are transmitted to the aircraft in sufficient

time for pilots to comply with them.

 Raise awareness that EU/ICAO compliant

communication practices help to prevent ground

navigation errors.

 One best practice is to implement a systematic

evaluation of the R/T loading; it may lead to frequency

splitting.

 Consider training recommendations for pilots,

controllers and vehicle drivers, including practical

exams.

Introduction

Establish an aerodrome local Runway Safety Team

Role

Terms of Reference

Composition

ICAO and EU

ICAO Runway Incursion definition

ICAO Hot Spot definition

Reporting culture

Exchange of lessons learned and best practices

Dissemination of Safety recommendations

What pilots want

Preparing a Runway Safety Programme for your aerodrome

Tasks

Hot Spot Aerodrome Chart - published in the AIP

Joint training

Raise awareness of runway safety matters

References

APPENDIX B

GUIDELINES FOR AERODROME LOCAL

RUNWAY SAFETY TEAMS

APPENDIX B GUIDELINES FOR AERODROME

LOCAL RUNWAY SAFETY TEAMS

INTRODUCTION

An aerodrome local Runway Safety Team (RST) should

form a key element in the aerodrome runway safety

programme and should ensure that a strong focus is

maintained on runway safety across all parties creating, de

facto, an aerodrome level safety management function. At

some aerodromes cross-disciplinary teams may already

exist that could carry out the functions of the aerodrome

local Runway Safety Team, using a discrete runway safety

agenda. If such teams are employed it is essential that

their work is not duplicated; instead the work should be

integrated as part of the aerodrome’s runway safety action

plan.

ESTABLISHING A AERODROME LOCAL RUNWAY

SAFETY TEAM

Aerodrome local Runway Safety Teams have been

established at many aerodromes in Europe. Experience

has demonstrated that these teams have been effective

at helping to minimise the risk of runway incursions at

individual aerodromes, where local issues such as taxiway

layout, runway configuration and aircraft operators’ needs

can be taken into account.

Note: Once established the aerodrome local Runway Safety

Team can be registered with ICAO at:

https://www.icao.int/safety/RunwaySafety/Pages/

default.aspx

ROLE

The role of the aerodrome local Runway Safety Team

should be to advise the appropriate Management on

the potential runway safety issues and to recommend

mitigating measures and solutions for those identified

issues. This appendix provides guidance on the role of

that team.

TERMS OF REFERENCE

The tasks mentioned here may be reflected in the

suggested Terms of Reference for an aerodrome local

Runway Safety Team.

 Monitor the number, type and, the severity of runway

safety events;

 identify any local problem areas and suggest

improvements e.g. by sharing the outcome of

investigation reports to establish local hot spots

or problem areas at the aerodrome and workable

mitigations with and for operational staff;

 work as a cohesive team to better understand the

operating difficulties of personnel who work in other

areas and recommend areas for improvement;

 ensure that the recommendations contained in this

European Action Plan for the Prevention of Runway

Incursions are implemented;

 conduct a runway safety awareness campaign that

focuses on local issues, e.g. produce and distribute local

hot spot maps or other guidance material as considered

necessary; and

 review the aerodrome to ensure it is adequate and

compliant with ICAO and, where applicable, EU

Standards and Recommended Practices regularly.

The establishment of an aerodrome local Runway Safety

Team is intended to facilitate effective local implementa-

tion of the recommendations contained in the European

Action Plan for the Prevention of Runway Incursions and

to stimulate proactive management of runway safety.

Specific objectives of an aerodrome local Runway Safety

Team include development of appropriate runway incur-

sion risk prevention measures and creation of awareness

of potential solutions, advising Management on runway

safety issues and recommending mitigation measures. A

plan containing action items for mitigating runway safety

deficiencies should be developed. Action items should be

aerodrome specific and linked to a runway safety concern,

issue or problem at that aerodrome.

COMPOSITION

The team should consist of, as a minimum, representatives

from at least the main groups associated with

manoeuvring area operations, namely the Aerodrome

Operator (which would include a vehicle driver), Ground

Handling Associations when appropriate, representatives

from the Air Navigation Service Provider/and local Air

Traffic Controller associations and pilots from Aircraft

Operators/and local pilot associations that operate at the

aerodrome and other organisations (e.g. wildlife control)

that operate on the manoeuvring area. Regulators may

also be invited to attend to advise on regulatory matters.

Notes:

1. The ICAO Runway Safety Team Handbook (Edition 2, June

2015) and Commission Regulation (EU) No 139/2014

describe the establishment, role, composition and ToR of

aerodrome local Runway Safety Teams.

2. The ICAO RST Handbook also encourages the presence of

the regulatory authority to attend local RST meetings and

lists technical experts of controller and pilot associations

as representatives who should participate.

3. ICAO has introduced the concept of Runway Safety

Team ‘Go-Teams’ which aim to assist a State and airport

in establishing an RST, supporting the implementation

stage by providing technical assistance, including

training, assessments and gap analysis, expert advice and

guidance based on best practices; details are in the ICAO

RST Handbook.

ICAO AND EU

ICAO Standards and recommended practices (SARPs)

are available to give the same consistent, predictable

operations at any aerodrome in the world. For EU states, EU

Regulations and associated AMC/GM transpose applicable

ICAO SARPs and some differences from them, into EU law.

All available safety recommendations of global interest

to the civil aviation community, resulting from runway

related accidents and incidents and their successful risk

mitigations should be reported to ICAO using the normal

reporting mechanism for the relevant organisations, i.e.

the organisations involved in the incursion. In EU states,

reporting must also comply with Commission Regulation

(EU) No 376/2014 and its supporting implementing

regulations.

ICAO RUNWAY INCURSION DEFINITION

To enable the sharing of safety lessons learned and a

common understanding of runway incursion causal and

contributory factors, ICAO introduced a commonly agreed

definition of a runway incursion in November 2004. The

definition is:

“Any occurrence at an aerodrome involving the

incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle or person

on the protected area of a surface designated for the

landing and take-off of aircraft.”

Note: This definition is also adopted in Commission

Regulation (EU) No 139/2014 Guidance Material.

One role of the aerodrome local Runway Safety Team is

to ensure that the ICAO definition is used. It is apparent,

however, that there are still various different interpretations

of the definition and the new Appendix N looks at this in

more detail with the aim of providing information that

could lead to a more consistent application of the runway

incursion definition.

ICAO HOT SPOT DEFINITION

The ICAO definition of a hot spot is:

“A location on an aerodrome movement area with

a history or potential risk of collision or runway

incursion, and where heightened attention by pilots/

drivers is necessary.”

The criteria used to establish and chart a hot spot are

contained in the ICAO Doc. 9870, Manual for the Prevention

of Runway Incursions; ICAO Doc. 4444 PANS-ATM; and

ICAO Annex 4 - Aeronautical Charts. Hot spots should be

identified and brought to the attention of the aerodrome

local Runway Safety Team. Hazards associated with hot

spots should be mitigated as soon as possible and as far

as is reasonably practicable. Operational staff needs to be

made aware of hot spots at aerodromes.

Note: Commission Regulation (EU) No 139/2014 AMC/GM

provides additional advice; moreover, a EUROCONTROL

Network Manager “Aerodrome Hot Spot Survey” report

provides more guidance (best practice) on the depiction of

hot spots on aeronautical charts.

REPORTING CULTURE

Ensure it is easy for operational staff at your aerodrome

to report runway incursions and other runway safety

occurrences, including post-flight, for pilots after landing

at the destination aerodrome. Ensure that the reporter

receives feedback in a timely manner. Support the

provision of a Just Culture for all operational staff. Make

use of lessons learned for joint training and improvement

of the aerodrome services, infrastructure and practices.

The overall purpose of the safety reporting system is to

use reported information to improve the level of safety

performance of the aerodrome, and not to apportion

blame.

Note: ICAO Annex 19 Safety Management, Commission

Regulation (EU) No 139/2014 AMC/GM and Regulation (EU)

No 376/2014 provide further advice on safety reporting

systems.

EXCHANGE OF LESSONS LEARNED AND

BEST PRACTICES

The problem of runway incursions is still considered to

be one of the top safety issues to be resolved in aviation.

Consequently, an important objective for aerodrome

local Runway Safety Teams is to raise awareness of the

operational hazards of working on the manoeuvring area

and share good practices to prevent runway incursions.

DISSEMINATION OF SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS

An aerodrome local Runway Safety Team should ensure

wide dissemination of the safety recommendations

derived from accident and incident investigation findings

as well as other relevant lessons learned, for example from

operational experience, and best risk mitigation practices.

WHAT PILOTS WANT

Do not expect pilots to be familiar with local procedures.

The difficulty encountered at aerodromes where EU/ICAO

provisions are not respected, is the use of local, unique

procedures and practices. Non-standard items have to be

interpreted by the pilot for the pre-flight briefing or whilst

taxing, from the cockpit.

What pilots need for safe operation on the manoeuvring

area is the consistent use of internationally agreed

standard phraseology, procedures and signs, markings

and lighting. Pilots’ wishes for standardisation of

communication practices include:

 Use of standard phraseology in accordance with EU and

ICAO provisions;

 use of signs, markings and lighting in accordance with

ICAO Annex 14 – Aerodromes, Volume 1 – Aerodrome

Design and Operations;

 enhanced situational awareness, based on the use of

one language – aviation English;

 short, unambiguous taxi clearances, with no more

than 2 sets of numbers to remember at a time. Special

consideration should be given to new information;

 enough sectors / frequencies to avoid congestion of the

R/T channels;

 complete information about expected taxi routing and

stand, taxi-out routing and runway well in advance; and

 accurate aerodrome charts and essential information on

aerodrome conditions- sources would be ATIS, NOTAMs

and, in some circumstances to be decided locally, real-

time radio communications.

PREPARING A RUNWAY SAFETY PROGRAMME

FOR YOUR AERODROME

The aerodrome local Runway Safety Team should

implement an action plan for runway safety, advise

management as appropriate on potential runway safety

issues and recommend strategies for hazard removal and

mitigation of the residual risk. These strategies may be

developed based on local occurrences or combined with

information collected elsewhere.

Although not considered a regulatory authority or

intended to replace any required component of a

Safety Management System (SMS), the aerodrome local

RST is aimed to improve and support runway safety

by integrating the safety systems of the participating

organisations (stakeholders). Interfacing service providers

should document the interface between the SMS and

the aerodrome local RST, where aerodrome local RSTs are

available.

When preparing a runway safety programme for

your aerodrome each action item should designate a

responsible person or organisation for completing the

relevant tasks. There may be more than one person or

organisation affected by an action item; however, one

person or organisation should take the lead and be

responsible for the completion of all the tasks associated

with the action item. A realistic time frame to accomplish

the work should also be associated with each action item.

TASKS

A number of the recommendations contained in the

Action Plan can be dealt with by the aerodrome local

Runway Safety Team.

One important task is the identification of potential runway

safety issues. It is essential to ask the question 'What' can

go wrong 'Where' and 'Why'. To provide workable answers

it is necessary to review aerodrome practices regularly,

and when relevant information is available, from incident

investigation findings.

It is important to ensure that:

 suitable data is available to provide evidence for making

decisions;

 findings from incident and accident investigations are

analysed and understood;

 lessons learned from incidents and accidents related to

runway safety issues from other aerodromes, as well as

one’s own aerodrome are taken into account;

 properly expressed safety concerns from operational

staff are considered even if no significant safety event

has yet occurred i.e. avoid the “it hasn’t gone wrong yet”

mind-set;

 reviews take place in different weather and light

conditions to assess all runway entrances and visual

aids to check that they are correctly located and clearly

visible to pilots and drivers;

 lights, signs and markings are checked for conspicuity

at a height similar to the height of the smallest and

largest aircraft and vehicles using the manoeuvring

area; and

 all markings and signs should be adequate for and

understandable by all parties, with no possible

ambiguity of their meaning.

In any review the aerodrome local Runway Safety Team

should take into account runway and taxiway layout, traf-

fic intensity and mix, and both visual and non¬-visual aids

such as markings, lights, signs, radar, taxiway designa-

tions, ATS procedures, AIP information etc.

When examining operating procedures, it is necessary to

ensure that procedures employed by different companies

at the aerodrome are robust, integrated and effective so

as to minimise the risk of runway incursions. Extra care

should be taken when examining existing or proposed

runway capacity enhancing procedures or noise abate-

ment schemes involving runway preferential systems. A

Safety Risk Assessment should be made before imple-

menting such procedures.

Review proposed changes to the runways adjacent taxi-

way and apron infrastructure in the light of Runway In-

cursion sensitivity and provide advice to the aerodrome

operators or building contractors.

Measure the effectiveness of operational solutions peri-

odically. This can be accomplished by comparing the re-

sults of the initial analysis with the current runway incur-

sion status. For example, if an action item was to provide

training for controllers, pilots or vehicle drivers, the effec-

tiveness of such training should be evaluated by the team.

Another important task for the aerodrome local Runway

Safety Team should be to assist in keeping a spotlight on

the subject and to develop and run local awareness cam-

paigns.

The timing of awareness campaigns is important, choos-

ing to make a runway safety briefing at the start of a busy

season, or just before an air show or similar unusual activ-

ity can be helpful to all operational staff.

A possible output could be the production and distribu-

tion of local hot spot maps or other guidance material as

considered operationally necessary. Hot spot maps may

point out unique or complex intersections and runway

crossings where runway incursions have taken place in

the past or areas of the runway or associated taxiways

which are not visible from the Control Tower. Consider-

ation shall be given to publishing these maps via the AIP.

An example extract of a local map, often referred to as a

'Hot Spot Map', produced by Barcelona Airport is shown.

Notes:

1. Best practices used in the production of hot spot maps

are listed in the EUROCONTROL Network Manager

“Aerodrome Hot Spot Study Report” http://skybrary.aero/

index.php/Ground_Operations.

2. Further information concerning the designation and

publication of hot spots is also provided in Appendix H.

3. The Collaborative Aerodrome Safety Hotspots (CASH)

Project introduced in France also provides aerodrome

safety related information (in French):

https://www.ecologique-solidaire.gouv.fr/collaborative-

aerodrome-safety-hotspots-cash

Other tasks could include, assisting in verifying that com-

munications between air traffic controllers, pilots and ve-

hicle drivers are satisfactory, or if any improvements could

be suggested. For example, although standard ICAO

phraseology may be used, some messages from ATC may

be overlong or complex, which may have the potential to

confuse vehicle drivers or pilots.

The inherent difficulties of communicating on the ma-

noeuvring area mean that aerodrome design, visual aids

and infrastructure naming conventions play an important

part in reinforcing the intended instructions passed by the

air traffic controller.

It is suggested that some members of an aerodrome local

Runway Safety Team participate in safety case work, re-

garding changes to existing, procedures or infrastructure

involving runways.

Aerodrome local Runway Safety Teams can play a role

in preparing the briefing pack for new users of an aero-

drome, or for a new high season.

The guidance found in this Action Plan should not be seen

to be limiting and good practice should be shared as ap-

propriate. The boundaries set by national regulators and

internationally accepted provisions should be respected.

Technology is available to help to prevent runway incur-

sions and may be considered to supplement good ma-

noeuvring area practices by enhancing situational aware-

ness e.g. through the use of appropriate alerting functions.

Extract from Hot Spot Aerodrome Chart - published in the AIP

JOINT TRAINING

Recommendation 1.1.4: Promote and make available

specific joint training and familiarisation in the

prevention of runway incursions to Pilots, Air Traffic

Controllers and Manoeuvring Area Vehicle Drivers.

Education and awareness of the aerodrome local Runway

Safety Team’s achievements, can be communicated via

training syllabi, newsletters, posters, stickers and the use of

forums, on-line and in workshops.

Also, as part of the ‘one team’ approach to runway safety,

airside drivers should be encouraged to visit apron control

/air traffic control as part of their training. Equally, apron/

air traffic controllers should be encouraged to go out with

airside drivers to understand, for instance, what it is like to

drive a tug on the aerodrome.

Training on runway safety matters may be a supplement

to core content training or EU Ops syllabi for licensing and

certification and may also be included in the continuation

training for air traffic controllers. EUROCONTROL

provides joint training for air traffic controllers, pilots and

manoeuvring area drivers called Aerodrome Resource

Management (ARM). This training provides insight into

the common runway incursion causal and contributory

factors (such as expectation bias) and how to deal with

difficult situations such as regaining situational awareness

and control of the present traffic situation. The ARM also

emphasises the importance of aerodrome local Runway

Safety Teams in the prevention of runway incursions and

‘trains the trainers’ to improve the effectiveness of course

participants in aerodrome local Runway Safety Team

activities.

RAISE AWARENESS OF RUNWAY SAFETY MATTERS

Ensure globally accepted practices to prevent runway

incursions are part of your local practices and that their

significance is locally understood, e.g. Never cross (or

instruct a vehicle or aircraft to cross) an illuminated red stop

bar.

Set up a user friendly email address to ease communication

e.g. lrst@xyzairport.aa

The ICAO Runway Safety Toolkit (http://cfapp.icao.int/

tools/RSP_ikit/story_flash.html) provides information for

educational and awareness programmes.

ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AERODROME

LOCAL RUNWAY SAFETY TEAMS

Recommendation 1.1.1: Assess the implementation

and operation of aerodrome local Runway Safety

Teams and consider if and how changes could be made

to increase their effectiveness in developing runway

safety actions.

Recommendation 1.1.2: Implement local runway safety

awareness campaigns and assess their effectiveness

at each aerodrome for Air Traffic Controllers, Pilots

and Vehicle Drivers and other personnel who operate

on or near the runway. Consider format, method of

delivery, frequency and feedback.

Establishing an aerodrome local Runway Safety Team is

only the start. As part of a continuous safety improvement

programme, aerodrome local Runway Safety Teams should

periodically assess the effectiveness in the way that they

work and the safety outcomes that they produce. In this

context, the following areas could be addressed;

 The composition, role, terms of reference, tasks and

associated safety programmes should be assessed

against industry best practice and available guidance

materials (e.g. ICAO Runway Safety Team Handbook).

 Evidence to support that RST proceedings are properly

captured:

  Aerodrome local RST attendance and

participation records.

  Minutes of aerodrome local RST meetings.

  Safety risk assessments and associated

recommendations and an action log/plan.

  Runway incursion hazard log and

corrective actions.

 Impact of runway incursion prevention activities and

campaigns to improve safety: consider format, method

of delivery, frequency and feedback.

 Processes and formal agreements governing the sharing

of safety data, safety reports and safety information

should be verified.

 Exchange visits to other aerodrome local Runway Safety

Teams to observe how they operate may also provide

additional ideas how to improve effectiveness.

 Internal and external (e.g. APEX) audits/surveys can also

help aerodrome local Runway Safety Teams improve

their overall efficiency and effectiveness.

REFERENCES

International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO)

 Annex 19 – Safety Management Systems

 ICAO PANS Aerodromes Doc. 9981 (Note: A new edition

is planned to be published in 2019 and to become

applicable in 2020)

 ICAO Doc. 9870 Runway Incursion Prevention Manual:

Chapter 3. Establishing a Runway Incursion Prevention

Programme 3-7: www.icao.int/fsix/res_ans.cfm

 ICAO Runway Safety Team Handbook Edition 2.0 June

2015

European Union

Commission Regulation (EU) No 139/2014 laying down

requirements and administrative procedures related to

aerodromes, specifically ADR.OR.D.005 and associated

AMC/GM

Commission Regulation (EU) 376/2014 on the reporting,

analysis and follow-up of occurrences in civil aviation

EUROCONTROL

 European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation

(EUROCONTROL)

http://www.eurocontrol.int/articles/runway-safety

 Aerodrome Resource Management (ARM) Training:

http://www.eurocontrol.int/training

 EUROCONTROL Network Manager Safety Study –

Aerodrome ‘Hot Spot’ Survey – May 2015.

 SKYbrary www.skybrary.ae .

Airports Council International (ACI)

https://www.aci-europe.org/

 Airport Excellence (APEX) in Safety programme:

http://www.aci.aero/APEX

ACI Runway Safety Handbook 2014

Air Services Australia

www.airservicesaustralia.com

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)

https://www.faa.gov/airports/runway_safety/

International Air Transport Association (IATA)

www.iata.org

International Federation of Airline

Pilots’ Associations (IFALPA) www.ifalpa.org

Transport Canada

http://www.tc.gc.ca/eng/civilaviation/standards/

systemsafety-posters-tools-3487.htm

United Kingdom Safety Regulation Group

http://www.caa.co.uk/home/

 UK CAP 1069, Preventing runway incursions at

small aerodromes

France DGAC

Collaborative Aerodrome Safety Hotspots (CASH) Project

https://www.ecologique-solidaire.gouv.fr/collaborative-

aerodrome-safety-hotspots-cash

Introduction

Training Delivery

Framework for an Airside Vehicle Driver Training Programme

Framework for Manoeuvring Area Vehicle Driver Training Programme

Framework for a Radiotelephony (RTF) Training Programme

Summary

References

Useful Web sites

APPENDIX C

AIRSIDE VEHICLE DRIVER TRAINING

APPENDIX C AIRSIDE VEHICLE DRIVER TRAINING

INTRODUCTION

Studies and data show that vehicles and their drivers

continue to be involved in runway incursions. It is the

responsibility of the Aerodrome Operator to have in place,

a formal training, assessment, proficiency check and

authorisation programme for all drivers operating airside.

Notes:

1. Commission Regulation (EU) No 139/2014 laying down

requirements and administrative procedures related to

aerodromes (plus Acceptable Means of Compliance and

Guidance Material) also contains useful information for

the control of aerodrome drivers.

2. The new edition of ICAO Doc. 9981, PANS Aerodromes due

to be published in 2019 will include a dedicated chapter on

Aerodrome driver permit schemes, focused mainly on the

safety aspects associated with airside driving.

As a result of local hazard analysis the operation of vehicles

on the aerodrome should have been highlighted as a

potentially high risk activity which demands a number of

formal control measures to be put in place to manage the

risk. A vehicle driver training programme is one of these

control measures and should form part of the overall

Safety Management System (SMS) of the Aerodrome

Operator.

The Aerodrome Operator is responsible for developing

an agreed standard for the vehicle driver training

programme. There will be a requirement for co-operation

and partnership with Air Traffic Control, Ground Handling

Agents, Airlines and other Service Providers airside to

ensure the continued operation of the programme.

Depending upon the scale and complexity of the

aerodrome and the individual requirements of the driver,

the programme should take into account the following

main areas:

 A generic airside vehicle driver training programme

which covers operational safety and health and safety

aspects of operating vehicles, plant and equipment in

close proximity to aircraft on aprons, stands and airside

roads.

 Specific training on the vehicle, plant and equipment,

e.g. car, tug, high loader, coach.

 Where the specific job function requires the driver

to operate on the manoeuvring area then additional

training on the hazards associated with runways and

taxiways should be covered.

 An essential requirement of operating a vehicle on

the manoeuvring area is the need to use VHF radio

communications with Air Traffic Control that will require

training in the correct use of RTF, standard phraseology

and, where required, aviation English.

 Works In Progress.

The following programmes describe what may be con-

sidered as ‘good practice’ guidance for Airside and Ma-

noeuvring Area vehicle driver training, with special atten-

tion given to a separate programme for radio telephony

training. The guidance is a compilation of material drawn

from many sources including ICAO, IATA, ACI and a large

number of aerodromes that already operate vehicle driver

training programmes. It is vital that both theoretical class-

room training and practical experience cover all the areas

mentioned. The aim of this guidance is to ensure consis-

tency and a high degree of standardisation in the manner

in which a driver obtains an ‘Airside Driving Permit’; there-

fore, it may be applied to the majority of aerodromes.

TRAINING DELIVERY

The three training programmes are intended as generic

guidance and each aerodrome will need to apply

those areas of training that are applicable to their local

geography, conditions and type of operation.

All of the three training programmes should consist of two

main parts, the first being the classroom/theoretical part

which should include the use of prepared presentations,

maps, diagrams, video, booklets, checklists as appropriate.

The second part should involve practical tuition and visual

familiarisation on the aerodrome and/or in a suitable

airside driving simulator with a suitably trained person.

This practical tuition will take a period of time depending

upon the complexity of the aerodrome; theoretical and

practical tests/examinations should also be used to

ensure that drivers have reached an appropriate level

of proficiency before issuing any form or airside driving

permit.

Following initial training, a programme of refresher

training should be organised after an agreed period of

time. For drivers that have access to the runway(s) this

should not normally exceed one year, whereas for apron

and other manoeuvring area drivers this period could be

extended.

Where delivery for vehicle driver training (apron and

manoeuvring area) and RTF is delegated to a third party

provider the aerodrome should institute a programme of

audits, as part of its SMS, to ensure that agreed standards

are being maintained.

FRAMEWORK FOR AN AIRSIDE VEHICLE DRIVER

TRAINING PROGRAMME

The Airside Driving Permit (ADP)

 The issuing authority

(normally the aerodrome operator):

  its validity in terms of time;

  conditions of use;

  non-transferability of ownership of the permit;

and

  control and audit of permit issue.

Note: Airside driving permits affording access to runways

should be kept to the minimum and subjected to ‘recency’ of

use checks to ensure that the permit holder still needs to drive

on the runway(s).

 Local enforcement and driving offence procedures.

 Relationship to State driver licensing system.

National Legislation and Regulation

 Government/State regulations related to general

vehicle driving licences.

 State/Regional/Local government requirements.

 Regulatory requirements/guidance for driving airside.

Aerodrome Regulations and Requirements

 Rules of Air Traffic Control, rights of way of aircraft.

 Specific aerodrome regulations, requirements and

local instructions.

 Local methods used to disseminate general

information and instruction to drivers.

 Local methods used to disseminate information

regarding works in progress.

Right of Way on the Ground

 Vehicles must always give priority to taxiing aircraft,

aircraft on tow or being pushed back and aircraft with

their anti-collision lights on.

Personal Responsibilities

 Fitness to drive (medical/health standards) national or

airport agreed requirements (alcohol/drugs).

 Issue and use of personal protective equipment such

as high visibility clothing and hearing protection.

 General driving standards.

 No smoking requirements airside.

 Responsibilities with respect to FOD and fuel/oil

spillage.

 Responsibility for individuals to ensure vehicle is

suitable for the task and used correctly.

 Concentration – no use of mobile phones/portable

electronic devices for personal use

Note: In addition to above, ‘sterile cab’ procedures - similar

to ‘sterile cockpit’ principles/procedures used by airlines - can

further improve concentration levels and reduce potential

distractions. In a ‘sterile cab’ only direct operational work

related matters should be discussed (e.g. between the driver

and any co-driver/passengers) whilst the vehicle is operating

on or in the vicinity of the runway(s).

 FOD and spillages.

 Vehicle reversing, use of banksman.

 Staff and passengers walking across aprons, rights of

way.

 Air-bridges and other services such as fixed electrical

ground power.

 The general aircraft turnaround process.

 Aircraft emergency stop and fuel cut off procedures.

 Hazardous cargo.

 Local vehicle towing requirements.

 Requirements for driving at night.

 Requirements for driving in adverse weather

conditions, particularly low visibility.

Local Organisations

 The role of the Aerodrome Operator in setting and

maintaining standards.

 The Regulator and its responsibilities.

 The National and/or local Police and their involvement

with airside driving other enforcement authorities

dealing with vehicles, driving, health and safety.

Emergency Procedures

 Action to be taken in the event of a vehicle accident.

 Specific action to be taken in the event of a vehicle

striking an aircraft.

 Action to be taken in the event of fire.

 Action to be taken in the event of aircraft accident/

incident, including procedures and clearances to enter

the runway.

 Procedures to be used by vehicle drivers if lost or

unsure of position.

Vehicle Standards

 Condition and maintenance standards agreed at

aerodrome and/or national level.

 The requirement to display obstruction lights and

company insignia.

 Requirements and content of daily vehicle inspections.

 Agreed standards of aerodrome and company vehicle

fault reporting and rectification.

 Local requirements for the issue and display of Airside

Vehicle Permits (AVP’s).

General Aerodrome Layout

 The general geography of the local aerodrome.

 Aviation terminology used such as runway, taxiway,

apron, roads, crossings etc.

 All standard aerodrome signs, markings and lights for

both vehicles and aircraft.

 Specific reference to those signs, makings and lights

used to guard runways.

 Specific reference to any controlled/uncontrolled

taxiway crossing procedures.

 Specific reference to the runway(s) Protected Area and

associated chart/map.

 Specific reference to known aerodrome ‘Hot Spots’ as

they may affect airside/manoeuvring area drivers.

Hazards of General Airside Driving

 Speed limits, prohibited areas and no parking

regulations.

 The danger zones around aircraft.

 Engine suction/ingestion and blast, propellers and

helicopters.

 Aircraft refuelling, fuelling zones, vehicle access/exit.

 Reduce the amount of ‘live’ airfield driving for training

purposes – in particular on runways.

 Reduce overall training burden – time saving.

 Reduce vehicle physical wear and tear, and fuel

consumption.

FRAMEWORK FOR MANOEUVRING AREA VEHICLE

DRIVER TRAINING PROGRAMME

It is anticipated that all drivers expected to operate on

the Manoeuvring Area of an aerodrome will obtain an

airside vehicle driver’s permit which has covered the

programme detailed previously. It is also anticipated that

any driver expected to drive on the manoeuvring area

will have obtained an agreed period of experience of

general airside driving before training to operate on the

manoeuvring area.

The numbers of drivers permitted to drive on the

manoeuvring area – especially the runways - should be

kept to the minimum necessary and regularly reviewed.

The functions they perform should normally be within the

following areas of responsibility

 Runway and taxiway inspections.

 Bird Control.

 Rescue and Fire Fighting.

 Essential Engineering.

 ATC.

 Snow clearing and De-icing.

 Airline/Handling agent for aircraft towing and runway

crossings.

 Escort Duties: Note: Specifically, managing groups/

convoys of vehicle and actions to be taken (e.g. inform

ATC) if an escort ‘loses’ a vehicle(s).

All drivers should be trained initially and be provided

with refresher training at agreed intervals with particular

additional emphasis on the following areas.

 Action to be taken in the event of personal injury.

Communications

 The role of the Aerodrome Operator in setting and

maintaining standards.

 The Regulator and its responsibilities.

 The National and/or local Police and their involvement

with airside driving other enforcement authorities

dealing with vehicles, driving, health and safety.

Practical Training (Visual Familiarisation)

 Airside service roads, taxiway crossings and any

restrictions during low visibility, standard taxiways

used.

 Aprons and stands.

 Surface paint markings for vehicles and aircraft.

 Surface paint markings that delineate the boundary

between aprons and taxiways.

 Signs, markings and lights used on the taxiway and

help indicate runways ahead.

 Parking areas and restrictions.

 Speed limits and regulations.

 Hazards during aircraft turnarounds and aircraft

movements.

Synthetic Driver Training Aids

The use of airside/aerodrome driving simulators can

provide a number of additional benefits to help airside/

aerodrome visual familiarisation:

 Supplement theoretical class room training.

 Allow drivers to practice driving airside, including use

of radios, in a safe, learning environment.

 Responsibilities with respect to escorting other

vehicles / aircraft on the manoeuvring area.

 Awareness briefing at the start of a shift.

 Consider adoption of ‘sterile cab’ procedures to

ensure concentration whilst driving airside/on the

manoeuvring area.

Briefing

Manoeuvring area drivers should be briefed at the start

of shift so they are aware of the airfield status. This should

include:

 The runways in use.

 If airfield low visibility procedures are in force.

 Any significant works areas in place, or being

established or removed that day.

 Stop bars that are inoperable making the taxiway

unusable for runway entry or crossing.

 Specific phraseology to be used when a driver is given

permission to spend time in a specified area for an

extended period, to avoid misunderstandings of the

exact boundaries of the clearance.

Manoeuvring area drivers should also ensure they carry an

up to date airfield map (incorporating runway protected

areas) in the vehicle and ensure that situational awareness

is maintained.

Note: ‘Moving map’ type functionality can alert drivers

when approaching a protected area or when entering one.

A physical or technical means to record clearances can also

help maintain driver situational awareness – see Appendix

Aerodrome Regulations and Requirements

 Rules of Air Traffic Control, rights of way of aircraft.

 Definitions of movement area, manoeuvring area,

aprons, stands.

 Methods used to disseminate information regarding

works in progress.

Air Traffic Control

 All access to a runway (even if inactive) should take

place only after receiving a positive ATC clearance

and providing a correct readback, and after the stop

bar (where provided) has been switched off; entering

a runway without a valid ATC clearance will create

a runway incursion, irrespective of the status of

aeronautical ground lighting. Function of aerodrome

control and its area of responsibility including the

extent of Protected Area(s).

 Function of ground movement control and its area of

responsibility.

 Normal and emergency procedures used by ATC

relating to aircraft.

 ATC frequencies used and normal hand over/transfer

points for vehicles.

 ATC call signs, vehicle call signs, phonetic alphabet,

standard phraseology.

 Demarcation of responsibilities between ATC and

Apron Control if applicable.

 Familiarisation with low visibility procedures and

the changes they bring to maneuvering area vehicle

operations.

Personal Responsibilities

 Fitness to drive with particular emphasis on eyesight

and colour perception.

 Correct use of personal protective equipment;

Responsibilities with respect to FOD.

 Description of lights used on the manoeuvring area

with particular emphasis on those related to low

visibility operations e.g. particular care should be

taken if a contingency procedure to be used in Low

Visibility Operations or at night turns off the green

taxiway centreline lights linked to an inoperable stop

bar.

Hazards of Manoeuvring Area Driving

 Engine suction/ingestion and blast, vortex, propellers

and helicopter operations.

 Requirements for driving at night.

 Requirements for operations in low visibility and other

adverse weather conditions.

 Procedures for vehicle, radio and/or transponder

(as applicable) becoming unserviceable whilst on

manoeuvring area.

 Rights of way for aircraft, towed aircraft and RFFS

vehicles in emergency.

 Being familiar with how aircraft under tow will appear

at night or in reduced visibility conditions.

Emergency Procedures

 Actions to be taken in event of vehicle accident/

incident.

 Actions to be taken in event of aircraft accident/

incident.

 Actions to be taken if FOD or other debris is found on

runways and taxiways.

 Procedures to be used by drivers if lost or unsure of

position.

 Local emergency telephone number.

Vehicle Standards

 Responsibility to ensure vehicle used is fit for purpose

and task e.g. vehicles airside should have fitted, and

drivers should use, flashing yellow lights (ideally

all of airside, but at a minimum those driven on the

manoeuvring area).

 Consider fitting a dashboard mounted compass in

vehicles.

 Requirements for daily inspection prior to operating

on the manoeuvring area.

 Particular attention to the display of obstruction and

general lights.

 Serviceability of all essential communications systems

with ATC and base operations.

 Serviceability of vehicle transponders (where fitted)

for A-SMGCS.

Aerodrome Layout

 Particular emphasis on standard ICAO signs, markings

and lights used on the maneuvering area.

 Special emphasis on those signs, markings and lights

used to protect the runway; particular attention

should be given to stop bars and autonomous runway

incursion warning systems (e.g. Runway Status Lights)

where these are installed.

 Extent of runway protected areas with associated

Protected Area chart/map.

 Description of equipment essential to air navigation

such as ILS.

 Description of protected zones related to ILS antenna.

 Description of ILS protected areas and their relation to

runway holding points.

 Description of runway instrument/visual strip, cleared

and graded area.

FRAMEWORK FOR A RADIOTELEPHONY

RTF TRAINING PROGRAMME

The movement of vehicles on the manoeuvring area is

subject to authorisation by Air Traffic Control. Depending

upon the complexity of the aerodrome, ATC may operate

a number of frequencies. Typically the aerodrome (tower)

controller will be responsible for all vehicles operating on

the runway, and the ground controller will be responsible

for all vehicles operating on the taxiways. It is essential

to fit all vehicles that operate on the runway with the

appropriate radio communication frequencies.

All drivers of vehicles operating on the manoeuvring

area should be expected to display a high degree of

competence with respect to use of RTF phraseology and,

where required, Aviation English.

Notes: Some aerodromes have adopted the so-called ‘Triple

One’ practice, namely: One Runway, One Frequency, One

Language (English) as means to improve the situational

awareness of drivers and pilots.

Hierarchy of Message Priority

 Message priorities, understanding of distress, alerting,

control, information messages.

 When on the manoeuvring area, messages from ATC

take priority; this may mean reducing the volume

of other transmissions to ensure correct message

exchange..

Use of the Phonetic Alphabet

 Correct pronunciation of letters, words and numbers.

Use of Standard Phraseology

 Emphasis on drivers using standard phraseology similar

to pilots; some aerodromes have defined additional

phraseology for driver- controller communications.

 Avoid certain phrases such as ‘cleared’, and ‘go ahead’.

Aircraft Familiarisation

 Knowledge of aircraft types and ability to identify all

types normally operating at the aerodrome.

 Knowledge of airline call signs.

 Knowledge of aircraft terminology relating to engines,

fuselage, control surfaces, undercarriage lights, vents

etc.

Practical Training (Visual Familiarisation)

 All runways (including access and exit routes), holding

areas, taxiways and aprons.

 All signs, surface markings and lights associated with

runways, holding positions, CAT I/II/III operations.

 All signs, surface markings and lights associated with

taxiways.

 Specific markings that demarcate the boundary

between aprons and manoeuvring area.

 Navigation aids such as ILS, protected area, antenna,

RVR equipment and other meteorological equipment.

 Hazards of operating around aircraft landing, taking

off or taxiing.

 Any locally used naming convention for particular

areas or routes.

 Knowledge of standard taxi routes, primarily intended

for aircraft.

Note: Aerodrome driving simulators can be used to

supplement all aspects of this training.

Vehicle Breakdown

 Local procedure for vehicle breakdown on runways

and taxiways.

 Procedure for indicating to ATC of vehicle failure.

Radio Fail Procedure

 Understanding of the local procedure if radio failure

occurs whilst on the runway or taxiway.

 Understanding of the light signals that may be used by

ATC to pass instructions to vehicles.

Correct Transmitting Technique and RTF Use

 Understand the reasons for listening out prior to

transmitting, especially if operating on the Tower

(runway) frequency whilst on the runway.

 Use of standard phraseology, aviation English.

 Words and sounds to be avoided.

 Correct positioning of microphones to avoid voice

distortion.

 Avoidance of ‘clipped’ transmissions.

 Be aware of regional accents and variations of speech.

 Speed of delivery of RTF phraseology.

Use of Portable Radios

 Correct use of radios.

 Effective range and battery life.

 Screening/shielding effects on the aerodrome.

 Use of correct call signs, either related to vehicle or an

individual person.

Use of Call Signs for Aircraft, ATC and Vehicles

 Understanding of terminology and acronyms used by

ATC and pilots.

 Knowledge of the airline call signs used at the

aerodrome.

 Vehicle call signs should be appropriate to function e.g.

‘Operations’, ‘Fire’, ‘Engineer’, where there is more than

one vehicle the use of numbers e.g. ‘Fire 2’. In addition,

where practicable, consider unique/discrete vehicle

numbers to reduce the chances of vehicular call sign

confusion especially between different agencies, i.e.

avoid the use of ‘Operations One’ and ‘Fire One’.

Use of Readback Procedures

 Vehicle drivers should use standard readback in the

same manner as pilots for instructions such as ‘enter/

cross the runway’.

Readability Scale

 Understanding and use of the readability scale

from 1 – 5

Aerodrome information

 Expect that ATC will provide real time significant

aerodrome information which may affect operations

on or near the runway when NOTAMS and ATIS (which

are normally used to advise pilots of significant

information regarding runway operations) are not

available.

Lost or Uncertain of Position

 Understanding of local communication procedures

for vehicles lost or uncertain of position on the

manoeuvring area.

6) Commission Regulation (EU) No 139/2014 (and

associated Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC)/

Guidance Material (GM)

7) ICAO Annex 14 - Aerodromes, Volume 1 - Aerodrome

Design and Operations, Ch. 8, Aerodrome Vehicle

Operations, and attachment A, para. 17 - Operators

of vehicles

8) ICAO Doc. 4444, PANS-ATM Ch. 7 Procedures for

Aerodrome Control

9) ICAO Doc. 9981, PANS Aerodromes

(Note: A new edition is planned to be published in

2019 and to become applicable in 2020)

10) Airside Vehicle Drivers Guide Air Services Australia

11) EUROCONTROL Network Manager Safety Study “The

Impact of Airside Drivers on Runway Safety” 2015

USEFUL WEB SITES

ACI:

https://www.aci-europe.org/ and

http://www.aci.aero/APEX

EASA:

www.easa.eu

EUROCONTROL:

www.eurocontrol.int/runwaysafety

IATA:

www.iata.org

UK CAA:

www.caa.co.uk

Air Services Australia:

http://www.airservicesaustralia.com/

Safety whilst using Radios

 Local instructions regarding use of portable radios

and hand held microphones whilst driving a vehicle.

 Local instructions on the use of mobile telephones

(cell phone) whilst operating airside

Practical Training

 On the job training under supervision.

Aerodrome driving simulators can be used to supplement

all aspects of this training.

For more information about communication practices

on the manoeuvring area, refer to Appendix A -

Communication.

SUMMARY

The above frameworks are intended only as guidance and

are based on current ‘good practice’. Aerodromes should

regularly review their vehicle driver training programmes

against programmes and documentation available across

the industry.

REFERENCES

1) Airports Council International ACI (World) Runway

Safety Handbook

2) Airports Council International ACI (World) Apron

Markings and Signs Handbook

3) IATA Airport Handling Manual (AHM) current edition

4) UK Civil Aviation Authority CAP 642 - Airside Safety

Management

5) Requirements for an Airside Driving Permit (ADP)

Scheme, UK CAA CAP 790

Sterile Cockpit for Safety

Communications

Situational awareness

Navigating on the ground - Visual aids

YOU CAN HELP TO PREVENT RUNWAY INCURSIONS!

Training

Best Practices Planning of Airport Ground Operations

References

APPENDIX D

AIRCRAFT OPERATOR/FLIGHT CREW BEST PRACTICES

APPENDIX D AIRCRAFT OPERATOR/FLIGHT

CREW BEST PRACTICES

Runway incursions often involve misunderstanding/

communication breakdown between operational staff

e.g. pilots, vehicle drivers on the manoeuvring area and air

traffic controllers. Miscommunication can lead to a loss of

situational awareness and a ground navigation error. The

majority of runway incursions occur during taxiing out and

departure operations.

Aircraft Operators are invited to review the materials put

forward, and where necessary, amend their Standard

Operating Practices with regard to ground operations.

Principle points to highlight for pilots include:

 Runway incursions may lead to Go-arounds or

indecision about whether to Go-around or not;

 Inexperience, lack of practice with procedures or

unclear procedures may lead to runway incursions;

 Air ground lighting is an important guidance when on

or near a runway;

 Aerodrome infrastructure design is important to

building situational awareness;

 A current aerodrome chart is essential for accurate

navigation on the ground;

 Errors by air traffic controllers, pilots or drivers are

typically caught within their peers. Thus pilots play an

important part in catching the errors they have made

themselves, other pilots and air traffic controllers;

 In today’s air traffic management system, compliance

with ICAO requirements to use aviation English on the

manoeuvring area is a vital safety net.

 Not gathering (i.e. not seeing or hearing) information

clearly or correctly is a frequent cause of incursions

when left unchallenged. An important communication

factor in runway incursion incidents is incorrect or

incomplete readback by pilots or air traffic controllers,

particularly when conditional clearances are used.

 Misunderstandings are more likely to arise when a pilot

is doing other tasks, being head-down.

Examples of this are conducting aircraft performance

calculations, deferred checklist items, administrative tasks,

starting an engine during an engine-out taxi, etc.

Safety reports show that Public Address announcements

to passengers or commercial announcements are a direct

source of error in many events.

STERILE COCKPIT FOR SAFETY

A key point in the prevention of runway incursions is to

apply better preventative measures during the taxi-phase.

Reduced workload will provide for increased attention to

the taxi phase and allow an updated and accurate positio-

nal and situational awareness.

The current generation of aircraft is highly automated

with complex systems, which allow preparation and pro-

gramming of the total flight on the ground. Flight deck

workload peaks have been shifted to now also include

the ground phase of aircraft operations. Appropriate mea-

sures should be undertaken to accommodate flight crew

workload on the ground. The taxi phase should be treated

as a “critical phase of flight”. Thus it is strongly advised to

adopt the sterile flight deck concept whilst taxiing.

During movement of the aircraft the flight crew must be

able to focus on their duties without being distracted by

non-flight related matters. This includes public address

announcements, performance (re)calculations, adminis-

trative tasks, briefings, items like flight control checks, and

or checklists. Preferably these should all be completed

before taxi-out. Taxi items should come after start items. If

an unforeseen change makes any of these actions neces-

sary after commencement of taxi, they should be done

with the aircraft stopped and the parking brake set. En-

sure cabin crews are aware of this requirement if it is not a

Standard Operating Procedure. The following definition of

a ‘Sterile Flight Deck’ is offered as a reference:

Sterile flight deck definition:

Any period of time when the flight crew should not be

disturbed, except for matters critical to the safe operation

of the aircraft.

It is generally accepted that the sterile flight deck applies

as follows:

a) Departure: when the aircraft starts engine/s and ceases

when the aircraft reaches 10,000’ above the departure

aerodrome elevation.

b) Arrival: when the aircraft reaches 10,000’ above the

arrival aerodrome elevation until the engine/s are shut

down after landing.

c) Any other times decreed by the flight crew. (E.g. in flight

emergency, security alert etc)

During taxi preferably both pilots should be looking out-

side. The pilot not flying should only handle essential

check list reading and communication. If a runway change

or intersection change or performance recalculation is

required, then it is advised to stop the aircraft and do the

required items after the parking brakes are set. ATC should

accept this as a normal procedure. Pilots may delay com-

puter re-programming, performance re-calculations and

briefings until aircraft is stopped at the runway holding

point.

Disturbances that can be avoided may include, but not be

limited to, calls received from non-operational areas (e.g.

company), entry onto the flight deck (e.g. cabin crew) and

extraneous conversations not related to the current phase

of flight. Public Address e.g. welcome announcements by

flight deck should be transferred from the taxi phase to a

moment before engine start-up or push back. Operational

calls on the company frequency cause the other pilot to

be isolated in the flight deck. These calls and announce-

ments should, if at all possible, be avoided while taxiing,

and above all, when approaching the active runway.

Note: EASA GM1 ADR – DSN.M.745 states that “Active runway

is to consider any runway or runways currently being used for

take-off or landing. When multiple runways are used, they

are all considered active runways.”

Engine Out Taxiing (EOT)

Due to the multiple safety, efficiency and operational fac-

tors which vary for every aircraft, airport lay-out, weather

conditions, surface conditions and traffic load, Engine Out

Taxiing (EOT) procedure should not be mandatory and

crews should assess its application depending on condi-

tions.

The incorporation of an approved, standardized EOT pro-

cedure into the Operations Manual, as part of the taxi-

ing procedures, provided the relevant crew training is

performed, should be mandatory if the procedure is to

be applied. The EOT procedure must clearly identify and

address any areas of potential confusion like responsibili-

ties and task allocation during start up and shutdown, and

criteria for when it may or may not be applied. Moreover,

the Operations Manual shall clearly state that the EOT

procedure is carried out at the Pilot-In-Command’s discre-

tion, after careful consideration of local and operational

circumstances.

Such circumstances include but are not restricted to:

1. Local airport restrictions on such operations, for

example taxiway/ramp surface gradients.

2. Manoeuvring space, tight turns and 180 degree- turns.

3. Possibility of Foreign Object Damage (FOD) due to

increased jet blast.

4. Compliance with engine warm-up and cool down times

for thermal stabilization as specified by the aircraft

manufacturer.

5. Weather conditions and taxiway/ramp surface status

(for example slippery, wet) that may preclude the

application of the procedure.

6. Operating procedures related to aircraft system

monitoring and checklist accomplishment, which must

be consistent with a late engine start (during taxi-out)

and/or an early engine shut-down (during taxi-in.)

If the Pilot-In-Command elects to carry out the EOT proce-

dure in accordance with the above, the following factors

should be taken into account:

1. Caution must be exercised when taxiing with one

(for twin engine) or two engine(s) shut down, to

compensate for the possible asymmetric force.

2. Slow and/or tight taxi turns in the direction of the

operating engine may not be possible at high gross

weight.

3. Aircraft system operation need to be carefully

considered to ensure critical systems used for taxi

remain operative, e.g. nose wheel steering, brakes, ice

protection system.

An engine start procedure requires time and attention,

which should not be detrimental to other taxiing duties,

such as external visual scanning, systems monitoring and

checklist accomplishment. Consideration should be given

to the expected departure queue with regards to the time

needed for engine start and “after start” items;

An engine should not be started:

1. By the pilot having the controls during taxi.

2. When taxiing on an apron or a complex taxiway layout.

3. When crossing an active runway.

4. When taxiing in low visibility conditions.

COMMUNICATIONS

The following guidelines, in addition to the formal R/T

procedures as laid down in PANS-ATM, ICAO Doc. 4444

PANS-ATM might help pilots in maintaining adequate

communication on the manoeuvring area.

See also Appendix A of this document (Communications

Guidance) for further information.

 Expect that ATC will use the ICAO readback procedure

(including drivers and other personnel who operate on

the manoeuvring area) to confirm that the message is

correctly understood.

 Improve situational awareness, when practicable, by

conducting all communications associated with runway

operations using aviation English.

 Improve situational awareness, when practicable,

by conducting all communications associated with

runway operations on a common frequency. This allows

situational awareness of other traffic for you and the

other traffic and can only be achieved when a message

is understood by all meaning that all communications

are conducted using aviation English on the runway

frequency.

(Note - Aerodromes with multiple runways may use a

different frequency for each runway)

 Extra care should be taken when accepting a conditional

clearance. Although a conditional clearance could be an

aid in the situational awareness for specific situations, it

might also restrict it. Therefore it is situation dependent.

 Proper crew resource management indicates that when

in doubt, all available sources should be consulted.

When one of the pilots would have missed an ATC call

or is in doubt, it is a good practice to request it again.

Similarly, if one crew member has a different perception

of a situation or clearance to the other, ATC should be

asked to clarify.

 Any clearance to cross or enter an active runway should

be heard, understood, and confirmed by all flight crew

members.

SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

Situational awareness is about knowing where you are

and where you want to go, as well as building the picture

of the traffic in the vicinity. Even during daylight and in

good visibility, people get lost. Even worse is the situation

where you assume you know your position, but find

yourself elsewhere. At times of darkness and Low Visibility,

additional care must be taken to ensure that accuracy

in navigation on the ground and the highest degree of

situational awareness is undertaken by all members of the

flight crew. If in doubt, seek clarification from ATC.

See also Appendix A of this document (Communications

Guidance) for further information.

 If Pilots have any doubt as to their exact position on the

surface of an aerodrome, they should stop and contact

ATC and follow the associated ICAO procedure (Doc.

4444, PANS-ATM).

 Proper crew resource management indicates that when

in doubt, all available sources should be consulted.

When one of the pilots would doubt on the situational

awareness, a good practice would be to stop the aircraft

taxiing or get immediate clarification by ATC. Normally

ATC is very familiar with the particular aerodrome

and thus in the best position to help re-establish the

situational awareness.

 Pilots should be “head-up” for a continuous watch while

taxiing, and should maintain “sterile flight deck” during

taxi phase. The pilot taxiing the aircraft should orient

himself mostly by outside reference with the help of

signs and ground markings. The other pilot should

that this could lead to the hurry-up syndrome. A rushed

crew is prone to make errors.

 Therefore it is absolutely imperative to make sure that

enough time is available before accepting a last minute

change. ATC should be aware to avoid the ‘hurry–up’

syndrome.

 Flight Crew should not enter a runway for departure if

not ready to take off. This avoids the possibility that an

aircraft is “forgotten” on an active runway. Advise ATC

accordingly.

 Flight Crew should verify the correct runway holding

position prior to entering for the purpose of taking-off

or for crossing.

 Avoid accepting rapid exit taxiways for runway entry. A

rapid exit taxiway is designed to be an exit, not an entry.

Using it as an entry hampers visibility, poses a threat for

exact performance calculations and does not guarantee

adequate visual aids.

 Pilots should turn on aircraft forward facing lights

when in receipt of a take-off clearance. The moment

of switching proves to be an important aid for vehicle

drivers or others on an active runway.

 The flight deck traffic display (TCAS) could also be a

good tool to detect traffic approaching and departing

a runway. Remember, an aircraft may be departing

from an intersection closer to the landing threshold

out of sight, due to restricted visibility, or line of sight

limitations.

 Use your heading display or compass to confirm the

runway alignment (QFU) with the information available

from charts. If fitted, use the ILS centreline guidance

system to confirm the correct runway alignment.

 Have a good look out; scan the entire runway and

approach in both directions before entering a runway.

If in doubt, seek clarification: ASK.

 All flight crew members must monitor the clearance for

taxi, take-off and landing, and must be ”in the loop” at

all times when runway operations are in progress.

continuously verbally give navigational information.

Promote best practices on flight deck procedures while

taxiing and during final approach - to include the “sterile

flight deck” concept.

 All access to a runway (even if non-active) should

take place only after receiving a positive clearance

and providing a correct readback, and after the stop

bar (where provided) has been switched off; entering

a runway without a valid ATC clearance will create a

runway incursion.

 Pilots shall not cross illuminated red stop bars when

lining up or crossing a runway, unless contingency

procedures are in force, e.g. to cover cases where the

stop bars or controls are unserviceable. In this case,

pilots should check with ATC that they are allowed to

cross an illuminated stop bar.

 At the moment, stop bars and runway status lights are

the only visual systems providing a clear red signal. This

should be interpreted as a clear danger sign, thus stop

taxiing.

 Crews approaching a runway with an instruction to

hold short should stop the aircraft as close as possible

to the holding point to make sure they clear taxiways

behind them. However, the cockpit position must not

cross the holding point markings and so allow the crew

to continue to see all signs and markings, and the stop

bars (where fitted).

 Ensure that flight deck procedures contain a requirement

for explicit clearances to cross any runway, this includes

non-active runways. This means that a conditional

clearance for crossing should not be accepted.

 Ensure a means to indicate receipt of landing / line-up /

take off / crossing clearances in the cockpit. Proper crew

resource management indicates that when in doubt,

all available sources should be consulted. Especially

for runway operations it is essential that both pilots

are fully aware of the factual clearance. ATC should

cooperate as long as it takes for the crew to understand

ATC instructions.

 During taxi for departure or during approach, Pilots

should refrain from accepting a runway change proposal

if time to re-brief is not sufficient. This includes a change

of departure intersection. It is tempting to save time,

fuel, capacity enhancement and for environmental

reasons to accept a last minute change for another

runway or runway entry. Pilots should be fully aware

NAVIGATING ON THE GROUND  VISUAL AIDS

Charts, signs, markings and lighting: These are all aids

to assist in determining your position. A high level of

awareness must be maintained to observe and respond

to mandatory signs and markings. A correct knowledge

of all the symbols and signs is therefore a must. All the

visual information that is available should correlate with

the actual situation. Gathering visual information and the

constant questioning and cross checking of your position

is the task of the entire flight deck crew. A crew member

who is in doubt or does not agree with the situation

must speak-up and a check should be made with ATC.

Reports to ATC and the airport should be made when

factual situations differs from procedures or published

information.

Aerodrome taxi charts should include ‘Hot Spots’ during

taxi, specially covering risk of runway incursions. This will

help to increase pilots’ situational awareness during the

taxi briefing.

YOU CAN HELP TO PREVENT

RUNWAY INCURSIONS! HOW?

1. It is essential to adhere strictly to all existing ICAO

Standard Operating Procedures and phraseologies.

2. Flight crews need to ensure that they follow the

clearance or instructions that are actually received, and

not the one the flight crew is expecting to receive. If in

doubt, ASK.

3. A good planning of the ground operations can decrease

the workload during taxi. The flight and its associated

risks start already during the preparation.

4. Good situational awareness is the top priority during

taxi. All crewmembers should be involved here. Avoid

heads down.

5. Application of the “Crew Resource Management”

principles during taxi is as important as during the

other phases of flight.

6. Even the most professional and experienced people

make errors. By being defensive and letting the built-in

safety nets do their work, a single error should not lead

to a serious incident or accident.

7. Advise ATC if you think another aircraft may be about to

enter a runway incorrectly or take-off/land incorrectly.

TRAINING

Although aircraft operators provide pilots with some

training for ground manoeuvres, e.g. Low Visibility

procedures, it is essential that pilots are fully acquainted

with aerodrome signage, markings and lighting for safe

runway operations, and that this knowledge is kept up to

date through recurrent training.

BEST PRACTICES PLANNING OF AIRPORT

GROUND OPERATIONS

(Refer to Recommendation 1.4.8)

Departing from, or coming to, an airport can be prepared

well in advance. A thorough planning for taxi operation is

essential. This preparation should be done at the gate or

prior to starting descent.

Familiarise yourself with the airport

 Prepare the necessary charts for taxi and have them

available for use during taxi.

 Take some time to study the airport layout. The naming

of taxiways and other airport infrastructure can be

misleading.

 Remember to review the latest NOTAM for both

the Departure and Arrival airport for information

concerning construction or taxiway/runway closures.

 Standard taxi routes are used more often at busy

airports. Review the routes you can expect.

Taxiing – navigating on the ground

Departing from, or coming to, an airport can be prepared

well in advance. A thorough planning for taxi operation is

essential. This preparation should be done at the gate or

prior to starting descent.

 Write down taxi route.

 Be alert for mandatory signs, markings, stop bars and

runway guard lights.

 Look for visual aids (Taxiway lights, location information

and destination signs).

 Assign crew member to look for and report signs/

markings and keep track of location against the

aerodrome chart.

 A crew member who is in doubt or does not agree with

the situation must speak-up.

 Expect that ATC will provide ‘real-time’ significant

aerodrome information which may affect operations on

or near the runway when NOTAMS and ATIS which are

normally used to advise pilots of significant information

regarding runway operations are not available.

 Flight Crew must advise ATC on first contact with the

Tower if additional time on the runway is required for

operational reasons, this might be the case when e.g.

in winter an engine run-up for shedding ice could be

required.

 When a pilot not taxiing the aircraft focuses on the

instruments in the flight deck, he/she is not able to

monitor the progress of the aircraft. Before undertaking

head- down actions advise the other pilot, so that

added emphasis can be placed by the navigating pilot

on maintaining navigational accuracy and situational

awareness.

 Do not rush. The higher your ground speed, the less

time you have to react, manoeuvre the plane and

avoid an obstacle. Avoid being rushed by accepting

last minute changes, especially during near runway

operations. Time can be your ally and your enemy;

use it wisely. Taxi defensively; this is being prepared for

the errors of others

 Use the ATIS information and your previous experience

to determine the possible taxi routes; to avoid possible

late changes to taxi routes and departure clearances, be

aware of scheduled runway configuration changes (e.g.

from day to night) when planning flights

 Pay special attention to the location of HOT SPOTS.

These are unique or complex intersections and runway

crossings where runway incursions have taken place in

the past or areas of the runway or associated taxi ways

which are not visible from the Control Tower.

 Know what runways you will encounter between where

you are and where you are going.

 Visualise this information on the charts.

 Plan timing and execution of check-lists, so that no

distractions occur when approaching and/or crossing

runways; i.e. all eyes outside during this phase.

Briefing

 Conduct a detailed briefing for all flight crew members,

especially during night and LVO. The visibility required

for taxiing may be less than the Runway Visual Range.

 Brief planned primary runway exit and taxi route.

 Assigned taxi routes should be briefed as thoroughly as

an instrument approach or departure.

 Airport diagrams should be readily available to all flight

crew members.

 Check that the crew fully understands all briefing items.

The human memory is “constructive”. That means that

we have the tendency to fill in the blanks.

 Reassure yourself that you follow the clearance or

instruction that you actually received, and not the one

you expected to receive (confirmation bias).

Communication

 Check your audio box and volume adjustment

whenever a frequency change is made.

 Take extra care accepting a “monitor xxx.xxx frequency”

clearance. When after some period this new frequency

keeps silent, suspect a wrong entry and refer back to

the previous frequency.

 If necessary request progressive taxi instructions.

 Avoid leaving the active ATC frequency. If you need to

leave the ATC frequency, then notify your other flight

crew members. Afterwards, be briefed by the other

crew member of what you have missed.

 The use of Aviation English in a busy and complicated

environment should be encouraged, improving

situational awareness.

 Speaking slowly is essential when operating in foreign

regions. Be proficient with the language used for

communication.

 Use standard ICAO compliant radio phraseology at all

times. Only strict adherence to standard phraseology

avoids miscommunications.

 Read back all runway crossing or hold short clearances

using correct radio phraseology.

 Read back, the complete instruction must be read back

and must be clear, “Roger” is not a readback. Always

include:

a) Your full aircraft call sign to avoid call sign

confusion.

b) ATC route clearances.

c) Clearances and instructions to enter, land on,

ake-off on, hold short of, cross and backtrack on

any runway.

d) The runway designator to avoid wrong runway

selection.

e) runway-in-use, altimeter settings, SSR codes, level

instructions, heading and speed instructions and,

whether issued by the controller or contained in

ATIS broadcasts, transition levels.

 Listen to clearances issued to other aircraft. Be extra

attentive when another aircraft with similar call sign is

on the frequency.

 Both pilots should monitor the frequency and agree

upon the acceptance of a clearance to taxi, cross a

runway, enter, line up, take-off and land on a nominated

runway. Any misunderstanding or disagreement should

be cleared up immediately by contacting ATC for

clarification: ASK.

 The use of headsets increases the readability of

communications with ATC and within the flight deck.

 Ensure all flight crew are on the appropriate frequency

until all runways have been vacated after landing.

 After the landing, vacate the runway as soon as

possible, but not by turning onto another runway,

unless specifically instructed to do so.

 When the aircraft has vacated the active runway, be

prepared to stop to resolve any questions about the

ATC clearance or about the aircraft position.

 Before commencing after landing procedures, pilots

should have received, understood and acknowledged

the taxi clearance.

Crossing or entering a runway

 Crossing or entering a runway when cleared to line up

and/or when crossing any runway, position the aircraft

at a right angle with the runway where possible, in or-

der to better observe the other traffic, both arriving and

departing.

 If you are cleared to “line-up and wait”, then only a short

delay on the runway should be anticipated. If you find

yourself in this position for a more extended period, ad-

vise about your position and seek clarification: ASK.

 If instructed to follow other traffic, be aware this does

not automatically include the clearance to enter or

cross a runway. Each aircraft requires a specific clear-

ance to enter or cross any runway.

7) ICAO Annex 15, Aeronautical Information Services,

Chapter 5: 5.3.17.14. Note. A stop bar is switched

on to indicate that traffic stop and switched off to

indicate that traffic proceed.

8) ICAO Doc. 4444, PANS-ATM, 7.13.7 Stop bars. Stop

bars shall be switched on to indicate that all traffic

shall stop and switched off to indicate that traffic

may proceed.

Other References

9) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No

923/2012 (SERA) (SERA.3210 Right-of-way and GM1

SERA.3210 (d) (3) Right-of-way.

10) ICAO Annex 11, Air Traffic Services.

11) ICAO Doc. 8168, Procedures for Air Navigation

Services – Aircraft Operations, Doc. 8168.

12) FAA. Federal Aviation Regulations / Airman’s

Information Manual, 2002

13) ICAO NACC Regional office, OPS guidelines for the

prevention of runway incursion, Jan Jurek, 2002

14) University of Leiden, Human factors in runway

incursion incidents, Patrick Hudson, Netherlands

Draft 0_1 v2.0

15) FAA, Runway safety: It’s everybody’s business, Kim

Cardosi, Ph.D., 2001 FAA, Runway Safety Blueprint

2002-2004, 2001 FAA/IATA Runway Incursion

Prevention Program.

 If there is any doubt when receiving a clearance

or instruction, clarification should be requested

immediately from ATC.

 Cancel check list activity when crossing and entering

runways. Avoid stopping on a runway unless specifically

instructed to do so.

Be aware that the expectations established during the

pre-taxi or pre-landing planning can be significantly

altered with a different and unexpected clearance.

REFERENCES

The following ICAO standards are provided to assist flight

crews in understanding the use and application of stop

bars:

1) ICAO Annex 2, Rules of the Air Chapter 3: 3.2.2.7.3

An aircraft taxiing on the manoeuvring area shall

stop and hold at all lighted stop bars and may

proceed further when the lights are switched off.

2) ICAO Annex 14 – Aerodromes, Volume 1 -

Aerodrome Design and Operations.

3) 5.3.17.9 Selectively switchable stop bars shall be

installed in conjunction with at least three taxiway

centre line lights (extending for a distance of at

least 90 m from the stop bar) in the direction that it

is intended for an aircraft to proceed from the stop

bar.

4) 5.4.3.35 A taxiway shall be identified by a designator

comprising a letter, letters or a combination of a

letter or letters followed by a number.

5) 5.4.3.36 Recommendation. When designating

taxiways, the use of the letters I, O or X and the use

of words such as inner and outer should be avoided

wherever possible to avoid confusion with the

numerals 1, 0 and closed marking.

6) 5.4.3.37 The use of numbers alone on the

manoeuvring area shall be reserved for the

designation of runways.

Memory

Best Practices

• Detecting occupied runway

• Runway Occupancy – Vehicles

• Premature landing/take-off clearance

Coordination

ATS Teamwork and Coordination

Best Practices

• Application of Team Resource Management (TRM) principles in ANSPs

• Establishing who controls the runway

• Hand-over/Take-over

• Transfer of departure traffic

Situational Awareness

Best Practices

• Promote a sterile control room concept

• Support Pilot Sterile Cockpit SOP

• Visual recognition of Hot Spots

• Work in progress

• Visual scanning techniques

• Continuous Watch of Aerodrome Operations (‘Heads Up’/ ‘Heads Down’)

• Managing vehicles on the manoeuvring area

Communication

Best Practices

• Taxi Instructions

• Conditional Clearances

• Readback requirements

Planning and Decision Making Process

Miscellaneous

• Runway Crossing

• Why Stop Bars?

• Stop Bar Contingency Measures

• Training (in Runway Incursion prevention)

• ATC Visual Lines of Sight (Controller ‘blind spots’)

APPENDIX E

AIR NAVIGATION SERVICE PROVIDER/AIR TRAFFIC

CONTROLLER BEST PRACTICES

APPENDIX E

AIR NAVIGATION SERVICE PROVIDERS AND AIR TRAFFIC

CONTROLLER BEST PRACTICES AND GUIDANCE MATERIAL

Most of the proposed recommendations and best practices

are already widely implemented. Others have found a minor

application for various reasons: rigidity of the systems,

existing procedures, national or local constrains, concerns

about their effects on traffic capacity or air traffic controller

workload and available technology.

ANSPs and air traffic controllers should carefully consider

the potential positive effects on the overall safety of

each recommendation and best practice and, in case of

uncertainties, assess them by virtue of their actual influence

and applicability at local level and not just consider them as

a ‘one-size-fits-all’ solution.

Furthermore, ANSPs may consider raising the rank of

some recommendations into a mandatory provision and

transposing them in their operational manuals.

Most typical runway incursion scenarios:

 Taking-off or landing on a runway that is already

occupied;

 Entering a runway for which another aircraft has

received a take-off or landing clearance;

 Two aircraft departing/landing on intersecting runways;

 Runway crossing after an aircraft has received a take-off

or landing clearance;

Several studies have focused on the types of Controller

error that can contribute to runway incursions. The findings

converge on several key points; the most common are

related to:

1. MEMORY: Forgetting about an aircraft, the closure of a

runway, a vehicle on the runway and/or a clearance that

has been issued;

2. COORDINATION: Inadequate coordination between

Controllers, hand over process, poor TRM;

3. SITUATIONAL AWARENESS: Misidentifying an aircraft

or its location, insufficient visual scan;

4. COMMUNICATION: incomplete, incorrect, ambiguous

or complex RTF, hear-back inaccuracies, misapplication

of conditional clearances;

5. PLANNING AND DECISION MAKING PROCESS:

Incorrect ATC clearance, bending the procedures,

providing insufficient separation and trying to be over-

expeditious.

All these key points are closely interconnected:

forgetting something, lack of clarity in communications,

underestimating the handover or missing timely

information may undermine situational awareness.

Thus, many of the air traffic controller recommendations

cover - at the same time - more than one facet of operations

and support improved situational awareness and correct

decision making by all stakeholders involved in runway

operations.

Runway incursions events, in most cases, come from a

combination of the above mentioned factors and in which

environmental characteristics such as airport layout,

procedures and behavioural habits may play an important

part in inducing a runway incursion.

Keeping this in mind, it is important also to recognise

when procedures are introduced in order to temporar-

ily mitigate an existing internal or external problem (for

example a ‘hot spot’ on the aerodrome) that, eventually,

should be eliminated through a long-term solution to re-

move the underlying risk.

MEMORY

ANSP Recommendations:

1.5.1, 1.5.2 e/g/h/i/j, 1.5.3, 1.5.4, 1.5.6 b, 1.5.14.

Memory can be defined as the ability to store, retain, and

subsequently recall information. It may involve conscious

and unconscious aspects.

Aerodrome traffic control includes observing and reacting

to events that take place on the manoeuvring area based

on interpretation of information acquired visually, dis-

played at the working position or received through voice

communication.

Memory plays an important part in this process because

of the large amount of information reaching the Control-

ler. It is therefore necessary to manage this data in such

a way that they are not missed, forgotten, or overlooked.

Techniques, procedures and the disciplined use of memo-

ry aids can support Controllers in the task.

AICRAFT

VEHICLES

PERSONS

SITUATION AWARENESS DECISION MAKING & PLANNING

RADIO

WEATHER

REPORTS

COMMUNICATIONS

✓ WORKING MEMORY

✓ PREDICTIONS

✓ MENTAL MODEL

✓ SPATIAL RELATION

✓ INTENTIONS & PLANS

AERODROME LAYOUT

ORGANISATION EQUIPMENT

SCENARIO PROCEDURES

CONSTRAINS FAILURES

GOALSTASKS

STRATEGIES FOR ALLOCATINGATTENTION

WORKING SKILLS

CWP

SELECTIVE ATTENTION

PERCEPTION

›››››››

ACTION EXECUTION

EXTERNAL EVENT

Fig 1: Basic air traﬃc controller cognitiveprocess

 For long inspections or busy context, request vehicle

drivers to call out every few minutes (“Vehicle

Operation Normal”). This time limit should be specified

locally but, ideally, should not exceed 5 minutes.

Further Reading:

See also Appendix L, Aerodrome Operator – Maintenance,

Inspections and Works in Progress/Temporary Modifica-

tions of the Aerodrome.

c. Premature landing/take-off clearance:

Controllers are generally accustomed to issuing the land-

ing clearance at the first logical opportunity so they can

mentally move on to the next required sequence of ac-

tions. For example, this happens often during low traffic

situations when landing clearance might be issued on re-

ceipt of the first aircraft call (even if at 15NM on final).

Similarly, line-up and/or take-off clearance are sometimes

issued very early and so far away from the runway regard-

less of ICAO Doc. 4444 PANS-ATM provisions on the matter

(§ 7.9.3.3 and 4).

Such an early passing of line-up and/take-off or land-

ing clearance, which may not have any capacity related

benefits, has been a contributing factor in several serious

runway incursions. This practice makes Controllers more

prone to memory lapses because of possible changes in

the operational scenario (new traffic calls or calls for run-

way inspections, handover, phone coordination, critical

incoming operational matter, …).

Proper timing in issuing clearances is a crucial element for

maintaining situational awareness; emerging tool func-

tionality such as conflicting ATC clearances on electronic

flights strips (EFS) systems can provide an effective mitiga-

tion.

ANSPs may establish at airports, as local best practice or

mandatory procedure, a distance from threshold where

the landing clearance should be normally issued and pub-

lish this information in AIPs to make pilots aware of it.

For instance: Where the landing rate is expressed in terms

of minimum distance between succeeding arriving aircraft

(5 NM) the landing clearance shall not be issued earlier

than 5NM from threshold and the controller may inform

pilot : “ XXX 123 number 1, continue approach RWY 35 ex-

pect landing clearance at 5 miles on final”.

BEST PRACTICES

a. Detecting an occupied runway:

ANSPs shall provide memory aids, surveillance systems

and integrated solutions for the purpose of detecting and

alerting ATS units when a runway is occupied.

Controllers should follow strict local procedures related to

the recording and display of the information regarding an

occupied runway (either via a paper/electronic strip bay

or via other established means and procedures (such as

‘blanking’ the anemometer/wind dials).

The effectiveness of any of these measures highly depends

on operational procedures and, obviously, strict Controller

adherence to them. If, for any reason, Controllers decide

to postpone the use of the available aids or rely solely on

memory, the chances to forget things are increased.

Electronic flights strips (EFS) may help in mitigate the

above issue by autonomously triggering the runway en-

gaged status every time, for instance, a vehicle strip is

moved into the appropriate runway bay. Flight Progress

Board (FPB) should be designed to have only ONE position

for placing aircraft and vehicle when cleared “on the run-

way” (as opposed to some EFS Boards that have separate

bays for departure and arrival on the same runway).

Further Reading:

EUROCONTROL SISG Operational Safety Study:

Controller Detection of Potential Runway and Manoeu-

vring Area Conflicts Ed. 1.0 – 2015.

b. Runway Occupancy – Vehicles:

ANSPs should introduce and promote procedures to sup-

port Controllers in performing memory related tasks and

increase overall situational awareness when vehicles occu-

py a runway. This is particularly important when there are

multiple vehicles on the runway and one vehicle reports

vacating, but the runway is still occupied. Other actions

can include:

 During runway inspections, request vehicle drivers to

call out progress checkpoints (like “1st third checked”,

report abeam taxiway D, etc.);

 Provide runway inspection clearances using partial/

progressive clearances in order to be called out by

drivers;

BEST PRACTICES

a. Application of Team Resource Management (TRM)

principles in ANSPs:

Strategies are available to ANSPs to make the best use

of all available resources - information, equipment

and people - to optimize the safety and efficiency

of Air Traffic Services. Team Resource Management

(TRM) enhances Controllers’ understanding of the

sources of error in ATC and helps them to develop

personal strategies to reduce error and to mitigate

consequences. TRM can also help raise awareness of

fatigue and unusual activity/behaviour of colleagues.

In this way TRM supports operational safety efforts

and aims to reduce human error also by dynamically

delineating roles and establishing effective cross-

checking procedures within a team such as the

‘professional challenge’ adopted by some ANSPs.

Further Reading: EUROCONTROL Guidelines for TRM

Good Practices, Ed. 1.1 – 2015

b. Establishing who controls the runway:

Phraseology adapted from proven pilot CRM (Crew

Resource Management) concepts such as: “My Runway

/ Your Runway” during, for instance, aerodrome

configuration change can improve coordination

between controllers and establish who has control of

the runway(s).

c. Hand-over/Take-over:

It is apparent that a number of runway safety

occurrences take place soon after a Controller handover,

either of the operational watch or a single operational

position. Controllers shall ensure that the complete

traffic situation on the runway has been passed on

and understood; to complement this process, the use

of handover/takeover (HOTO) checklists, with runway

status listed last, should be encouraged. Furthermore,

handover/takeover shall be postponed every time

critical tasks need to be completed.

d. Transfer of departure traffic:

At some aerodromes transfer of departure traffic from

the Ground Controller to the Aerodrome Controller are

suspended during runway inspections or configuration

changes until the inspection/change is complete.

COORDINATION

ANSP Recommendations:

1.5.1, 1.5.2 d/e, 1.5.3, 1.5.4, 1.5.5, 1.5.6, 1.5.7 & 15.14.

ATS Teamwork and Coordination

The ATS system relies on good teamwork to achieve its

goals.

Inadequate coordination between the Ground Controllers

(GND) and Aerodrome Controllers (TWR) or between dif-

ferent controlling positions can cause a runway incursion,

mainly due to:

 Possible misinterpretation of a situation when a

runway is occupied by more than one participant:

e.g. an aircraft and a vehicle managed on different

frequencies by different controllers;

 Runway Configuration Change/Status: who

isresponsible for the runway?

In all these cases procedures shall state clearly:

 Areas of responsibility, avoiding overlaps.

 That where control of taxiing aircraft is provided by a

GND Controller and the control of runway operations

by an Aerodrome Controller, the use of a runway by

taxiing/crossing aircraft shall be coordinated with, and

approved by, the Aerodrome Controller. Moreover,

communication with the aircraft concerned should be

transferred from the GND Controller to the Aerodrome

Controller prior to the aircraft entering the runway.

 Where circumstances do not permit the use of a single

VHF frequency for aircraft and vehicles, for runway op-

erations, the GND Controller or the TWR Coordinator

must obtain an explicit approval from the Aerodrome

Controller before clearing a vehicle to enter or cross

an active runway. The Aerodrome Controller should be

the person responsible for the correct recording and

displaying of the runway engaged status.

SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

Recommendations: All ANSP

For a Controller, situational awareness means mainly

acquiring and maintaining a mental picture of the traffic

situation considering all the potential unexpected

progressions or changes in the scenario. It also involves

projecting that mental picture into the immediate future

and can create an expectation about what is going to

happen next.

The controller’s working environment and procedures

should be designed to help in maintaining the situational

awareness keeping in mind that ATC procedures and

controller behaviour influence, also, pilots’ and drivers’

situational awareness.

BEST PRACTICES

a. Promote a sterile control room concept:

Interruptions (e.g., due to phone calls, non-standard

events and communications) and distractions (e.g.,

loud conversations, ambient noise, presence of

external staff, smartphone, etc.) do occur. Some cannot

be avoided and therefore must be coped with by the

Controllers. Others can be minimised or eliminated

through training, adoption of effective procedures,

discipline and the use of good judgment. If the number

of interruptions and distractions is not minimised or

the impact of residual interruptions and distractions

is not controlled, safety can be affected. In accordance

with the principles of TRM, air traffic controllers that

feel they are been distracted by non-operational

factors should feel able to voice their discomfort.

b. Support Pilot Sterile Cockpit SOP:

There is a link between runway incursions or other

ground navigation error and clearances or amended

clearances being passed whilst aircraft are taxiing,

backtracking or lining-up.

There is a BEST TIME FOR ISSUING ATC CLEARANCES.

Best practices and procedures encourage Controllers

to pass clearances and information before the pilot

begins to taxi; if a late-notice tactical change to

the clearance has to be issued when the aircraft

is close to the runway, the following procedure

shall be followed to avoid possible confusion:

When an aircraft is at the holding position or on the

runway, ATC should always use the phrase, “HOLD

POSITION” before passing a revised clearance, this

is to ensure that the pilot has no doubt that the ATC

communication does not constitute a clearance to line-

up, take-off or cross.

c. Visual recognition of Hot Spots

In some tower control rooms, photos of the

manoeuvring area and/or hot spots (taken from

different heights/perspectives) are displayed near

to the controller working position and/or in the local

Operation Manuals. This information can help air

traffic controllers improve their situational awareness

by imagining what a lost pilot or driver could be seeing.

d. Work in progress

Work in progress may change the surface of the

aerodrome temporarily or permanently; the

infrastructure left behind at the end of the shift, may

be different on return. ANSPs should know about all

changes well in advance as these should be published

by NOTAM/AIP. Consequently, ANSPs can assess the

impact of works on the movement area and properly

inform Controllers who should expect to provide ‘real-

time’ significant aerodrome information to pilot via R/T

and/or ATIS.

Further Reading:

See also Appendix L, Aerodrome Operator –

Maintenance, Inspections and Works in Progress/

Temporary Modifications of the Aerodrome.

e. Visual scanning techniques: In more than half of the

analyzed Sudden High Energy Runway Conflict (SHERC)

events in the EUROCONTROL Operational Safety Study,

ATC did not visually detect the potential conflict prior

to the runway incursion: the best practice of a proper

and systematic visual scan of the entire runway and

approach area, in both directions, can be one of the

most effective safety barriers to stop an event.

Anyone can "look", but scanning is more than just

looking. Scanning is the skill of seeing by looking in

a methodical way.

g. Managing vehicles on the manoeuvring area:

Current ICAO Doc. 4444 PANS-ATM at § 7.12.6 and its

forthcoming transposition into EU law, prescribe the

recording of vehicles during operations in low visibility

conditions. ANSPs should consider establishing

this provision in all visibility conditions and manage

vehicles - on the manoeuvring area – through, for

instance, the use of progress strips as done with aircraft

in order to easily improve situational awareness and

detect possible conflicts.

h. Runway access points for vehicles:

Some runway incursions are attributed to vehicles

entering runways other than by via designated vehicle

entry points (e.g. taxiway or road). Where designated

access points are used, a stop bar or a road-holding

position marking and light often provide an additional

layer of protection. It is acknowledged, however,

that using designated vehicle entry points may not

be operationally feasible in all circumstances e.g.

when runway inspection, wildlife control or rescue/

fire fighter vehicles require immediate access to the

runway in the course of their duties.

Glancing out without stopping to focus on anything is

of limited value as is staring out into one spot for long

periods of time. Scanning is not limited to the external

view but must also incorporate a structured search

inside the visual control room at supporting systems

such as weather and surveillance systems, EFS, etc.

Learning how to scan properly by knowing where and

how to concentrate the search requires training and

the constant sharing of attention with other Controller

tasks.

f. Continuous Watch of Aerodrome Operations

(‘Heads Up’/ ‘Heads Down’)

Recommendation 1.5.13c states that “controllers

shall develop procedures to ensure that, as far as

practicable, controllers are ‘heads-up’ for a continuous

watch of aerodrome operations.” Whilst this implies

a predominantly ‘eyes outside’ style of controlling, in

the context of modern ATC VCRs and the increasing

amount of technology that is available to assist the

controllers, the recommendation also recognises

that controllers will, inevitably, spend some time

‘heads down’ . A structured, methodical scanning

technique will help controllers integrate ‘heads down’

tasks with the need to maintain a ‘heads up’ posture;

the combination results in the ‘continuous watch’ of

aerodrome operations.

ANSPs should, therefore, reinforce, on a regular basis,

the fundamental importance of an aerodrome control

visual scan (both inside and outside the window) and

train controllers in techniques that can help to develop

and maintain this skill.

Further Reading:

EUROCONTROL SISG Operational Safety Study: Sudden

High Energy Conflict (SHERC) Ed. 1.0 – 2017

Fig 2: Sample of a Vehicle Progress Strip

COMMUNICATION

ANSP Recommendations:

1.5.1, 1.5.2 a/b/c/d/e, 1.5.6 b, 1.5.7, 1.5.8.

Voice radio telephony (R/T) communication at airports

is frequently cited as a causal or contributory factor to

runway incursions.

Voice communication that works effectively in low traffic

situation is sometimes strained to the breaking point

during peak traffic periods. It is during these times that

Controllers may not be able to communicate with pilots

in the way ATC-pilot communication loop was designed to

work. This can lead to an unwelcome and unintentional

reduction of safety measures such as proper timing of

transmissions and readbacks/hearback to accommodate

more ATC instructions onto the crowded frequencies.

Yet these are the scenarios and circumstances where

the consequences of inaccuracies or omissions may be

more critical, and where robust safety measures are most

needed.

Further Reading:

Appendix A, Communications Guidance provides a more

detailed elaboration of the factors that Controllers, pilots

and drivers should follow in order to preserve strong

R/T safety standards that can help to prevent runway

incursions. In addition, the following communications

related areas are highlighted.

BEST PRACTICES

Taxi Instructions

Taxi instructions issued by a controller will always contain

a clearance limit, which is the point at which the aircraft

must stop until further permission to proceed is given. For

departing aircraft the clearance limit will normally be the

holding position of the runway in use, but it may be any

other position on the aerodrome depending on prevailing

traffic circumstances. When a taxi clearance contains a taxi

limit reporting point beyond a runway, it shall contain an

explicit clearance to cross that runway, or an instruction to

hold short, even if the runway is not in use.

Communication with any aircraft using the runway for the

purpose of taxiing should be transferred from the ground

controller to the aerodrome controller prior to the aircraft

entering/crossing a runway.

Standard taxi routes simplify taxi instructions and help

to reduce the likelihood of communication errors and

confusion on or near the runway; consequently, it is

strongly advisable to use standard taxi routes.

Pilots require a general overview of the expected taxi

routing. For more complicated taxi instructions, it may be

appropriate to divide the message into segments, placing

the clearances and instructions in sequential order, to

avoid the possibility of pilot misunderstanding, while

providing the complete picture.

Conditional Clearances

Conditional clearances, when justified, can help to improve

the flow of traffic on and around aerodromes but only

where they are accompanied with the most stringent voice

communication discipline. The ICAO provisions for the

use of Conditional Clearances are described in Appendix

A, Communications Guidance which also advises ANSPs

to assess their continued use and consider if they can be

removed or reduced.

Further Information:

A SKYbrary SKYclip covering Conditional Clearances can be

viewed at:

http://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/Conditional_

Clearance_ (SKYclip).

Readback requirements

Readback requirements have been introduced in the

interest of flight safety. The stringency of the readback

requirement is directly related to the possible seriousness

of misunderstandings in the transmission and receipt

of ATC clearances and instructions. Strict adherence

to readback procedures ensures that the clearance or

instruction has been received and understood correctly by

the correct aircraft.

Further guidance on the critical operational importance of

the readback/hearback communication loop is provided in

Appendix A - Communications.

Further Reading:

See more in Appendix A, Communication Guidance.

See SKYbrary SKYclip covering Readback-Hearback at:

https://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/Solutions:SKYclips

Electronic flights strips (EFS) may help in raising situational

awareness when an aircraft is crossing a runway if, when

clearing it, the system will turn automatically into a runway

engaged/occupied status.

Note: EASA GM1 ADR – DSN.M.745 states that “Active runway

is to consider any runway or runways currently being used for

take-off or landing. When multiple runways are used, they are

all considered active runways.”

Why Stop Bars?

The provision of stop bars at all Runway Holding Positions

and their use at night and in all visibility conditions can

form part of effective runway incursion prevention

measures.

Stop bars are installed to provide protection at runways

and reduce the risk of runway incursions through:

 Enhanced visibility of Runway Holding Positions.

 Reinforcing the control of aircraft and vehicles in the

vicinity of the runways.

 Minimising the risk of aircraft or vehicle identification

error.

 Minimising the risk of ATC clearances being

misinterpreted.

 Enhancing safety during low visibility conditions.

Pilots and vehicle operators are required to stop at the

Runway Holding Positions and obtain clearance from ATC

prior to entering a runway; clearance to enter the runway

by ATC should be issued in the following sequence:

1. ATC Aerodrome Controller shall extinguish the stop

bar lights

2. Once the stop bar lights have been extinguished, ATC

will issue the pilot or vehicle with the appropriate

clearance.

Note: This should happen almost simultaneously

PLANNING AND DECISION MAKING PROCESS

Recommendations:

1.5.1, 1.5.2 d/f/g/h/i/j/k, 1.5.3, 1.5.4, 1.5.7, 1.5.9, 1.5.14.

The decision making process is vulnerable when

information is incomplete, conflicting or unreliable, or

when goals conflict. Decision making may be improved

by training and strategies that do work well in real-

world environments. Training, for example, may sensitise

Controllers to trade-offs among speed, accuracy, and task

prioritization; in addition, it may foster techniques for

identifying and correcting problems, understanding and

planning. For instance, Controllers may learn to recognize

gaps in their knowledge of relevant information, conflicts

in the data, or unreliable assumptions.

MISCELLANEOUS

Runway Crossing ANSP Recommendations:

1.5.1, 1.5.2 b/c/g/j, 1.5.3, 1.5.4, 1.5.7, 1.5.8, 1.5.9,

1.5.10,1.5.14

If an aerodrome is designed so that there is no need for

aircraft or vehicles to cross an active runway, then the risk

of this type of incursion is confined to discretionary use

by ATC of such clearances and any active runway crossing

clearance should be regarded as of equivalent significance

to a take-off or landing clearance.

The relative risk of collision at a central intersection is higher

than the risk inherent in crossing at the end of the runway;

where circumstances permit, runway crossing clearances

should be given as near to either end of a runway as

possible and, where this is not possible, at least full length

take-offs should be preferred for departing aircraft.

When time is critical, Controllers should consider

informing the crossing aircraft/vehicle of traffic which

will subsequently land or take-off on the same runway.

Simultaneous runway crossings should be discouraged

except when all parties involved agree and traffic

information is provided. Other phraseology associated

with runway crossings is provided in Appendix A,

Communications Guidance. Aerodrome design

considerations to reduce the amount of runway crossings

are explored in Appendix K.

The service provider may consider, inter alia, the following:

(a) physically disconnecting the respective lit stop bar

from its power supply;

(b) physically obscuring the lights of the lit stop bar; or

ead the aircraft to cross the lit stop bar."

In addition, stop bar contingency plan may include

closing the taxiway where the failure happened and

using an alternative, suitable runway holding position

equipped with a functioning stop bar. Exceptionally,

ATC may instruct pilot to cross/enter the runway with a

specific clearance given by ATC to cross an illuminated

stop bar due to a malfunction of the system and a specific

read back of crossing an illuminated stop bar due to a

malfunction of the system.

Further Information:

See SKYbrary SKYclip covering the use of Stop Bars at:

http://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/Stopbars_(SKYclip).

Training

ANSP Recommendations: All ANSP

Runway Safety issues should be included in team briefing

or debriefing sessions that may occasionally be held at

unit level, as part of a lesson learning process; this should

include not only the scenarios that have led to actual

runway occurrences, but also other situations that almost

resulted in a runway incursion.

Air Traffic Controller training ab-initio syllabus and

refresher courses should include at least information

about:

1. Runway incursion causal and contributory factors.

2. How to prevent runway incursions.

3. Lessons learnt (e.g. via runway incursion case studies

affecting own or other aerodromes.

4. Visual scanning techniques (outside and inside the

visual control room).

Ideally, stop bars would be installed at all Runway Holding

Positions and used H24 irrespective of weather and/or

environmental conditions. There are, however, various

reasons why an airport, where stop bar are already

installed, do no use them H24. The main concerns are:

 Air traffic controllers’ workload: The use of stop bars

requires ATC manual actions through the lighting

control interface in the control tower, these actions are

sometimes considered as additional workload to the

normal ATC procedures, particularly where the lighting

control interface has not been designed efficiently. The

solution is an effective interface where stop bars that

protect the runway should be individually selectable

with a single input by the runway controller at his/her

own working position.

 Stop bars are installed only at CAT II/III Runway Holding

Position

Electronic flights strips (EFS) can provide a method of stop

bar control that could alleviate ATC workload constraints

combining, for instance, the issuing of the line-up clearance

with the extinguishing of the stop bar lights and/or a

minimal stop bar control panel in the EFS display.

ANSPs, in conjunction with Airport Operators, shall

provide a clear policy for the use of stop bars and related

contingency procedures. Recommendation 1.5.10d states

that an aircraft shall not be instructed to cross illuminated

stop bars when entering or crossing a runway unless

contingency measures are in force. The objective of this

recommendation is to maintain the integrity of the stop

bars, which are intended to protect the runway at any

airport the pilot may fly to.

Stop Bar Contingency Measures

ANSP Recommendation: 1.5.10c

(From GM1 SERA.3210 (d) (3) Right-of-way)

“When considering contingency arrangements for situations

where the stop bars cannot be turned off because of a

technical problem, the air traffic service provider should take

into account that such contingency arrangements should

significantly differ from normal operations and should

not undermine the principle that a lit stop bar must not be

crossed.

crossing points, ‘hot spots’ and approaches, can

compromise the fundamentals of the ‘heads up, eyes

outside’ main nature of aerodrome control.

ANSPs, in consultation with aerodrome operators, should

assess visual sight lines from the VCR and existing visibility

restrictions which have a potential to limit the controller’s

view of the runway. Known controller ‘blind spots’ can be

depicted on AIP aerodrome/hot spot charts. In addition,

aerodrome surveillance systems (e.g. A-SMGCS), cameras

and other sensors (similar to those being introduced to

implement ‘Remote Tower’ operations) can be used to

mitigate controller ‘blind spots’. Temporary restrictions

in visibility from the VCR, due for instance to work in

progress, shall be treated in the same way as permanent

ones.

Longer term solutions could include changes to

procedures, technological implementations or re-

positioning of the facility/CWP to ensure the best possible

solution within the limitations of the airport layout.

An extract from an aerodrome chart highlighting the

areas not visible from ATC can be seen below. See also

Appendix K.

Adequate practical training should follow theoretical

training in runway safety procedures.

Note: Runway incursion training awareness is a requirement

of Regulation (EU) No 2015/340.

ATC Visual Lines of Sight

ANSP Recommendations: 1.5.11 and 1.5.12

Notwithstanding the introduction of new technologies

and functionalities that can sometimes promote a ‘heads

down’ posture, Aerodrome control still requires controllers

to ‘look out of the window’ and maintain a continuous

watch on aerodrome operations as far as is practicable (i.e.

it is impractical during reduced visibility conditions where

the use of technologies can assist the controller to control

traffic on and around the aerodrome).

Impairment or infringement of controllers’ visual lines of

sight, in particular to runway thresholds, intersections,

Fig 3: Aerodrome chart highlighting the areas not visible from ATC (HS1).

Safety Regulatory Audits and Inspections

National Runway Safety

Support and Promotion of EAPPRI

APPENDIX F

OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES FOR REGULATORS

APPENDIX F OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES FOR REGULATORS

Effective oversight of runway and aerodrome operations

forms an important part of the safety management

system (SMS) of the aerodrome operator, air navigation

service provider, other stakeholders and of the State Safety

Program activities.

EU, ICAO and national obligations place responsibilities

on States to ensure safety, regularity and efficiency of

aircraft operations at aerodromes under their jurisdiction.

Therefore, it is essential that the State retains its overseeing

responsibility and ensures that the aerodrome operator,

whether or not the aerodrome operator is state owned

or private, complies with the relevant ICAO SARPs and/or

applicable EU or national regulations.

For the Regulator this may be partly achieved by

implementing an aerodrome certification procedure

to certify an aerodrome through the approval of the

aerodrome manual and acceptance of their SMS. For air

navigation service providers and other stakeholders a

similar certification process should be in place.

SAFETY REGULATORY AUDITS AND INSPECTIONS

The Regulators should conduct safety regulatory audits

and inspection on aerodromes operations to monitor and

assess the level of safety achieved.

The regulatory oversight of aerodrome operators may

include:

 Ensuring that an aerodrome has an effective runway

incursion prevention programme that meets ICAO or

EU or national requirements;

 Joint/coordinated audits and inspections to examine the

interfaces between the aerodrome agencies involved

in runway incursion prevention; e.g. coordination

between ATC, aircraft operators, aerodrome operators

and contractors during aerodrome work in progress;

 Reviewing the airside driver training programme to

ensure the adequacy of driver training for the staff of all

organisations operating airside;

 Reviewing Low Visibility Procedures (LVP) from a runway

incursion perspective;

 Reviewing incident prevention programmes, including

occurrence reporting relating to runway incursions;

 Reviewing aerodrome design changes, including

vehicular traffic routes that intersect runways and

taxiways;

 Reviewing runway safeguarding, including entry and

exit points, runway, taxiway holding points, stop bars,

illuminated signs and lights;

 Reviewing procedures for third party contractors during

any work in progress on the manoeuvring area;

 Reviewing the work program of the aerodrome local

Runway Safety Team with reference to the European

Action Plan for the Prevention of Runway Incursions.

RISKBASED OVERSIGHT

In the frame of the introduction of Risk-based oversight

(see the EASA document “Practices for risk-based

oversight”) within the audits and inspections planning

process of regulators, the regulator can adapt the

oversight burden for an operator with regards to:

 Its intrinsic risk exposure to runway incursions;

 Its safety performance regarding runway incursions.

That is to say the means that the operator puts in place

in order to reduce the runway incursion risk as far as is

practicable. If the operator is intrinsically exposed to runway

incursions and/or has a poor or weak runway incursion risk

regime, the regulator might intensify the oversight on one

or several points exposed above. On the other hand, if the

operator has no runway incursion problem, the oversight

burden might be relaxed.

SUPPORT AND PROMOTION OF EAPPRI

Regulators should actively support and promote the

European Action Plan for the Prevention of Runway

Incursions as part of the State Safety Program activities.

Although the action plan is guidance material and

contains recommendations only, regulators should

ensure that it is given a continuous priority in its oversight

activities wherever possible by:

 Promoting awareness of the European Action Plan for

the Prevention or Runway Incursions guidance material.

 Conducting a gap analysis to ensure that all

recommendations are implemented where possible.

 Ensuring that runway safety and the prevention of

runway incursions are addressed in regular audit

inspections.

 Ensuring that the recommendations arising from audits

are implemented wherever possible.

REFERENCES

1) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU)

No 1034/2011 on safety oversight in air traffic

management and air navigation services

2) Commission Regulation (EU) No 1035/2011 laying

down common requirements for the provision of air

navigation services

3) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No

2017/373 laying down requirements for service

providers and the oversight in ATM/ANS (applicable

January 2020)

4) Commission Regulation (EU) No 139/2014 laying

down requirements and administrative procedures

related to aerodromes

5) EASA document “Practices for risk-based oversight”

NATIONAL RUNWAY SAFETY

In addition to the regulatory oversight described above, it

may benefit a regulator to keep a high level, national focus

on the risk of runway incursions. This can be achieved

by establishing a national runway incursion prevention

steering group. Membership of the group could include

representatives from industry such as aerodromes, airline

flight operations, air traffic services, industry safety

groups, aerodrome local Runway Safety Team members

and appropriate representatives from the regulatory

authority.

Terms of reference for such a group might be to:

 Address specific hazards identified nationally,

coordinating this through sub-groups or external

agencies as required.

 Promote good practice, share information and raise

awareness through publicity and educate industry.

 Actively enhance work continuing in industry.

 Act as a coordination point for industry.

 Identify and investigate which technologies are

available that may reduce runway incursion risks.

 Review current aerodrome, ATC and aircraft operational

policies and if necessary make recommendations on

future policy to reduce the risk of incursions.

 Make recommendations for guidance and advisory

material for industry on aerodrome, aircraft and ATC

operational issues to reduce the risk of incursions.

 Oversee and promote the reporting of runway incursion

incidents.

 Ensure the thorough analysis of data to identify and

examine specific areas of concern.

General definition

The international SMS framework

Safety management systems guidance materials

Risk based, data driven systematic approach to safety

Assessing the effectiveness of SMS implementation

APPENDIX G

SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

APPENDIX G SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

GENERAL DEFINITION

A Safety Management System (SMS) is a management tool

for the management of safety by an aviation undertaking

aimed at ensuring that safety is managed systematically

and consistently. In summary, safety management:

 includes the entire operation;

 focuses on processes, making a clear differentiation

between processes and outcomes;

 is data driven;

 involves constant risk-based monitoring;

 is strictly documented;

 aims at gradual improvement as opposed to dramatic

change; and

 is based on strategic planning as opposed to piecemeal

initiatives

THE INTERNATIONAL SMS FRAMEWORK

ICAO

ICAO Annex 19 (Safety Management) consolidates

the overarching safety management SARPs on safety

management relating to aircraft operators, air navigation

service providers and aerodromes which had previously

been detailed in Annexes 6, 11 and 14 respectively.

To support the Annex 19 SARPs, ICAO Doc. 9859 (Safety

Management Manual) aims to harmonise SMS implemented

in the aviation sector. ICAO recommends a framework

for the implementation and maintenance of a SMS by an

organisation. The implementation of the framework should

be commensurate with the size of the organisation and the

complexity of the services provided.

Within Europe, requirements for safety management

systems are contained in European Union (EU) “Common

Requirements”

 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No

1034/2011 on safety oversight in air traffic management

and air navigation services

 Commission Regulation (EU) No 1035/2011 laying

down common requirements for the provision of air

navigation services.

 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No

2017/373 laying down requirements for service

providers and the oversight in ATM/ANS (applicable

January 2020).

 Commission Regulation (EU) No 139/2014 laying down

requirements and administrative procedures related to

aerodromes, specifically ADR.OR.D.005.

 Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 on Air

Operations.

EUROCONTROL

In addition, ESARRs (EUROCONTROL Safety Regulatory

Requirements), apply to some non-EU EUROCONTROL

States. Namely:

 ESARR3 Safety Management Systems in ATM and its

related guidance material;

 ESARR4 Risk Assessment and Mitigation in ATM and its

related guidance material.

1. The term “aviation undertaking” refers to any organisation providing aviation services. The term thus encompasses air traffic service providers and certified aerodromes

as well as approved training organisations that are exposed to safety risks during the provision of their services, aircraft operators, approved maintenance organisations,

organisations responsible for type design and/or manufacture of aircraft, as applicable.

SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS GUIDANCE

MATERIALS

RISK BASED, DATA DRIVEN SYSTEMATIC APPROACH

TO SAFETY

Complimentary to core SMS activities, evolving safety

thinking is to move from an events-based approach to safety

(including runway safety) to a comprehensive data-driven,

risk-based approach. In so doing, more focus will be given

to proactive, leading safety indicators and other systemic

issues (related to the prevention of runway incursions)

and will supplement the traditional, reactive approach to

safety. A change of approach that shifts the focus from

“what went wrong” to an analysis of “what went right” can

provide valuable insights and a better understanding of

the everyday (positive) things that contribute towards safe

operations rather than a reliance on the still relatively few

occurrences that have a negative impact on safety.

Note: The EUROCONTROL documents, “From Safety I to Safety

II – A White Paper” and “Systems Thinking for Safety: Ten

Principles A White Paper – Moving Towards Safety II” provide

more information about this approach. These documents

should be addressed only for the aviation undertakings whose

SMS have already reached an excellent maturity level.

ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SMS

IMPLEMENTATION

To assess the effectiveness of their SMS implementation

regarding runway incursions, aviation undertakings should

at least focus on the following SMS related issues:

 Change management:

The aerodrome operator and the local air navigation

service provider should take special attention while

conducting changes on the platform that have an

impact on runway safety. While conducting the safety

impact assessment study, a representative subset

of the relevant actors on which the change has an

impact should be included in the team in charge of its

elaboration. These actors include when relevant the

platform’s users and the ground handlers. Furthermore,

the aerodrome operator and the local air navigation

service provider should ensure that all the measures

decided in the safety impact assessment study are

effectively in place.

 Just culture:

The aerodrome operator should ensure that just culture

is in place among the subcontractors that operate

works that have an impact on runway safety.

 Occurrences management:

The analysis of a serious occurrence related to runway

safety should be systematically conducted by the

aviation undertakings. Furthermore, when actions

related to this analysis are decided, a control loop

assessing the effective implementation of these actions

should be present in the SMS of the concerned aviation

undertaking.

 Interfaces management:

The aerodrome operator and the local air navigation

service provider should have contacts with a

representative subset of the relevant stakeholders

that have an impact on runway safety, including the

subcontractors and the platform’s users. Particularly, a

representative subset of platform’s users should actively

participate to the aerodrome local Runway Safety Team

(RST) meetings.

 Communication/Training:

The aviation undertaking should ensure that all the

stakeholders that have an impact on runway safety are

aware and trained to address runway safety issues.

100

Manage Aerodrome Information

NOTAM and AIP Supplement

Data Quality Management

Data Consistency and Completeness

Single European Sky Regulation

Post-Flight Information

Designation and Publication of Hot Spots in States AIP

Digital Aeronautical Information Management

Interoperability from Original Data Source to End User

APPENDIX H

AERONAUTICAL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

101

102

APPENDIX H

AERONAUTICAL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT GUIDANCE

Accurate aerodrome charts providing relevant information

for the pilot, manoeuvring area driver and aerodrome

controller is fully acknowledged as an important

contributor to the prevention of runway incursions.

Errors contained in aerodrome charts have led to a loss

of situational awareness and ground navigation errors

by pilots and have been documented in runway accident

reports.

The following guidance material is intended to explain

further the recommendations it refers to, contained in

the European Action Plan for the Prevention of Runway

Incursions, complementing the relevant ICAO provisions.

Time critical aerodrome information that may affect

operations on or near the runway shall be provided to

pilots in real-time using radiotelephony communication,

through the Flight Information Services in accordance

to ICAO Annex 11, Air Traffic Services, Ch. 2 and 4 (see

recommendation 1.3.8).

In addition, collection, provision and dissemination of

aeronautical information should be made in accordance

with relevant ICAO provisions for Aeronautical Information

Services (AIS). Knowledge of conditions at the aerodrome

which may affect operations on or near the runway shall

without delay be reported to States AIS for appropriate

promulgation. A number of recommendations are made

in support of this objective.

EAPPRI Recommendation 1.8.1 - concerns the provision

of relevant, adequate, timely, and quality aeronautical

data and aeronautical information

Quality assurance procedures shall be implemented by

the ANSP/AISP. Adequate quality assurance procedures

should also be implemented by any organisation that

originates numerical data supporting aeronautical data

elements. EUROCONTROL guidelines are developed

supporting the implementation of Quality Management

Systems in accordance with ISO 9001.

www.eurocontrol.int/articles/quality-phase-1-p-17

The aerodrome services responsible for the provision of

raw aeronautical data shall take into account relevant

aeronautical data quality requirements, in particular on

accuracy and integrity, in accordance with applicable

ICAO SARPS (Annex 11- Air Traffic Services, Ch. 2; Annex

14 – Aerodromes, Volumes I and II – Ch. 2; Annex 15 –

Aeronautical Information Services, Ch. 3, Appendix 7; and

Annex 4 – Aeronautical Charts, Appendix 6).

Reference documents:

ICAO Annexes 4, 11, 14, 15 and Doc. 8126.

Managing aerodrome information

For promulgation of aerodrome information, States AIS

needs adequate time for the preparation, production

and issuance of relevant material. This is relevant for

promulgation of new information, permanent changes to

published information and for temporary changes. Close

coordination is therefore required between those services

concerned in origination, surveying and provision of

aerodrome data to ensure timely provision of information.

Of particular importance in the view of runway incursion

prevention are changes that affect aerodrome charts

published in the AIP (e.g. Aerodrome Chart, Aerodrome

Ground Movement Chart) and information that qualifies to

be notified by AIRAC.

The predetermined AIRAC effective dates shall be observed

by the responsible aerodrome services in the planning

of publication of aeronautical information and when

submitting aeronautical information/data to AIS.

NOTAM and AIP Supplements

Notification of temporary changes is made through

appropriate means of the Integrated Aeronautical

Information Package (IAIP) considering the period of

validity and nature of the information. AIS shall follow the

operating procedures as described by ICAO Doc. 8126 (AIS

Manual) and the EUROCONTROL Operating Procedures

for AIS Dynamic Data (OPADD). The OPADD document

provides guidance on NOTAM format and content, with the

purpose to achieve harmonisation in the NOTAM output for

the benefit of the users.

A NOTAM should not remain in force for more than three

months. When the condition issued by a NOTAM exceeds

the three month period, a new or replacement NOTAM may

be issued, but only in those cases where the condition is

expected to last for a further period of maximum one to

two months. If it is expected that the condition will last for

an additional three months or more, an AIP Supplement

shall be issued.

103

Single European Sky (SES) regulation on aeronautical

data quality (ADQ)

The Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 73/2010,

amended by 1029/2014, is laying down the requirements

on the quality of aeronautical data and information for

the single European sky, in terms of accuracy, resolution,

integrity and timeliness (ADQ). The ADQ IR is supplementing

and strengthening the requirements of the ICAO Annex 15,

Aeronautical Information Services to achieve aeronautical

data and information of sufficient quality to support current

and future flight operations.

The scope goes beyond the ANSPs/AISPs to include non-

ANSP entities. In terms of scope, the aeronautical data/

information process chain extends from original data

sources (e.g. surveyors, procedure designers, aerodrome

authorities, etc.), through AIS and publication to the end

users of data and information, either by human users

or aeronautical applications. Concerning Aerodrome

Operators, it applies for those aerodromes for which IFR or

Special-VFR procedures have been published in national

AIPs; as such procedures demand higher data quality.

More info:

www.eurocontrol.int/adq

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/

TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32010R0073

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriser

v%3AOJ.L_.2014.284.01.0009.01.ENG

This is linked to the SES implementation objective ITY-

ADQ – Ensure quality of aeronautical data and aeronautical

information, which is derived from the Commission

Regulation (EU) 73/2010. The SES implementation

objective applies to ANSPs, AIS Providers, operators

of those aerodromes and heliports for which IFR or

Special-VFR procedures have been published in national

aeronautical information publications, public or private

entities providing services for the origination and provision

of survey data, procedure design services, electronic terrain

data, electronic obstacle data and manufacturing industry.

More info:

www.atmmasterplan.eu/depl/essip_objectives

Information on temporary changes of the operating

conditions at the aerodrome shall be optimized to increase

the situational awareness of the most critical changes.

When needed, AIP Supplement with graphics and charts

should be published. In general, an AIP Supplement shall

be considered for temporary changes with duration three

months or longer and for information of short duration

which contains extensive text and/or graphics.

Reference documents:

ICAO Annexes 4, 14 and 15, ICAO Doc. 8126

EUROCONTROL Operating Procedures for AIS Dynamic

Data - OPADD (Ed. 4.0)

Data quality monitoring

Compliance with the quality management system in place

shall be monitored by States AIS. AIS should for instance

monitor the departure/arrival time of the AIS products and

the time required for postal delivery, in order to adhere to

the AIRAC system. EUROCONTROL’s tool “pTracker” supports

such monitoring activities.

More info:

www.eurocontrol.int/services/ptracker-ais-publication-

postal-delivery-time-tracking-tool

Data consistency & completeness

European AIS Database (EAD) enables aeronautical

information providers to enter and maintain their data in the

repository and enables data users to retrieve and download

AIS data and AIP charts in a digital format. The quality of

data is enhanced by using international standards and data

checking procedures, including validation and verification.

EAD performs regular data quality/completeness reviews

and reports results to data providers.

More info:

www.eurocontrol.int/ead

104

Arrangements shall be made for aerodromes for collection

of information concerning the state of operations of air

navigation facilities and services noted by aircrew. These

arrangements shall ensure that the information is made

available to AIS, for distribution as the circumstances

necessitate.

Pilots should adhere to the established procedures and

reporting mechanism.

Reference documents:

ICAO Annex 6, 14 and 15

ICAO Doc 8126

Communication tools

EUROCONTROL has means in place to facilitate

communication:

 AIS AGORA” is an aeronautical information online

forum recognized globally.

www.eurocontrol.int/aisagora

 “@is online” is a collection of links about the AIS and

aeronautical information resources available on the

internet. www.eurocontrol.int/articles/ais-online

EAPPRI Recommendation 1.8.4 - concerns user

friendliness of the AIP Charts

Aerodrome charts are provided in a wide variety of

formats. Some formats are user friendly and some may

compromise pilots as they fly from one State to another,

requiring extra effort to ensure correct understanding of

the important information they contain. In particular, Hot

Spots at aerodromes need to be clearly communicated.

Note: ICAO definition of Hot Spot: A location on an

aerodrome movement area with a history or potential risk

of collision or runway incursion, where heightened attention

by pilots/drivers is necessary (ICAO Annexes 4 and Annex 14

Volume 1).

EAPPRI Recommendation 1.8.2 - concerns data

integrators/data (DAT) providers / post-AIS data providers

Once aerodrome data has been acquired to the required

quality standards, data should be protected from

corruption during collation and publication by AIS and

by all industry data preparation agencies during the

processing of data.

Involved parties should take measures to ensure that the

integrity of AISP data is preserved when ingesting and

processing this data. Processes between DAT providers

and AISP should be in place (e.g. letters of agreement

concerning data quality) with the objective to ensure that

aeronautical data is processed according to the relevant

standards.

Reference documents:

EUROCAE ED76/RTCA DO 200 (series documents),

Standards for processing Aeronautical data

EUROCAE ED 77/RTCA DO 201 (series documents),

Standards for Aeronautical Information

Commission Regulation (EU) 2017/373 Annex VII Part-DAT

(applicable January 2020).

ICAO Annex 15Aeronautical Information Services

EAPPRI Recommendation 1.8.3 - concerns the users’

feedback process and post-flight information

AISPs should as part of the Quality Management System

(QMS) establish procedures allowing for the users to

provide feedback concerning the availability and quality

of aeronautical information. A mechanism should also be

in place to ensure that the users’ queries are addressed

accordingly.

Post-flight information

Additional information/data relating to the aerodrome

of departure and any inadequacies observed shall be

reported by Aircraft Operators (ref. Annex 6, Part 1 - Ch

4 and Part II, Section II - Ch 2) and collected to enable AIS

processing of post-flight information without delay (ref.

Annex 15 and Doc. 8126 – Ch. 8 and Annex 14, Volume

1 – Ch. 9).

105

charts. This data element is stated as critical in the ICAO

Aeronautical Data Quality Requirements tables.

ICAO Annex 15 (Appendix 1) does not contain a

requirement to publish the latitude /longitude of runway

holding positions in the State AIP, Part AD, AD 2.

Nevertheless, timely and accurate information of

established runway holding positions is vital for runway

incursion prevention, and their publication in the AIP and

on (electronic) charts. Therefore geographical coordinates

of Runway holding positions should be published in

States AIP.

Similar ambiguity in ICAO SARPS, where quality

requirements have been defined but no publication

required, is observed in relation to some essential

aerodrome data elements such as geographical

coordinates of taxiway centre line points, taxiway

intersection marking line, and taxiway/runway shoulder

width.

Reference documents:

ICAO Annexes 4, 14 and 15

ICAO Doc. 8697 & Doc.9870

EAPPRI Recommendation 1.8.5 - concerns Digital

Aeronautical Information Management

The availability of digital aeronautical information

depends upon the move towards a networked data

centric environment based on common data exchange

formats, which are enabling interoperable data exchange.

The Aeronautical Information Exchange Model (AIXM),

developed by EUROCONTROL and FAA, supports the ICAO

and user requirements for aeronautical data including

obstacles, terminal procedures and aerodrome mapping

databases. The AIXM contains an exhaustive temporality

model that enables the provision of digital dynamic

updates of aeronautical information (digital NOTAM),

which in turn enables enhanced pre-flight information

briefing products and updates of digital charts (on the

ground and in the air) providing the latest information

about the aerodrome surfaces.

More info:

www.aixm.aero

Designation and publication of Hot Spot(s)

in States AIP

The respective aerodrome operator shall designate,

whenever necessary, a location or several locations on

the movement area of the aerodrome as Hot Spot(s).

Hot spot(s) shall be published in the AIP on the relevant

charts for those aerodromes with a history where there is

a potential increased risk of collision or runway incursion

and where heightened attention by pilots/drivers is

necessary.

The criteria used to establish a hot spot on a chart and

the symbols to be used are contained in ICAO Annex 4,

with more guidance provided in Annex 14 Aerodromes,

Volume 1 - Aerodrome Design and Operations, ICAO Doc.

9870 Manual on the Prevention of Runway Incursion and

ICAO Doc. 8697 Aeronautical Charts Manual.

Published hot spot information shall be clear and effective

and should consider the following charting guidance:

 Each hot spot is depicted by a clear bright red circle

and joined to a red label box, providing the assigned

designator of the hot spot if applicable (e.g. HS1, here

meaning “Hot Spot 1”).

 Large tabulated textual information elaborating the

action required of pilots in and around the hot spot.

This may be inserted on the main aerodrome diagram

or on the verso of the chart.

 Additional graphical boxes depicting the hot spots

in greater detail. These additional boxes should if

possible be linked to the relevant hot spot on the main

aerodrome diagram, by lines or arrows.

 Publish specific hot spot pages in cases where the

aerodrome diagram otherwise would be too cluttered,

to present the hot spots effectively.

 Usage of a colour-coded format assisting the depiction

of runways, hot spot areas and normal taxiways.

Publication of Runway holding positions in States AIP

ICAO defines the required publication resolution for

runway holding positions (Annex 15, App. 7 and Annex 4,

App. 6), and includes in Annex 4 provisions and symbols

for insertion of this information on relevant aeronautical

106

The Commission Regulation (EU) No. 73/2010 on

aeronautical data quality (ADQ) addresses interoperability

between the data supply chain actors from original data

sources through AIS to the next intended user.

The AMC and GM to the Commission Regulation (EU)

No. 139/2014 on aerodromes address data quality

requirements, the content of such formal arrangements

and the necessary coordination between aerodrome

operators and providers of aeronautical information

services.

EUROCONTROL has developed ADQ guidance material to

facilitate the establishment of formal arrangements and

SLAs between aeronautical data originators/providers

and AISP, with the purpose to set agreed required quality

levels of the data, the timeframe of delivery and their

format:

 ADQ Formal Arrangements (FA) Guidelines, including

templates, document structure and implementation

checklist.

More info:

www.eurocontrol.int/adq

www.eurocontrol.int/articles/adq-library

Reference Documents:

ICAO Annex 4 - Aeronautical Charts

ICAO Annex 6 - Operation of Aircraft

ICAO Annex 11 - Air Traffic Services

ICAO Annex 14 - Aerodromes, Volume 1 -

Aerodrome Design and Operations

ICAO Annex 15 - Aeronautical Information Services

ICAO Doc. 8126 - Aeronautical Information Services

Manual

ICAO Doc. 8697 - Aeronautical Chart Manual

ICAO Doc. 9870 - Manual for Preventing Runway Incursions

Commission Regulation (EU) No. 73/2010

Commission Regulation (EU) No. 139/2014

EUROCONTROL Operating Procedures for AIS Dynamic

Data – OPADD (Ed. 4.0 April 2015)

Aerodrome Mapping Databases (AMDB) is one of

the fundamental developments to runway incursion

prevention. ICAO Annex 15 includes since 2013 provisions

to States on aerodrome mapping data requirements

for provision and aerodrome mapping data product

specification, and AMDB dataset content and structure.

This enables States AISPs, airlines and aerodromes to

move towards a business driven collaborative information

sharing environment.

In order to enable collaborative runway incursion

prevention applications, it is recommended to create

common on-line aerodrome mapping services based

on the EUROCAE ED-99 series Aerodrome mapping

standard. The implementation should follow a services

oriented approach. This will enable on-line access of

shared Hot Spot information and electronic display in e.g.

on-board Electronic Flight Bags and technologies used

by operational staff on the maneuvering area, enabling

an enhanced and common situational awareness at the

aerodrome.

More info:

www.eurocontrol.int/aim

www.eurocontrol.int/articles/AMDB

Reference documents:

EUROCAE ED-99/RTCA DO-272 (series documents)

"User requirements for airport mapping"

It specifies the user requirements for aerodrome mapping

database content and quality. The document forms the

basis for an RTCA/EUROCAE specification effort related to

the creation of a common database interchange standard

for aerodrome mapping.

EAPPRI Recommendation 1.8.6 - concerns formal

arrangements between aerodrome operators and AISP

for provision of quality assured aeronautical data and/or

aeronautical information.

The aerodrome operator determines, documents and

maintains, as appropriate, data relevant to the aerodrome

and available services. This data should be provided to the

users and relevant ATS and AIS providers.

Formal arrangements shall be established between the

aerodrome operators and the AISP in order to support

and enable exchange of the relevant aeronautical data

and/or aeronautical information with the required quality

and integrity.

107

108

Aerodromes

Background

Military aviation and runway incursions

EAPPRI and military

Aerodrome Operator

One aerodrome, two authorities

Mixed Type of Flight

Mixed Type of Aircraft

Radio Equipment and Procedures

Aerodrome Markings

Use of the Runway Lights

Ad Hoc allocation of military staff at civil aerodrome

Conclusion

APPENDIX I

GUIDANCE FOR JOINTUSE CIVIL/MILITARY

109

110

APPENDIX I GUIDANCE FOR JOINT USE AERODROMES 

CIVILMILITARY

BACKGROUND

One approach to increasing airport capacity is to operate

from joint-use aerodromes. A number of communities

see the opening of military airbases for civilian use as an

opportunity for local economies. Joint-use aerodromes

may be used for the training/flight checking of airline pilots

or as bases for technical and test flights.

There are already numerous joint-use aerodromes, hosting

different types of military aviation within ECAC. A number

of air forces share aerodrome facilities with civil entities

accommodating traffic which is both military and civil,

domestic and international.

To support overseas operations, the military, very often

as a part of multinational operations, use civil aerodrome

facilities either as short-term refuelling stop aerodromes or

as temporary bases.

The regulatory position varies from State to State. There

is no agreed pan-European definition of a joint-use

aerodrome; actual use differs among the States.

However, the European Union Regulation (EC) No 216/2008

in the field of aerodromes, air traffic management and

air navigation service refers to the military (in particular,

equipment, and organisations that are controlled by the

military.

). Member States shall, as far as practicable, ensure

that any military facilities open to public use, (aerodrome or

part therefore) or services provided by military personnel to

the public (ATM/ANS), offer a level of safety that is at least

as effective as that required by the essential requirements

of the European Union.

In addition, the EUROCONTROL Guidelines Supporting

the Civil Use of Military Aerodromes (CUMA) highlight the

key institutional, legal, financial, technical and operational

issues. CUMA proposes a set of recommendations to

support the national decision making process. For the

purposes of this document, a joint-use aerodrome is

either a civil aerodrome used regularly by military traffic

or a military aerodrome used regularly by civil traffic. An

aerodrome (ICAO term) and an airfield (military term)

should be considered as synonyms.

MILITARY AVIATION AND RUNWAY INCURSIONS

The military aviation community is not immune from

runway incursions. EUROCONTROL collects runway

incursion reports on a yearly basis. The operational data

confirms the involvement of military aircraft in runway

incursions within the ECAC area. The reports verify the

military aircraft’s involvement regardless of types of

operations and types of flight rules.

Military personnel can therefore contribute to the

prevention of runway incursions. Like all staff operating

on the manoeuvring area, military personnel, need to be

aware of the potential hazards.

ICAO Annex 13 defines responsibility for the investigation

of runway incursions involving civilian assets/persons. The

reporting of runway incursions in civil aviation is mandated

for EU members

The prevention / investigation / reporting of runway

incursions involving only military is a state responsibility.

In accordance with ESARR 2

, reporting is mandated for

the military in all occurrences where:

 Civil Air Traffic Services is providing service to military

aircraft, and

 Military Air Traffic Services and/or Air Defence are

providing service to civil aircraft.

EAPPRI AND MILITARY

In respect of the application of EAPPRI recommendations,

the military should be involved as:

 Regulator: military aviation authority (MAA) or

equivalent national regulatory body;

 Aerodrome operator: military aerodrome and military

unit co-located with a civilian aerodrome;

 ANSP: where the military provides aerodrome air traffic

services to civil airspace users;

2. See Article 1 of Regulation (EC) No 216/2008

3. Commission Regulation (EU) No 376/2014 on the reporting, analysis and follow-up of occurrences in civil aviation

4. EUROCONTROL Safety ATM Regulatory Requirements

111

The civil and/or military aerodrome regulator may perform

the task of re-certifying an aerodrome, and may clarify roles

and responsibilities.

MIXED TYPE OF FLIGHT

Joint-use aerodromes facilitate both types of flights, civil

and military. The majority of applicable ICAO provisions

are identical, although differences may be found regarding

procedures for formation flying or other military functions.

The application of different types of procedure could create

confusion during aerodrome operations.

For instance, as per Recommendation 1.10.9, conditional

clearances should not be used for civilian traffic during

military formation flight operations. Further, during surface

movement, a formation of aircraft is considered as a single

aircraft in terms of right-of-way. When an individual aircraft

and a formation are on a converging course, a formation of

aircraft should be treated as one entity.

At present, the application of mixed aerodrome operations

requires a safety assessment by each State at each joint-use

aerodrome.

Timely and effective coordination between the various

airport entities responsible for ground operations is

important. One of the practices at joint-use aerodromes

is regular coordination between civil and military entities

facilitating mixed types of operations. The means

of coordination can range from a joint civil-military

coordination body to a liaison officer assisting with daily

coordination. In certain cases, the representative of a flying

unit is present in the tower during military operations.

MIXED TYPE OF AIRCRAFT

Civil pilots may not be able positively to identify military

aircraft types. ATC instructions involving specific military

aircraft types, e.g. “Follow F 1”, should be avoided.

 Aircraft operator: military aircraft operator based/

operating at joint use aerodromes, i.e. where the

aerodrome operator is civilian and the Air Traffic

Services provider is civilian.

Note that for some States there is one regulator responsible

for all ATM matters, civil and military, and in others there

may be two regulators with discrete civil or military

responsibilities.

With the support of civil and military stakeholders,

EUROCONTROL has identified some specific factors

causing and contributing to runway incursions at joint-use

aerodromes, by collecting experiences on a voluntary basis.

The current EAPPRI recommendations have been reviewed

in the light of the needs of joint-use aerodromes and

recommendations for the Prevention of Runway Incursions

at Joint-Use Aerodromes developed.

AERODROME OPERATOR

There are three main areas at aerodromes where civil and

military operations interact: the apron, the manoeuvring

area and approach/terminal airspace.

There are joint-use aerodromes where one aerodrome

operator (civil or military) is wholly responsible for

manoeuvring area operations. There are also joint-use

aerodromes where more than one aerodrome operator

is responsible for a specific segment of the aerodrome

movement area.

To clarify roles and responsibilities, one of the aerodrome

operators should take the lead in the coordination of the

application of EAPPRI recommendations.

When implementing CUMA, the civil aerodrome operator

should verify and assess differences between the

existing services and infrastructure and the related ICAO

provisions; such differences should be notified by means of

Aeronautical Information

5. EUROCONTROL Guidelines Supporting the Civil Use of Military Aerodromes

112

phraseology, aerodrome signs, lights and markings. They

will also be unfamiliar with local aerodrome procedures.

Moreover, because of the regular rotation of military

personnel, local familiarisation training is required.

CONCLUSION

 Military aviation is not immune from runway incursions.

Military personnel can therefore contribute to the

prevention of runway incursions. One way of achieving

appropriate awareness is through participation in an

aerodrome local Runway Safety Team.

 Even though the majority of ICAO recommendations

are directly applicable, there are some particular points

with regard to joint-use aerodromes covered by EAPPRI

only.

 The civil and military authorities responsible for flight

safety at the aerodrome should identify the potential

risk regarding the unauthorised use of the runway and

other portions of the manoeuvring area and implement

measures to prevent events resulting in potential or

actual runway incursions

 States may consider implementing recommendations

and guidance material identified in EAPRRI for their

application at joint-use aerodromes.

REFERENCES:

1) ICAO Annex 13 Aircraft Accident and Incident

Investigation

2) ICAO Doc. 4444, PANS-ATM, Part IV

3) EU Regulation (EC) No 216/2008

4) Commission Regulation (EU) No 376/2014 on the

reporting, analysis and follow-up of occurrences in civil

aviation

5) EUROCONTROL Guidelines Supporting the Civil Use of

Military Aerodromes; Edition 1.0

6) EUROCONTROL Safety ATM Regulatory Requirements

(ESARR2)

RADIO EQUIPMENT AND PROCEDURES

Even though the majority of military aircraft are VHF/UHF

radio equipped, military aircraft very often operate using

UHF. Civilian aircraft use VHF only.

Simultaneous aerodrome operations using different

frequencies are a known practice at joint-use aerodromes,

and may lead to communication breakdowns and reduced

situation awareness.

Special procedures are applied, e.g. TWR/GND transmission

on both VHF and UHF frequencies, and cross-coupled VHF

and UHF frequencies.

Military pilots and controllers may use non-standard ICAO

phraseology. Very often, a domestic language is in use at

national joint-use aerodromes. There are also instances in

which approved R/T phraseology means different things to

civil and military pilots.

Both practices could cause a breakdown in communication

and reduce situation awareness.

AERODROME MARKINGS

A number of markings around military aerodromes may

be different from the ICAO standards. Some of them are

outside the movement area for civil aircraft; however, those

which are visible to civil pilots/drivers could lead to pilot or

vehicle driver navigation error.

USE OF THE RUNWAY LIGHTS

The technical characteristics and operational procedures

for air-ground lighting at joint-use aerodromes sometimes

deviate from ICAO Annex 14 - Aerodromes, Volume 1 -

Aerodrome Design and Operations.

The application of different light-operating procedures

may reduce situation awareness on or around the runway.

AD HOC ALLOCATION OF MILITARY STAFF AT CIVIL

AERODROME

Military pilots and ground personnel, coming from all

around the world, may not be familiar with ICAO flight rules,

6. EUROCONTROL Guidelines Supporting the Civil Use of Military Aerodromes

113

114

Introduction

Light Colours and Their Meanings at Runway Entrances

Stop Bar Implementation and Use Policy

Stop Bars Operational Use

Autonomous Runway Incursion Warning Systems (ARIWS)

LEDs

‘Follow the Greens’

Conclusion

APPENDIX J

USE OF AERONAUTICAL GROUND LIGHTING THAT

PROTECTS THE RUNWAY

115

116

APPENDIX J USE OF AERONAUTICAL GROUND LIGHTING

THAT PROTECTS THE RUNWAY

INTRODUCTION

Runway incursions have been a hazard in the aviation

industry for some time. Recent technological advances

have allowed air navigation service providers (ANSPs) and

airport operators to invest in the deployment of warning

systems aimed at preventing incursions and/or mitigating

the effects of an incursion. These systems range from

traditional runway guard bars (“stop bars”) operated by

air traffic services (ATS) personnel, to more advanced

autonomous systems that are deployed or under evaluation

at various airports.

The use and colours of lights are widely accepted across

the aviation world. Clear requirements exist for the exterior

lighting of airframes to assist pilots in situational awareness

and collision avoidance. There are protocols for the lighting

of vehicles on aerodromes, obstacle and obstruction

lighting and for the use of warning lights on the flight deck.

Although ICAO Annex 14, Volume 1 provides for the use of

certain types of lighting to protect the runway, no specific

priority or meaning is attached to these lights. A proposed

definition and priority is one purpose of this appendix.

Light Colours and Their Meanings at Runway Entrances (see

table below)

1. RED lights ahead of an aircraft or vehicle mean: it is

unsafe to proceed beyond the RED lights. This is the case

regardless of whether the lights are fixed, alternating

or flashing and is independent of an ATC clearance.

RED means STOP!

2. YELLOW lights are used to convey a similar but less

distinct message. They indicate that a potential hazard

exists beyond the lights, but that in conjunction with an

appropriate ATC clearance it will be safe to proceed.

3. GREEN lights are often used to indicate the route to be

followed by an aircraft or vehicle, particularly at night

or in periods of reduced visibility. In all cases green

lights are a routing aid and must only be followed in

conjunction with an ATC clearance.

Light Colour

(in order of priority)

ATC Operational use Meaning for the pilot or

manoeuvring area driver

Example

RED

May be manually or

automatically switched

and/or deselected in

conjunction with an ATC

clearance

STOP

Pilots and drivers should

contact ATC and await or

confirm clearance; NEVER

CROSS RED LIGHTS

Runway Stop Bars

YELLOW

None CAUTION

Runway ahead, do you

have an ATC clearance to

proceed?

Runway Guard Lights

GREEN

May be manually or

automatically switched

and/or deselected in

conjunction with an ATC

clearance

PROCEED

Only in conjunction with an

ATC clearance

Taxiway Centreline

Guidance

117

 Where the in-pavement stop bar lights might be

obscured from a pilot’s view, for example, by snow or

rain.

 Where a pilot may be required to stop the aircraft in

a position so close to the lights that they are blocked

from view by the structure of the aircraft.

These lights should be visible to approaching aircraft up to

the stop bar position.

When planning to implement stop bars, it is important to

acknowledge the potential cost. Therefore, it should be

taken into consideration that:

 Stop bars located across entrance taxiways are

selectively switchable.

 Stop bars located across taxiways intended to be used

only as exit taxiways are switchable selectively or in

groups.

 Stop bars should be interlocked with the first 90 meters

taxiway centre lights beyond the stop bar so that when

centre line lights beyond the stop bar are illuminated

the stop bar is extinguished and vice versa.

 The light´s electrical system should be designed so that

all lights of a stop bar will not fail at the same time.

In the event of stop bars failing in the illuminated state,

appropriate contingency procedures are required. For

example, those specified in GM1 SERA.3210 (d) (3) Right-of-

way:

“When considering contingency arrangements for situations

where the stop bars cannot be turned off because of a

technical problem, the air traffic service provider should take

into account that such contingency arrangements should

significantly differ from normal operations and should not

undermine the principle that a lit stop bar must not be crossed."

Air Traffic Control, together with Aerodrome Operators,

should operate the lights on or near a runway so that a

pilot or manoeuvring area vehicle driver is never instructed

to enter, cross, or use a runway counter to the meaning

of the lights described here. Especially, Flight crews and

manoeuvring area vehicle drivers should not be instructed

to cross illuminated stop bars.

Pilots and manoeuvring area vehicle drivers shall never

cross red lights nor enter, cross, or use a runway without a

valid ATC clearance to do so.

Recommendation 1.2.14 states “Regularly assess the

operational use of aeronautical ground lighting e.g.

stop bars, to ensure a robust policy to protect the

runway from the incorrect presence of traffic”.

For this purpose, the following should be taken into

consideration.

Consider the benefits of using technology as a safety net

to provide immediate and simultaneous runway and

traffic proximity alerts for Pilots, Air Traffic Controllers and

Manoeuvring Area Vehicles and to help to protect the

runway. Systems such as Stop bars, No-entry bars, Runway

Guard Lights (RGL) and ARIWS/RWSL, that protect the

runway should be ICAO and, as appropriate, EU compliant.

Check aerodrome lighting from different heights to

replicate driver and cockpit views/perspectives.

STOP BARS  IMPLEMENTATION POLICY

Stop bars and runway guard lights that protect the runway

should be EU and ICAO compliant. Consider using stop bars

and runway guard lights at all runway holding positions

under all weather conditions (24 hours a day) to help

prevent runway incursions.

Consider installing extra lights, uniformly, to enhance

conspicuity of an existing stop bar.

Consider adding a pair of elevated lights to each end of the

stop bar:

 To enhance their conspicuity to pilots and manoeuvring

area drivers when needed.

118

 To provide an interface at the TWR so that:

 Stop bars can be individually selectable by the

runway controller.

 The number of inputs (clicks) to switch on and

to switch off the stop bar should be reduced to a

minimum.

 The interface´s screen should be available from

the controller position in an ergonomic way so the

controller does not have to turn his/her head and

body significantly.

AUTONOMOUS RUNWAY INCURSION

WARNING SYSTEMS

Consider the Implementation of an Autonomous Runway

Incursion Warning Systems (ARIWS), for example Runway

Status Lights (RWSL), which have been developed to deliver

automatic warnings and runway status indications to pilots

and manoeuvring area vehicle drivers.

The operation of an ARIWS is based upon a surveillance

system which monitors the actual situation on a runway

and automatically returns this information to warning

lights at the runway (take-off) thresholds and entrances.

 When an aircraft is departing from a runway (rolling) or

arriving at a runway (short final), red warning lights at

the entrances will illuminate, indicating that it is unsafe

to enter or cross the runway.

 When an aircraft is aligned on the runway for take-off

and another aircraft or vehicle enters or crosses the

runway, red warning lights will illuminate indicating

that it is unsafe to start the take-off roll.

Thus, in accordance with the principles presented in this

appendix, when ARIWS lights are triggered, pilots and

drivers are presented with a globally consistent signal

which means “STOP IMMEDIATELY”.

LEDS

Consider the use of LED lighting as they enhance the pilot

and driver experience with a more precise colour and a

higher apparent luminance.

The service provider may consider, inter alia, the following:

(a) physically disconnecting the respective lit stop bar from its

power supply;

(b) physically obscuring the lights of the lit stop bar; or

the aircraft to cross the lit stop bar.”

In addition, stop bar contingency plans may include

closing the taxiway where the failure happened and

using an alternative, suitable runway holding position

equipped with a functioning stop bar. Exceptionally, ATC

may instruct pilot to cross/enter the runway with a specific

clearance given by ATC to cross an illuminated stop bar due

to a malfunction of the system and a specific read back of

crossing an illuminated stop bar due to a malfunction of the

system.

The objective is to maintain the integrity of the stop bars,

which are intended to protect the runway at any airport the

pilot may fly to.

Access to active and non-active runways requires a specific

ATC clearance to enter or cross the runway. An extinguished

stop bar, or any other red light, on its own does NOT

constitute a clearance to enter or cross a runway.

STOP BARS  OPERATIONAL USE

When planning to implement stop bars, it is important

to acknowledge the potential ATC workload increase.

Therefore, it should be taken into consideration:

 To manage the length of time the stop bar is

extinguished to ensure:

 That aircraft and vehicles have crossed them prior to

their re-illumination.

 When conditional clearances are in use to avoid

the incorrect presence of a second aircraft or other

traffic on the runway.

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'FOLLOW THE GREENS’

Consider the use of lighting systems that provide taxiway

routing guidance e.g. so-called ‘Follow The Greens’

technology which are seen as beneficial to navigating on

the ground by pilots to prevent misrouting.

CONCLUSIONS

Defining the meaning and priority of lights as described in

this Appendix is the first step in identifying categories and

types of system.

To achieve the main aim of this work and despite advances

in recent years, the delivery of a consistent level of service

regarding the use of lights that protect the runway around

the world is needed. Next steps include the:

 Promotion of international standards for the use of lights

that protect the runway and associated procedures.

 Development of global requirements necessary to

ensure consistent use of lights that protect the runway.

 Enhancement of procedures and relevant training for

all operational staff working on the manoeuvring area.

 Coherent integration of ground, ATC and aircraft

systems in the future.

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Introduction

Aerodrome Design Principles

Aerodrome Infrastructure Naming

Other

APPENDIX K

AERODROME DESIGN GUIDANCE FOR THE PREVENTION

OF RUNWAY INCURSIONS

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APPENDIX K AERODROME DESIGN GUIDANCE FOR THE

PREVENTION OF RUNWAY INCURSIONS

INTRODUCTION

Recommendation 1.2.12 states “New aerodrome

infrastructure and changes to existing infrastructure

should be designed to reduce the likelihood of runway

incursions”.

This recommendation is consistent with Commission

Regulation (EU) No139/2014 and its guidance materials on

aerodrome design (GM1 ADR-DSN.D.240).

Indeed, airfield design has a significant impact on the

likelihood of runway incursions, and on the severity of

their consequences. Complex geometries are a source of

confusion and incidents. Suitable aerodrome design can

dramatically reduce the risk of a runway incursion whilst

enabling operations efficiency and enhancing aerodrome

capacity.

The design principles suggested in this guidance material

can be applied to new aerodrome infrastructure and

changes to existing infrastructure. In either case, it is

essential to include all stakeholders in the decision making

and change management process, especially airlines/

pilots and ATC; aerodrome local Runway Safety Teams can

provide a conduit for this consultation. The efforts of airfield

geometry improvement shall be prioritised following a

risk-based approach. The areas treated in priority should

be those of higher risk, as identified by the airport and

ANSP Safety Risk Management (SRM), using a quantitative/

probabilistic method (aeronautical study), accident and

incident records (statistics), or the local experience. Lessons

learned and good practices from other airports are also a

good source for identifying the infrastructure requiring

corrective actions.

The key objectives when designing airfield infrastructure

should be to simplify the geometry and minimise the

constraints on the operations, whatever the type of traffic

and the location of the aerodrome. The airfield layout

and the visual aids should be conspicuous and easy to

understand, for both the air crews and the airfield drivers.

The infrastructure should comply with the standards for

the largest, most frequent aircraft type (commonly called

“design aircraft”) as specified in the terms of the Aerodrome

Operating Certificate. Occasionally, it may be possible to

accommodate a more demanding aircraft based on a safety

study, and operational procedures when appropriate. More

generally, infrastructure and procedures together should be

suitable for all the aircraft intended to use each aerodrome.

AERODROME DESIGN PRINCIPLES

Runway entrances

Air crews need an unobstructed view of the runway, in both

directions to the thresholds, to confirm that the runway

and its approach are clear of conflicting traffic before

proceeding to enter onto this runway. To provide this clear

view, runway entrances should be perpendicular to the

runway as far as practicable. When this is not technically

achievable, the pilots must have a direct view from the

cockpit to the runway and its approach when crossing the

holding positions and entering onto the runway. The use of

“RUNWAY AHEAD” (white on red) surface markings - whilst

not ICAO compliant - to supplement signs and lighting,

enhances situational awareness of pilots and drivers and

has proved to be beneficial runway incursion prevention

measure at many (but not all) aerodromes.

The lack of visibility due to an alignment of a runway by

a Rapid Exit Taxiway (RET) was a contributive factor in

a runway incursion which led to a collision in May 2000

at CDG.

Multiple taxiway entrances at one location, also known as

Y-shaped connectors, increase the risk of confusion and

often reduce the visibility from the taxiway to the runway.

More generally, limiting the options available to pilots on

each entrance (or exit) helps to avoid confusions.

It is recommended to implement taxiway widths adapted

to the aviation traffic of the aerodrome, and in compliance

with the standards for the design aircraft (cf. CS ADR-DSN

Chapter D). Wide (nonstandard) taxiway entrances reduce

the effectiveness of signs and markings as aids to prevent

ground routing error and the infringement of the runway

protections. As per Recommendation 1.2.16a, closely

spaced multiple parallel runway holding positons on the

same taxiway should be avoided. The creation of islands

with the use of artificial turf, green painting, or zebra

markings is a good practice for clearly segregating the

routes and optimising the perception of the visual aids

preventing runway incursions.

These visual aids are primarily the runway-holding position

marking, the mandatory instruction markings and signs,

and the enhanced taxiway centreline markings (CS ADR-

DSN Chapters L and N).

7. http://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/SH33_/_MD83,_Paris_CDG_France,_2000

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Note: EASA GM1 ADR – DSN.M.745 states that “Active runway

is to consider any runway or runways currently being used for

take-off or landing. When multiple runways are used, they are

all considered active runways.”

Taxiway crossing active runways

Airfield design should avoid configurations including

crossing a runway as a basic route for gaining access to

another part of the aerodrome. This is not easily achievable

for instance when an airport is developed on both sides of

a runway, or on multi-runway systems with Closely Space

Parallel Runways (CSPR).

It is possible to significantly reduce the number of aircraft

crossing with a taxiway bypassing the entire runway. Such

an infrastructure is called a perimeter taxiway (PT) or an End

Around Taxiways (EAT).

End Around Taxiway can contribute to reduce the Runway

Occupancy Time (ROT), taxi time and congestion on the

manoeuvring area, as the time spent waiting for crossing a

runway during peak hours can be considerable.

Sufficient space is required between the by-passed runway

and the EAT centreline where it crosses under the approach

or takeoff path, in order to enable aircraft to taxi while aircraft

are operating from and to the runway. The specifications for

Runway End Safety Areas (RESA), and possible interference

with the ILS and other radio navigation aids should also

be taken into account. The EAT should route traffic behind

the localiser (LLZ) antenna, and not between the localiser

antenna and the runway in order to allow simultaneous taxi

on the EAT and precision approaches or LVTO.

Note: Depending on the topography of the runway and EAT,

an aircraft taking-off and facing the perimeter taxiway can

believe that another aircraft using this taxiway is performing

a runway incursion (or the opposite). Research efforts show

that in this case, a screen between the runway end and the EAT

prevent confusions.

Fig 4: ntroduction of islands for separating access taxiways

On a multi-runway system, including convergent or

crossing runways, a particular attention should be given to

taxiway design in order to avoid confusions between the

runways. As far as practicable, two runways intersecting at

one of their extremity should be clearly separated (EASA CS

ADR-DSN Chapter D).

Rapid Exit Taxiways

Rapid Exit Taxiways (RET) are designed to be runway exits

only. The acute angle between the Rapid Exit Taxiway and

the runway axis does not provide a line of sight from the

cockpit backward to the active runway extremity. “NO

ENTRY” mandatory instruction markings and signs should

be used to prevent incursions on RET.

RET should be long enough for an aircraft to decelerate

down to the taxi speed prior to join any other taxiway. A

RET should meet with a parallel taxiway, and never end

directly onto another active runway (that is used for take-

off/landing).

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When runway/taxiway crossings cannot be avoided, avoid

using mid- locations where departing aircraft have too

much energy to stop, but not enough speed to take-off and

clear an intruding aircraft or vehicle.

Taxiway centerline design should allow the aircraft to be

perpendicular to the runway, thereby providing a clear line

of sight to the active runway extremity.

Long, straight taxiways accessing to or crossing runway

should be avoided, or replaced by ‘zig-zags’.

For example, move from the ‘straight’ configuration on the

left to the 'zig-zag' configuration on the right.

Fig 5: End Around Taxiway by-passing Threshold 04R at Detroit-Wayne Intl. Airport (DTW)

Fig 6: End Around Taxiway example screen

Fig 7: Introduction of a zig-zag for preventing runway incursion

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Different taxiways on the same aerodrome should not have

the same or similar designations especially on different

sides of the same runway. No taxiway should be left without

a designation.

Taxiway names should be the shortest possible, and

use single-letter and single-digit designations as far as

practicable. However, it is not always possible to name all

taxiways in such manner at large aerodromes. There, main

taxiways should be designated by single letters. At large

aerodromes, connectors could be named based on the

main routes they connect (e.g. AB1, AB2, AB3 connecting

taxiways A and B).

Another logic should be used for the taxiways that connect

to the runway in order to reduce potential confusion. For

instance, the names can be derived from the letter of the

full parallel taxiway, when existing (e.g. P1, P2, P3 between

taxiway P and the runway. A taxiway crossing a runway

should not have the same name on each side of the

runway, in order to clarify holding short instructions and

prevent misunderstandings leading to runway incursions.

In addition to these best practices, rules can be adopted

locally for highlighting the difference between straight

taxiways and Rapid Exit Taxiways on a same runway side,

especially when their geometry does not reflect explicitly

their status (e.g. angled non-RET access taxiway). For

instance, a different letter can be used (e.g. P1, P2, P3 for

the straight taxiways and Q1, Q2, Q3 for the RET).

OTHER

Lines of sight from the air traffic control tower

The Air Traffic Control Tower should be located such that

it has good visibility of surface movements of aircraft and

vehicles, without any visual restrictions.

However, when there are areas with no direct visibility from

the ATC Tower, these may be published in an AIP Aerodrome

chart. When these areas include runway holding points,

cameras to provide controllers with a direct vision of the

holding point should be implemented; other aerodrome

surveillance systems such as A-SMGCS can also present

additional information to controllers.

Miscellaneous

 Runways should not be designed to be used as

occasional taxiways and vice versa.

In the catastrophic collision of a Boeing 747-400 with

a construction site at Taipei Taoyuan in October 2000,

the aircraft mistook a full parallel taxiway under poor

conditions of visibility, to be the active runway. This

taxiway was widened in order to serve as an occasional

runway.

 When practicable, permanently disused taxiways and

roadways should be removed to prevent mis-routings

and incursions. If left in place, the taxiway must be closed

with ICAO compliant markings, signs and lighting. It

must be shown and identified as decommissioned for

navigation purposes on the aerodrome map/chart.

 The Air Traffic Control Tower should be located to allow

the controllers to maintain a continuous watch on all

flight operations on and in the vicinity of an aerodrome

as well as vehicles and personnel on the manoeuvring

area.

 Parallel taxiways (to the runway) minimise the time

aircraft stay on the runway.

 Service roads should not intersect runways thereby

minimizing the risk of a vehicle to infringe the runway

protections without prior authorization. When a

direct access is provided for RFF vehicles, conspicuous

roadway markings and signage should clearly restrict

its use by other vehicles and ATC should be contacted

before entry.

AERODROME INFRASTRUCTURE NAMING

Convention

Taxiways should be designated in a simple and logical

manner that is instinctive to pilots and manoeuvring area

vehicle drivers. Taxiway and infrastructure designations

should be the shortest possible. The complexity of the

airfield layout at large airports should be addressed through

collaborative, comprehensive Safety Risk Management

(SRM) processes. The naming of taxiways should follow

ICAO recommendations.

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Maintenance

Inspections

Works in Progress

Temporary modifications of the aerodrome

Aerodrome geometry

Visual aids (taxiways)

Prevention of runway incursions from roadway accesses

Briefing and supervision of Contractors/Works Staff

Aerodrome Operations – Protected Areas

APPENDIX L

MAINTENANCE, INSPECTIONS, WORKS IN PROGRESS/

TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS OF THE AERODROME

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128

APPENDIX L AERODROME OPERATOR  MAINTENANCE,

INSPECTIONS, WORKS IN PROGRESS/TEMPORARY MODIFI

CATIONS OF THE AERODROME

MAINTENANCE

Recommendation 1.2.1a: Assess the implementation

of ICAO Annex 14, Volume 1 and EU provisions and

implement maintenance programmes relating to

Runway operations e.g. markings, lighting and signage.

Ensure that signs and markings are clearly visible,

adequate and unambiguous in all relevant conditions.

Reviews should take place in different weather and light

conditions to assess all runway entrances and visual aids to

check that they are correctly located and clearly visible to

pilots and drivers. Lights, signs and markings are checked for

conspicuity at a height similar to the height of the smallest

and largest aircraft and vehicles using the manoeuvring

area; all markings and signs should be adequate for and

understandable by all parties, with no possible ambiguity

of their meaning.

The use of cameras on a vehicle that is driven all around the

movement area has proven to be useful. The same process

can be repeated in different weather conditions and with

the cameras set at different heights.

INSPECTIONS

Recommendation 1.2.11: Aerodrome Operators, in

conjunction with ANSPs, should review procedures for

inspections

In order to prevent runway incursions, the aerodrome

operator should have procedures in place for conducting

runway inspections, including direction of runway

inspection, communication procedures, actions in case of

communication failure or vehicle breakdown, stop bars

crossing, runway crossings, etc.

Commission Regulation (EU) No 139/2014 AMC2 ADR.

OPS.B.015 (c) says:

A monitoring and inspection programme of the movement

area should be established which is commensurate with

the traffic expected at the aerodrome and the size and

complexity of the aerodrome, in order to identify any

default or potential hazards to the safety of aircraft or

aerodrome operations.

Several types of inspections are normally performed:

a) Daily inspections, which provide an overview of the

general condition of all movement area and facilities,

covering items such as the presence of FOD, the status

of visual aids, wildlife and current surface conditions,

etc.

b) Regular inspections, which are part of the preventive

maintenance of the aerodrome, are more detailed

checks of the condition on the movement area and its

associated facilities.

c) Extra inspections should be carried following

the completion of works, a reported incident, a

Pilot/ATC report and during or after excessive

weather events (excessive heat, freeze and

thaw periods, following a significant storm, etc;

Inspectors should use checklists covering the various

inspection areas. A sketch of the aerodrome may

accompany the checklist so that the location of

problems can be marked for easy identification.

When it is anticipated that inspections – or other activities

- on the runway will be prolonged, the adoption of an ’Ops

Normal’ type call (e.g. “Call Sign still on runway 23”) at a

specific interval e.g. every 5 minutes from the driver to ATC

to remind them of their presence on the runway may be

considered.